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Recent Cases
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE EFFECT OF TENURE
ON PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS' SUBSTANTIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS
Perry v. Sindermann1
Board of Regents v. Roth2
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been some debate in the academic community
concerning the extent of constitutional protections afforded public school
teachers. Much of this debate has focused on the following questions: (1)
What substantive and procedural rights does the fourteenth amendment
guarantee to public school teachers; and (2) what effect, if any, does
tenure8 have on these rights? Two recent United States Supreme Court de-
isions4 provide some answers to these questions. This note will consider
the effect of these two decisions on the substantive and procedural rights
of both tenured and nontenured teachers.
II. THE SiNDERMANN CASE
Robert Sindermann had been employed for 10 years in the Texas state
college system and had spent the last 4 years at Odessa Junior College under
a series of 1-year contracts. Although there was no formal tenure system at
the junior college, there existed a possible basis upon which de facto tenure
could be found.5 During his last contractual term, Sindermann became in-
volved in public disagreements with the college's Board of Regents. The
1. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
2. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
3. Tenure is a job security device. It has been defined as assurance to an
experienced faculty member that he may expect to continue in his academic posi-
tion unless adequate cause for dismissal is shown in a fair hearing following estab-
lished procedures of due process. Tenure is granted after a probationary period of
anywhere from two to seven years.
4. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593 (1972).
5. The alleged de facto tenure is based on the following language in the
junior college's official faculty guide:
Teacher Tenure: Odessa College has no tenure system. The Administration
of the College wishes the faculty member to feel that he has permanent
tenure as long as his teaching services are satisfactory and as long as he
displays a cooperative attitude toward his co-workers and his superiors,
and as long as he is happy in his work.
408 U.S. at 600. Some reliance is also placed on guidelines issued by the Co-ordinat-
ing Board of the Texas College and University System that indicate that one who
has been employed as a teacher in the state college and university system for seven
or more years has some fonn of job tenure. See CO-ORD NATiNG BOARD OF THE TEXAs
COLLEGE AND UNIvERsnTY SYsTEm, Poucy PAPER 1 (1967).
(279)
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Board voted not to renew his contract when it expired in May, 1969. The
Board never informed Sindermann of the reasons why his contract was
not renewed, nor did it grant him the opportunity for a hearing at which
he could challenge the nonrenewal. Sindermann filed suit in federal dis-
trict court, alleging (1) that the nonrenewal infringed upon his constitu-
tionally protected right to free speech because it was based upon his pub-
lic criticism of the Board, and (2) that the Board's failure to grant him an
opportunity for a hearing on his nonrenewal violated procedural due
process as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
The district court granted summary judgment for the Board of Regents.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that despite
Sindermann's lack of tenure, nonrenewal violated his substantive rights if
the Board's decision was based upon Sindermann's exercise of first amend-
ment rights.6 The court of appeals also held that if Sindermann could show
an "expectancy" of reemployment, failure to grant him a hearing would
violate procedural due process.7 The court remanded both issues for trial.
On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the court of appeals's
decision on the substantive issue was affirmed, but the Court expressly
disagreed with the appellate court's decision that procedural due process
protects the mere "expectancy" of reemployment. 8 Nevertheless, the Court
stated that Sindermann should have had an opportunity to prove the exist-
ence of de facto tenure, and remanded the case to the district court for a
determination of that issue. As explained in part V of this note, the
existence of de facto tenure would provide Sindermann with a property
right in continued employment, which is protected by procedural due
process.
III. THE RoTH CASE
Roth involved a teacher without tenure who was hired by the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin-Oshkosh for one academic year. Wisconsin provides pro-
cedural protection against nonrenewal for inadequate cause only under
its tenure statute, which also provides that a teacher can obtain tenure only
after a four-year probationary period.9 Roth was informed, without being
provided with an explanation or an opportunity for a hearing, that he
would not be rehired for the following year. He then filed suit in the Fed-
eral District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin alleging: (1)
That the reason for his nonrenewal was his public criticism of the uni-
versity, and thus the university's action infringed upon his first amendment
rights; and (2) that the university's failure to provide reasons for non-
renewal and an opportunity for a hearing on its decision violated his con-
stitutionally protected right to procedural due process.
The district court stayed proceedings on the first amendment issue and
6. Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939, 942-43 (5th Cir. 1970), affd, 408 U.S.
593 (1972).
7. Id. at 943-44.
8. 408 U.S. at 603.
9. Wis. STAT. § 37.31 (1) (1967), as amended, Wis. STAT. § 37.31 (1) (Supp.
1973). According to this statute, a teacher with tenure cannot be discharged except
upon written charges and pursuant to certain procedures. No protection is pro-
vided a teacher without tenure whose contract is simply not renewed.
[Vol. 58
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granted summary judgment for Roth on the procedural issue, ordering
the university to provide a hearing and a statement of reasons for non-
renewal.10 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed,1' and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court reversed, holding that
Roth had no constitutional right either to a statement of reasons or to
an opportunity for a hearing on the decision not to renew his contract.12
IV. SUBSTANTIVE CONsTrrToNAL RxIGHTS
Earlier decisions held that public employment, such as teaching, was
a privilege that could be conditioned upon waiver of constitutional rights.' 3
Erosion of this proposition began in 19521' and culminated in 1967 with
Keyishan v. Board of Regents.'5 In Keyishan, the board decided not to re-
new the one-year contract of a nontenured teacher because he failed to
sign a loyalty oath as required by a New York statute. The United States
Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional and expressly rejected the
premise "that public employment, including academic employment, may
be conditioned upon the surrender of constitutional rights .... ."16 This
principle was reaffirmed in Pickering v. Board of Education.17
Thus, although the Court has rejected the view that there exists a
constitutional right to public employment,' 8 it has taken the view that dis-
missal or nonrenewal may not be motivated by a teacher's exercise of his
constitutional rights.19 The Court has specifically applied this principal to
a teacher's exercise of first amendment rights,20 the privilege against self-
10. Roth v. Board of Regents, 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970), aff'd, 446
F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd & remanded, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
11. Board of Regents v. Roth, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd & remanded,
408 U.S. 564 (1972).
12. 408 U.S. at 569.
18. See Adler v. Board of Educ., 842 U.S. 485 (1952); United Pub. Workers
v. Mitchell, 30 U.S. 75 (1947).
14. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). This case involved the
issue of whether public employment could be conditioned upon subscribing to a
loyalty oath. In holding that it could not, the Court stated:
[T]o assert that there is no constitutionally protected right to public
employment is to obscure the issue.... It is sufficient to say that consti-
tutional protection extends to the public servant whose exclusion ... is
patently arbitrary or discriminatory.
Id. at 191-92.
15. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
16. Id. at 605.
17. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). The Court stated:
[T]o suggest that teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish
the First Amendment rights ... [is to proceed] on a premise that has
been unequivocally rejected in numerous prior decisions of this Court.
Id. at 568. This case involved a nontenured teacher who was dismissed after publi-
cation of a letter that was critical of his employers.
18. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Pettigrew, Constitu-
tional Tenure: Toward a Regulation of Academic Freedom, 22 CAsE W. Rrs. L.
REv. 475,492 (1971).
19. Pettigrew, supra note 18, at 492.
20. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Keyishan v. Board
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incrimination, 2' and the right to freedom of association.2 2 Moreover, Key-
ishan, which involved a teacher without tenure, expressed the view that
lack of tenure is immaterial as to violation of his substantive rights. The
Court reaffirmed this aspect of Keyishan in Sindermann by stating that the
lack of a contractual or tenural right to reemployment was irrelevant as to
Sindermann's claim that nonrenewal violated his first amendment rights.28
It should be noted, however, that a teacher's constitutional rights are
not absolute. In Pickering, the Court stated that there may be exceptions
where
the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of
its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses
in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in gen-
eral. [The general test is to] balance ... the interests of the teacher,
as a citizen ... and the interests of the State, as an employer .... 24
Thus, there may be instances where a state's interest in efficient school
administration may outweigh a teacher's constitutional rights. 25
A situation not dealt with in either Roth or Sindermann is where both
constitutionally protected and unprotected grounds motivate a school
board's dismissal or nonretention of a teacher. This problem was raised in
Ferguson v. Thomas,26 where the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
constitutional infringment does not invalidate the nonrenewal action if it
is shown to have played only a minor role in the school board's decision
and other permissable grounds are shown to exist.27 The court further
stated that where the protected grounds play a significant role, a balancing
test should be employed to resolve the conflict. 28 In McLaughlin v. Tilen-
dis,29 the Seventh Circuit took a different view, holding that although the
exercise of constitutionally protected rights will not warrant dismissal, the
dismissal should stand if other unprotected grounds exist.8 0 The Eighth
Circuit, in Smith v. Board of Education,8 ' espoused a third position in
holding that if any protected grounds exist at all, nonrenewal is invalid.82
A further problem exists where the board gives no reasons at all for
its nonrenewal or dismissal of a public school teacher. Although the
teacher with tenure is protected here,88 it has generally been held that a
teacher without tenure may be refused reemployment for any reason or for
21. See Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
22. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
23. 408 U.S. at 597-98.
24. 391 U.S. at 568.
25. See, e.g., Orr v. Thorpe, 427 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1970); Smith v. Board
of Regents, 426 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1970); Smith v. Board of Educ., 365 F.2d 770
(8th Cir. 1966).
26. 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970).
27. Id. at 858-59.
28. Id., citing Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) and Slochower
v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
29. 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968).
30. Id., at 289-90.
31. 365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1966).
32. Id. at 782-83.
33. See note 3 supra; note 47 infra.
[Vol. 38
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no reason at all if no constitutional right is involved.3 4 Roth reinforces this
view.3 5
V. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The fourteenth amendment requires that certain procedural safe-
guards be followed in order to protect one's substantive rights. Before pro-
cedural due process will be found to apply, it must first be determined
that one has an interest that is "encompassed by the fourteenth amend-
ment's protection of liberty and property."3 6 Thus, in order to determine
when procedural due process protects a public school teacher's interest in
continued employment, one must identify the situations in which the in-
terest amounts to a right to "liberty" or "property" for purpose of the
fourteenth.
"Liberty" and "property" are not rigid, narrow terms, but rather are
to be defined broadly and flexibly within certain prescribed boundaries so
as to give the fourteenth amendment meaning.37 In determining whether
procedural due process applies, it is the nature of the interest, and not its
weight or importance, that is significant.3 8 Once it has been determined
that an interest is within the fourteenth amendment's protection of "liberty"
and "property," the weight or importance of the interest is relevant in de-
termining the form of hearing required by procedural due process.3 9
In Roth, the Court indicated that if the state, in refusing to renew
Roth's contract, had made charges against him that might damage his
standing or associations in the community-i.e., charges of dishonesty or
immorality-or had imposed a stigma on him that foreclosed his freedom
to seek other employment opportunities, an interest in "liberty" would be
involved, and due process would require a hearing with opportunity to
refute the charges.40 The school authorities in both Roth and Sindermann
made no such charges, however; they simply did not renew the teachers'
contracts. In surveying this situation, the Court in Roth held that when
one is merely not rehired in one job, but remains free to seek another, he
is not deprived of "liberty" within the meaning of the fourteenth amend-
ment.4' Likewise, the Court in Sindermann stated that "the mere showing
that [a teacher] was not rehired in one particular job, without more,
[does not show] a loss of liberty."42
The procedural protections of the fourteenth amendment also apply
to previously acquired property interests. To have a property interest that
34. Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153, 1158 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969). See also Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 896-97 (1961); Parker v. Board of Educ., 348 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1965).
35. 408 U.S. at 569. Even where the teacher without tenure alleges that a
constitutionally protected right is involved in the nonrenewal decision, no hearing
is required. Id. at 575 n.14.
36. Id. at 569.
37. Id. at 571-72.
38. Id. The district court judge used a balancing test to see if procedural due
process should apply rather than looking at the nature of the interest involved.
39. Id. at 570.
40. Id. at 573-74.
41. Id. at 575.
42. 408 U.S. at 599.
5
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is protected by procedural due process, a person "must have more than an
abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expecta-
tion of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it."'14
Thus, the Supreme Court has held that college professors who are
dismissed during the term of their contracts have a protected property
interest in continued employment until the end of that term."4 Their
property interest is based upon their contract of employment.
A teacher may also acquire a protected property interest by virtue
of an implied promise of continued employment beyond the term of his
present contract.45 It is not entirely clear what constitutes such an implied
promise. The Court has indicated that it is similar to an implied contract
under contract law.46
A public college professor with tenure also has a property interest in
continued employment that is safeguarded by procedural due process. It is
by virtue of having tenure that the professor has a protected property in-
terest.4 7 Thus, he cannot be fired without the opportunity for a hearing
and a statement of reasons.48
In addition, even where there is no statutory tenure, de facto tenure
may exist. In Sindermann, the Court indicated that in certain situations
"there may be an unwritten 'common law' that certain employees shall
have the equivalent of tenure."4 9 This may be inferred from all relevant
circumstances. 50 If de facto tenure is found to exist, a teacher may assert a
property interest in continued employment that is protected by procedural
due process.51 Sindermann asserted the existence of de facto tenure at
Odessa Junior College based on provisions of the College's faculty guide,5 2
and the Supreme Court affirmed the action of the court of appeals in re-
manding this issue to the district court for determination.55
Absent a contract of employment, an implied promise of continued
employment, or statutory or de facto tenure, does a teacher have any right
to procedural safeguards when his contract is not renewed? The lower courts
faced with this issue were split on the answer. The majority held that a
nontenured teacher was not entitled to either a statement of reasons for
norenewal or an opportunity for a hearing.54 One court held that a
43. 408 U.S. at 577.
44. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (emphasis added).
45. Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971).
46. Id.
47. Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
48. Most tenure statutes provide that the teacher who has acquired tenure
shall not be discharged except for cause and upon written charges. The teacher
is also provided a hearing at which he may refute the charges. See, e.g., §§ 168.102-
.130 RSMo 1971 Supp.; WIs. STAT. § 37.31 (1) (Supp. 1971).
49. 408 U.S. at 602.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 603.
53. Id.
54. Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 943
(1972); Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
991 (1970); Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969).
[Vol. 38
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teacher without tenure had a right to a statement of reasons but not to an
opportunity for a hearing.55 Two courts held that a nontenured teacher had
a right to both if he could show an "expectancy" of continued employ-
ment.56 Finally, some writers and courts advanced the theory that the Con-
stitution itself provides a basis upon which a nontenured teacher may claim
a property right in continued employment6 7 This theory is commonly
known as "constitutional tenure."
The Court in Sindermann expressly rejected the view that mere "ex-
pectancy" of continued employment is protected by procedural due proc-
ess. s Further, in Roth the Court adopted the majority view by holding that
the Constitution does not require an opportunity for a hearing or a state-
ment of reasons before nonrenewal of a nontenured teacher's contract, ab-
sent a showing that the teacher was deprived of an interest in "liberty" or
that he had a "property" interest in continued employment despite the lack
of tenure.5 9 The Court in Roth also expressly discarded the notion of con-
stitutional tenure by stating:
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution.
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by
existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain
benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those bene-
fits.o9
Thus, in order for a public school teacher's interest in continued employ-
ment to amount to a property interest, which is sufficient to invoke pro-
cedural due process, the interest must arise from a contract of employment,
an implied promise of continued employment, or statutory or de facto
tenure.
The dissenting Justices in both cases would have the Court adopt the
constitutional tenure theory and give nontenured teachers the right to a
hearing and to a statement of reasons on the nourenewal decision in order
to insure that the decision is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.61
At least four policy considerations may be advanced against this position.
First, probationary teachers are hired for many reasons and purposes. Some
are even hired with the understanding that their employment is only tem-
porary. It would place an undue burden on administrative officials to re-
quire them to give every nontenured teacher a hearing and a statement of
55. Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 972 (1971).
56. Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1970), affd, 408 U.S. 593
(1972); Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970).
57. Pettigrew, supra note 18 at 476; see Gouge v. Joint School Dist., 310
F. Supp. 984 (W.D. Wis. 1970); Roth v. Board of Regents, 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D.
Wis. 1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd & remanded, 408 U.S. 564
(1972).
58. 408 U.S. at 603.
59. 408 U.S. at 569, 579.
60. Id. at 577.
61. Id. at 579 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Id. at 587 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
7
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reasons if he is not rehired. Second, school officials should be given a great
deal of discretion in making decisions concerning new faculty members.62
The Court's decision in both cases will allow them to exercise this discre-
tion as in the past. Third, tenure would serve little purpose if teachers with-
out tenure were given the right to a hearing and a statement of reasons,
because this would have the effect of giving tenure to a teacher from the
moment he is hired. Finally, under the majority's view a nontenured
teacher still has some protection from arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable
nonrenewal decisions, at least where such decisions are based on the teach-
er's exercise of his constitutional rights, because these decisions may be
challenged in a section 1983 suit. 3
The dissenting Justices advanced the additional argument that it is
anomalous to hold on the one hand that a welfare recipient has a protected
property interest in continued receipt of welfare benefits under statutory
standards, 64 and to hold on the other hand that a nontenured teacher has
no protected property interest in continued employment. The countervail-
ing argument is obvious, however. There is no anomaly, because the prop-
erty interest in continued receipt of welfare benefits is based upon a source
independent of the Constitution-a statuteGG-whereas the nontenured teach-
er's interest in continued employment has no statutory or other independent
basis, unless of course the teacher is dismissed before the end of his con-
tract term or can show an implied promise of continued employment.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is clear that a public college's decision not to rehire a teacher may
not be based solely upon his constitutionally protected conduct. Lack of
tenure is irrelevant as to this issue. Tenure is, however, important pro-
cedurally to a teacher's claim of infringement of constitutional rights. A
teacher who has tenure or some other legitimate claim to a property in-
terest in continued employment is procedurally protected. Thus, when this
type of teacher alleges that his dismissal is based on constitutionally pro-
tected grounds, he must be given an opportunity for a hearing at which
he may refute the charges. However, a teacher without tenure and with no
legitimate claim to a property interest in continued employment is not
procedurally protected by the fourteenth amendment. The mere expecta-
tion of being rehired is insufficient to give one a legitimate claim to a
property interest in continued employment.66
Further, the Court expressly rejected the idea that a nontenured teacher
has a right to a hearing where he asserts that the decision not to rehire him
was based upon protected grounds.67 Therefore, it appears that this type
of teacher must either raise his constitutional claim in district court by
bringing a section 1983 suit 68 or be foreclosed from review. Thus, it will
62. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
63. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
64. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
65. Id.
66. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
67. 408 U.S. at 575 n.14; 408 U.S. at 599 n.5.
68. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
[Vol. 58
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probably be more difficult for a teacher without tenure to prove his claim of
infringement on constitutional rights than for a teacher with tenure, since
the burden of proof rests on the nontenured teacher in a section 1983
action. 69 Where the teacher is tenured, the college must bear the burden
of proving that its nonrenewal decision is not based on constitutionally pro-
tected grounds.7 0
Finally, because some teachers will have the right to a hearing and
to a statement of reasons on the nonrenewal decision and others will not,
the question becomes: where should the line be drawn? Since the tenure
system is already in existence, the Court has drawn it in the most prac-
ticable, workable place.
LARRY E. SKAER
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT OF
NARCOTICS ADDICTION AS GROUND FOR ANNUILMENT
Costello v. Porzelt'
Dolores Costello and Wayne Porzelt were married on February 25,
1971. In early April of 1971, plaintiff Dolores observed that her husband
was behaving oddly and discovered that objects were missing from the
apartment. She subsequently uncovered a package of heroin and a hypo-
dermic needle hidden in the bathroom medicine cabinet. It was then that
she noticed needle marks on defendant Wayne's arms. When confronted
with these facts, Wayne admitted his addiction to heroin. After that en-
counter, plaintiff had no further marital relations with her husband. She
subsequently brought this suit for an annulment on the ground that
Wayne's concealment of his heroin addiction was a premarital fraud going
to the essentials of the marriage. Plaintiff testified that if she had known of
defendant's addiction at the time of the marriage she would not have mar-
ried him.
The Superior Court of New Jersey granted the annulment. Accepting
the inherent power of courts of equity to annul fraudulent contracts of
marriage, the court initially recognized that since procreation is paramount
among the purposes of marriage, any condition or behavior frustrating the
sexual aspect of marriage goes to the essence of the marital relation. The
court then cited an impressive array of medical authorities in support of
the thesis that drug addiction dissipates the user's sexual appetite.2 Hence,
the court concluded that drug addiction frustrated one of the central ob-
jects of marriage. On the basis of this premise, the court held the conceal-
ment of addiction was a fraud sufficient to warrant the granting of an
69. Pettigrew, Constitutional Tenure: Toward a Regulation of Academic Free-
dom, 22 CASE W. REs. L. R v. 475, 513 (1971).
70. Id.
1. 116 N.J. Super. 380, 282 A.2d 432 (CIL 1971).
2. 116 N.J. Super. at 382, 282 A.2d at 436.
1973]
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annulment, even though the marriage had been consummated prior to
the disclosure.
Contemporary domestic relations statutes and judicial decisions reflect
the uncertainty that has long existed concerning the nature of divorce
and annulment and the circumstances under which a marriage is void or
voidable. The courts generally grant annulments for causes existing at the
time of the marriage that prevent a valid relationship from being created.8
Thus, a marriage may be annulled because of the legal,4 mental,r or physi-
cal6 incapacity of one of the parties at the time of the ceremony. Further,
since it is vital to the validity of the marriage that the parties freely con-
sent to the ceremony, an action for annulment may be predicated on the
ground that the marriage was procured by the fraud or deceit of one of
the parties. 7
To obtain an annulment on the ground of fraud, the innocent party
must establish his or her justifiable reliance on a misrepresentation of an
existing material fact.8 Once the court finds the required justifiable reliance,
the central issue becomes whether the misrepresentation is material. Resolu-
tion of this issue has been complicated by the judicial maintenance of
a historic distinction between consummated and unconsummnated marriages.
As the Porzelt court pointed out,
New Jersey courts... [grant] judicial annulment in [unconsum-
mated marriages] when infected by fraud of any kind whatsoever
that would render a contract voidable, but [demand] that the
fraud go to the very essence of the marriage relationship when con-
summation is established. 9
Actually, the difference is merely a difference in the definition of the term
"material"; when the marriage has been consummated, the fraud must
relate to the central objects of marriage in order to be material.1 0 The ul-
3. 4 Am. JuR. 2D. Annulment of Marriage § 1, at 440 (1962).
4. See Cunningham v. Cunningham, 206 N.Y.S. 841, 99 N.E. 845 (1912)
(under the age of statutory consent); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 186 Misc. 772,
62 N.Y.S.2d 130 (1946) (undissolved prior marriage); Browning v. Browning, 89
Kan. 98, 130 P. 852 (1913) (former spouse living); Martin v. Martin, 54 W. Va.
301, 46 S.E. 120 (1903) (incestuous marriage).
5. See Kirkland v. Kirkland, 38 Ill. App. 2d 280, 186 N.E.2d 794 (1962)
(insanity); Worley v. Worley, 176 S.W.2d 74 (Spr. Mo. App. 1943) (feeble-
mindedness); Fratello v. Fratello, 118 Misc. 584, 193 N.Y.S. 865 (Sup. Ct. 1922)
(physical duress).
6. See Rickards v. Rickards, 53 Del. 134, 166 A.2d 425 (1960) (impotency);
Ryder v. Ryder, 66 Vt. 158, 28 A. 1029 (1894) (incurable syphilis).
7. DiLorenzo v. DiLorenzo, 174 N.Y. 467, 67 N.E. 63 (1903).
8. Id. at 472, 67 N.E. at 63:
It is a general rule that every misrepresentation of material fact, made
with the intention to induce another to enter into an agreement and
without which he would not have done so, justifies the court in vacating
the agreement.
Accord, Masters v. Masters, 13 Wis. 2d 332, 108 N.W.2d 674 (1961).
See also Arndt v. Arndt, 336 Ill. App. 65, 82 N.E.2d 908 (1948).
9. 116 N.J. Super. at 383, 282 A.2d at 434.
10. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 3 Allen (85 Mass.) 605 (1862), established what
has been termed the essentialia doctrine, under which only that fraud going to
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timate question is always, "Did the misrepresentation relate to facts that
the law deems of sufficient significance to merit interference with the mar-
riage relationship?"
Unfortunately, the requirement that the fraud must pertain to the
essentials of the marital relationship has been difficult to apply. As the
Porzelt court recognized, there is a "paucity of authority" in the area.1
Many courts have been content to pronounce obscure definitions equating
"essentials" with "matters vital to the marriage."' 2 This vague criterion was
amplified in the 1873 New Jersey case of Carris v. Carris.13 Although de-
dining to give a comprehensive definition of "essentials," the Carris court
stated that "[o]ne of the leading and most important objects of the insti-
tution of marriage under our laws is the procreation of children ... 14
In advancing the message underlying these standards, New Jersey courts
have granted annulments of consummated marriages for concealing a
surgical operation that rendered the woman barren; 15 concealing im-
potence;' 6 concealing a fixed determination not to have children;17 and
suppressing knowledge of a venereal disease.' 8 These cases and others' 9
tend to support the pronouncement in Porzelt that "any physical or mental
condition or behavior which strikes against the central purpose of marriage,
namely its sexual aspect culminating in procreation, goes to the essence of
the marital relation."20
The question addressed in Porzelt is whether addiction to narcotic
drugs is a "condition.. . which strikes against the central purpose of mar-
riage."2' An imposing series of medical works and periodicals all generally
confirming that drug addiction leads to sexual indifference and rejection
is set out in the case of Melia v. Melia.22 Many other medical authorities
11. 116 N.J. Super. at 883, 282 A.2d at 435. Porzelt cites virtually all the
reported cases in this specific area.
12. See Woronzoff-Daschkoff v. Woronzoff-Daschkoff, 303 N.Y. 506, 104
N.E.2d 877 (1952); cases cited notes 27 &c 28 infra.
13. 24 N.J. Eq. 516 (Ct. Err. &c App. 1873).
14. Id. at 524.
15. Turney v. Avery, 92 N.J. Eq. 473, 113 A. 710 (Ch. 1921).
16. Steerman v. Snow, 94 N.J. Eq. 9, 118 A. 696 (Ch. 1922).
17. Pisciotta v. Buccino, 22 N.J. Super. 114, 91 A.2d 629 (App. Div. 1952).
18. Crane v. Crane, 62 N.J. Eq. 21, 49 A. 734 (Ch. 1901).
19. See Heup v. Heup, 45 Wis. 2d 71, 172 N.W.2d 334 (1969) (having chil-
dren is primary purpose of marriage); Zerk v. Zerk, 257 Wis. 555, 44 N.W.2d 568
(1950) (failure to have sexual relations goes to the essence of a marriage).
20. 116 N.J. Super. at 385, 282 A.2d at 435.
21. Id.
22. 94 N.J. Super. 47, 52-53, 226 A.2d 745, 747-48 (1967). For a general
understanding of the potential problems see the following sources cited by Prozelt:
T. BROWN, Tim ENIGMA OF DRUG ADDicrIoN 39 (1961) (the addict is possessed
of only one fervent objective-the ways and means of obtaining his next shot
of heroin); Y. KRON & E. BROWN, MAINLINE TO NowI z -THr MAKING OF A
Hmom ADDiar 153 (1963) (marriage in the life of an addict-if it takes place at
all-is a very transitory episode); D. MAURER &c V. VOGEL, NARcOTIcS AND NARcoTic
ADDncrION 72 (1954) (general tendency to reduce or obliterate sexual desire); Kolb,
Drug Addiction, A Study of Some Medical Cases, 20 ARcHivEs oF NEUROLOGY &c PsY-
cIATRnY 171, 183 (1928) (reduction or elimination of sexual desire tends to remove
the opiate addict from the category of psychopathic sex offenders).
1973]
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concur in this pronouncement. 23 It has been observed that the use of
opiate drugs (usually heroin or morphine) "depresses appetite, pain and
erotic urges of all sorts, heterosexual, homosexual or autoerotic." 24 The
addict "loses his nature" with regard to sexuality; i.e., his sexual appetite
is chilled if not entirely dissipated.26 The loss of sexual drive resulting from
drug addiction has often been cited to dispute accusations that drugs in-
duce sexual crimes.2 6
The reported decisional law on this question is as sparse as judicial
definitions of "essentials." Though making no definitional representations
as to "essentials," Delaware has summarily concluded that drug addiction is
not such.27 The court equated narcotics addiction with personal traits and
moral character, the fraudulent concealment of which does not amount
to a fraud sufficient for annulment. The persons desiring to marry have
the burden of ascertaining such traits and character prior to marriage.28
New York has held to the contrary. In the case of Lockwood v. Lockwood,29
the New York court held that the husband had a duty in law to make a full
and complete disclosure of his narcotics addiction to his wife.80 For one pur-
pose of distinguishing the Delaware and New York decisions, it is worthy
of note that the Delaware court did not consider the evidence as estab-
lishing the precise nature of the drug used, whereas the New York decisions
explicitly involved situations where "hard" drugs such as heroin were used.
Arguably, the Delaware court's decision would have been different if there
had been established an addiction to "hard" drugs.
In those jurisdictions, including Missouri, in which this question has
not been considered, a party whose spouse has concealed his drug addiction
has two approaches open to him in seeking dissolution of the marriage.
First, he could try to obtain an annulment on the ground of fraud by
representing the addiction as an "essential" within the jurisdiction's de-
cisional law following the reasoning of the Porzelt court. Although Mis-
souri has no specific statute on annulment, Missouri courts have granted
28. See generally AMER. BAR Ass'N-AmER. MED. Ass'N JOINT COaNm. R ORT
ON NARCOTIC DRUGS, DRUG ADDICTION: CRIME OR DISEASE? 45-59 (1961); R. GOOD-
mAN & P. RHEINGOLD, LAWYERS' DRUG HANDBOOK (1967); L. LEWIN, PHANTASTICA:
NARCOTIC AND STIMULATING DRUGS: THEIR USE AND ABUSE (1964); PRESIDENT'S
ADVISORY CoMn. ON NARcoTIc AND DRUG ABUSE, FINAL REPORT (1963); L. UHR
& J. MILLER, DRUGS AND B.HAVIOR (1960).
24. Wilker Sc Rasor, Psychiatric Aspects of Drug Addiction, 14 Am. J. Ma.
566, 567-68 (1958). See also Vogell, Isbell & Chapman, Present Status of Narcotic
Addiction, 138 J.A.M.A. 1019, 1028 (1948).
25. J. CHEIN, W. GRARD, W. LEE & S. ROSENFELD, THE ROAD TO H 857"58
(1964).
26. A. SCHUR, NARCOTIC ADDICTION IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 23 (1962).
27. Husband v. Wife, 257 A.2d 765 (Del. Super. Ct. 1969).
28. Id. at 768. See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 3 Allen (85 Mass.) 605, 607 (1862),
which is usually cited in holding that misrepresentations concerning character,
rank, wealth, or condition in life of the spouse are not so connected with the
essentials of marriage as to warrant an annulment.
29. 29 Misc. 2d 114, 220 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
80. Id. at 114, 220 N.Y.S.2d at 719; accord, O'Connell v. O'Connell, 201 App.
Div. 388, 194 N.Y.S. 265 (1922).
[Vol. 88
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [1973], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss2/6
RECENT CASES
annulments consistent with general principles of equity.3 ' The difficulty
in Missouri is a dearth of cases granting annulments for fraud. One case
in which the plaintiff did prevail on this ground is Watson v. Watson.
3 2
Prior to the marriage, plaintiff husband had inquired of his wife whether
she had a venereal disease. Though infected with syphilis, she said that she
was not diseased. The trial court denied an annulment, and the St. Louis
Court of Appeals reversed. The court remarked that the wife's misrepresen-
tation related to an essential of marriage. Presumably, the annulment was
granted because the fraud pertained directly to the sexual relationship and
to reproductive capability. Thus, the lawyer can argue with some confidence
that since drug addiction dissipates sexual powers, it meets the Missouri
conception of "essentials," and an annulment should be granted.
The second approach is to qualify the misrepresented fact itself as a
ground for annulment or divorce. Although addiction to narcotics is not a
distinct ground for annulment in Missouri, a divorce can probably be
obtained on the grounds of general indignities.33 Missouri courts have held
that the continued use of narcotics tending to render the user callous, reck-
less, and untruthful, to cause physical prostration, and to destroy the ob-
jects of marriage constitutes indignities sufficient for divorce if the habit
is incurable.34 The problem faced by the spouse seeking divorce is that re-
lief is not granted simply on a showing of narcotic addiction, but rather is
conditioned upon proof of actual manifestations of the mental and physical
impact of the drug addiction.
Even though the Porzelt decision may be viewed as reinforcing previous
New Jersey cases, its implications are of current interest in view of the ex-
panded awareness of the harms potential in drug abuse. Today, narcotic
addiction is considered one of this country's greatest social problems. The
courts and society in general have realized that drug addiction is an ill-
ness, and have established programs aimed at rehabilitating, rather than
punishing, the addict. Unfortunately, there has been little, if any, reflec-
tion upon the domestic problems caused by the addiction. Judicial recogni-
tion of the family's plight has been virtually non-existent. It seems irrational
to require one who has suffered from the relationship to resort to the legal
fiction of "essentials" in order to prove a fraud sufficient to warrant an
annulment. In jurisdictions lacking the definitional guidelines available
to the Porzelt court, the nonaddict spouse is at the mercy of that court's con-
ception of a legal illusion. Surely, equitable considerations should not al-
low this to happen. Rather, the courts should recognize the misery of the
nonaddict spouse and grant relief. Thus, an immediate need exists for the
recognition of narcotic addiction as a separate and distinct ground for the
dissolution of a marriage.
STEPHEN D. ALIBER
31. Taylor v. Taylor, 355 S.W.2d 383 (Spr. Mo. App. 1962). See generally
Anderson, Annulment of Marriage in Missouri, 21 Mo. L. Rhv. 119 (1956).
32. 143 S.W.2d 349 (St. L. Mo. App. 1940).
33. See § 452.010, RSMo 1969. See also Roberts, Domestic Relations and
Family Law, 28 Mo. L. REv. 385 (1963).
34. Dawson v. Dawson, 23 Mo. App. 169 (St. L. Ct. App. 1886) . See also
Bauman v. Bauman, 17 S.W.2d 594 (St. L. Mo. App. 1929).
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ENVIRONMENTAL LAWSUITS-WHAT MUST
ORGANIZATIONS ALLEGE TO HAVE STANDING TO SUE?
Sierra Club v. Morton'
For several years, the Sierra Club and other environmental interest
groups have desired to become recognized as pro bono legal representatives
of conservationists and preservationist interests in their own rights. On
the basis of their generalized ideological interest in the environment they
have sought the power to bring environmental lawsuits in their own names
without the necessity of obtaining local plaintiffs.2 The Supreme Court
recently quashed those hopes in a case that environmentalists had hoped
would be the culmination of successful lawsuits concerning their standing to
sue.8 That case involved a remote area of the Sierra Nevada Mountains
where purportedly local plaintiffs were nonexistent.
In 1969, the United States Forest Service approved a plan submitted
by Walt Disney Enterprises, Inc., for the construction and operation of a
ski resort in the Mineral King Valley of the Sequoia National Forest.
The Sierra Club4 filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California seeking an injunction against the Forest
Service's issuance of the necessary permits to Disney and a declaratory
judgment that the proposed development violated various federal laws.5
The Sierra Club sued as a membership corporation alleging "a special in-
terest in the conservation and the sound maintenace of the national parks,
game refuges and forests of the country"( and invoking the judicial review
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (hereinafter APA).7
The government challenged the Sierra Club's standing to sue, but
the district court rejected the argument and granted a preliminary in-
junction.8 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed and vacated the injunction, holding that the club had no stand-
ing absent a showing of "more direct interest." O
The Supreme Court affirmed in a 4-3 decision.
The Sierra Club asserted two basic arguments to support its claim to
standing. First, the club argued that the proposed development would in-
jure its interest in protecting the natural resources of the area and that
this injury satisfied the "injury-in-fact" test. The club also claimed stand-
1. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
2. See Phillips, ENVIRONMENTALISTS' SUrTs-ARE THEY STANDING OR FALLING?,
4 NAT. REsouRcEs LAw. 469 (1971).
3. See cases cited note 24 infra.
4. The Sierra Club is a nonprofit California corporation with an estimated
national membership of 78,000 persons. The club has actively taken a special
interest in the conservation and maintenance of our national parks and forests
and has been especially active in the Sierra Nevada Mountain area.
5. The Sierra Club argued that the issuing of the necessary permits and the
construction of the ski resort would violate the following federal statutes: 16
U.S.C. §§ 1, 41, 43, 45 (c), 497 (1970).
6. 405 U.S. at 730.
7. Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
8. See Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970), affd sub nom.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
9. Id. at 30.
V'ol. 8
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ing as a private attorney general, i.e., as a representative of the public in-
terest in conserving and protecting the environment.
In order to understand the meaning of the instant case and its impact
on these arguments and on conservationists' right to sue, it is necessary to
review briefly the law of standing.10 Just prior to 1940, the Supreme
Court set forth the so-called legal interest test in Tennessee Electric Power
Co. v. TVA. 1" In that case, the Court denied standing to competitors of
the TVA, holding that one had no standing "unless the right invaded
is a legal right-one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected
against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a
privilege." 12
Recent Supreme Court decisions have expanded and liberalized the
concept of standing, especially where violations of federal statutes are al-
leged.'3 In Flast v. Cohen'4 the Court stated that standing to raise consti-
tutional issues is to be considered within the framework of the "case or
controversy" requirement of article III, section 2 of the Constitution. The
Court said:
The question of standing is related only to whether the dispute
sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context
and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolu-
tion .... The emphasis in standing problems is on whether the
party . . . has 'a personal stake in the outcome of the contro-
versy'.15
In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp,16
the Court rejected the "legal interest" test, saying that it is an improper
test for standing because it goes to the merits.17 The Court further applied
the "case or controversy" requirement to the question of standing to raise
statutory, as well as constitutional, issues in federal court.
Data Processing, as clarified by Barlow v. Collins,'8 set forth a two-
pronged test for standing. First, to satisfy the "case or controversy" require-
ment, the plaintiff must allege that the "challenged action has caused him
injury in fact, economic or otherwise."19 Second, "the interest sought to be
10. For extended discussions of standing, see C. Wi-r, FEDmRAL COURTS
§ 13 (2d ed. 1970); Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional
Requirement?, 78 YAIE L.J. 816 (1969); Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing,
37 U. CM. L. REv. 450 (1970); Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cmi.
L. R v. 601 (1968).
11. 306 U.S. 118 (1939). See also Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay,
225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
12. 306 U.S. at 137.
13. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
14. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
15. Id. at 101, quoting from Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
16. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
17. Id. at 153.
18. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
19. 397 U.S. at 152. The Court recognized that the interest allegedly injured
need not be economic, but "may reflect aesthetic, conservational, and recreational
values." Id. at 154, quoting from Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC,
354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965).
19731
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protected by the complainant [must be] arguably within the zone of in-
terests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee
in question."2 0 The Court in Data Processing held that this two-pronged
test is applicable to the question of standing to obtain judicial review
under section 10 of the APA.21
In trying to obtain judicial review of the Forest Service's action in this
case, the Sierra Club relied upon section 10 of the APA.22 The club alleged
that the proposed development would injure its interest in protecting and
conserving the natural resources of the Sierra Nevada Mountains.2 3 The
Court held that this allegation of injury to a general, widely shared in-
terest in the environment failed to satisfy the first prong of the Data Proc-
essing test, which requires an allegation of injury in fact.
Previously, lower federal courts had held a general interest in the en-
vironment sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact test.24 One of the leading
cases is Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC.2 5 In Scenic Hudson,
the court stated:
In order to insure that the Federal Power Commission will ade-
quately protect the public interest in the aesthetic, conservational,
and recreational aspects of power development, those who by
their activities and conduct have exhibited a special interest in
such areas, must be held to be included in the class of aggrieved
parties under § 313 (b) [of the Federal Power Act.] 26
In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin,27 the court said that a
"demonstrated interest in protecting the environment from pesticide
pollution" was sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact test.28
20. 397 U.S. at 153. Since the Court decided that the Sierra Club failed to
satisfy the injury-in-fact test, it was unnecessary to reach a decision on the zone-
of-interests test.
21. Id.
22. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
23. 405 U.S. at 735 n.8.
24. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.
1970); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965); Cape May County Chapter, Inc., Izaak Walton League of America v.
Macchia, 329 F. Supp. 504 (D.N.J. 1971); Upper Pecos Ass'n. v. Stans, 328 F.
Supp. 332 (D.N. Mex. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of
Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Sierra Club v. Hardin, 825 F. Supp. 99
(D. Alas. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 324 F.
Supp. 878 (D.D.C. 1971); Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett,
315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970); Izaak Walton League of America v. St. Clair,
313 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Minn. 1970); Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205
(D. Colo. 1970); Parker v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 685 (D. Colo. 1969); Road
Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
25. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
26. Id. at 616.
27. 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
28. Id. at 1097. The organizations held to have standing in this case were
the Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., the National Audubon Society, the Sierra
Club, the Western Michigan Environmental Action Council, and the Izaak Walton
League of America, intervenor.
[Vol. 8
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The Supreme Court was unwilling to go this far, however.2 9 The Court
noted with approval the cases that liberalized and expanded the categories
of injury that could be alleged in support of standing)3 But the Court
also pointed out that such liberalization is quite different from abandon-
ing the requirement that the party seeking review must have suffered an
individualized injury.3 1 In rejecting the Sierra Club's claim of standing,
the Court said that "the injury in fact test requires . . . that the party
seeking review be himself among the injured."3 2
The Court further stated:
[A] mere "interest in a problem", no matter how longstanding
the interest and no matter how qualified the organization is in
evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render the
organization "adversely affected" or "aggrieved" within the mean-
ing of the APA.33
The key language is by itself. It implies that a general environmental in-
terest might be sufficient if coupled with something else. It is unclear,
however, what this something else might be.
An organization's general interest in the environment might be suf-
ficient to satisfy the injury in fact test if coupled with either (1) an allega-
tion of individualized injury to one or more of its members,3 4 or (2) joinder
of another party who alleges the necessary individualized injury.3 5 In fact,
in most of the federal court cases in which environmental interest groups
were held to have standing, one of these factors was present.3 0 In the in-
stant case neither was true.
29. The first case to hold that a mere interest in the environment would not
satisfy the injury-in-fact test was Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir.
1970), aff'd sub nom. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). For a discus-
sion of the Sierra Club v. Hickel case concluding that the court of appeals reached
the correct result see Note, Sierra Club v. Hickel: A Standing Requirement for
Self-Appointed Public Interest Groups, 33 U. PiTr. L. Rxv. 355 (1971).
30. 405 U.S. at 738.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 734-35.
33. Id. at 739 (emphasis added).
34. The individualized injury requirement appears to require that the mem-
bers of an environmental interest group (or an individual party) who allege the
necessary individualized injury either live in or near the area in question or
make use of the area in question. A court probably would not grant standing
to one who does not live in dose proximity to or who has never used the area
in question. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engrs, 348 F. Supp.
916, 922 (N.D. Miss. 1972). It is dear that an organization may represent its
members in a properly commenced proceeding for judicial review. See NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
35. This alternative certainly seems feasible in light of the liberal rules
concerning joinder of parties in the federal courts. See FED. R. Cry. P. 20.
36. For cases in which the organization alleged individualized injury to one
or more of its members, see cases cited note 24 supra. For cases in which another
party alleging individualized injury was joined, see, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preserva-
tion Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965) (members of a local en-
vironmental interest group who used the area in question); Parker v. United
States, 307 F. Supp. 685 (D. Colo. 1969) (individuals living near the area in
question); Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D. N.Y. 1967)
(incorporated town affected by the proposed action).
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The Sierra Club also relied on the "public action" theory to obtain
standing. The dub argued that under this theory, its status as an or-
ganization with a longstanding concern for the environment gave it
standing to obtain judicial review of the "public" question involved in
the case.37 The Court rejected this argument, pointing out that it rested
upon a misconception of the public action theory.38
That misconception is that the public action theory is a separate
theory of standing. This view had its origin in a statement in Scripps-
Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC89 that "these private litigants have standing
only as representatives of the public interest."40 In the field of environ-
mental protection litigation, this approach resulted in a recent lower
federal court holding that an alleged contravention of "the public interest
in environmental resources" was sufficent to give standing to "responsible
representatives of the public."41 This holding, of course, supported the
Sierra Club's position. As the Court in Morton pointed out, however, the
public action theory merely allows a party to argue the public interest,
as well as his own, once he has established his standing under the tests de-
scribed previously.42 In Scripps-Howard, the party had obtained standing
by alleging economic injury to himself (i.e., injury in fact); the above-
quoted passage refers only to the arguments that the party could use to
support his claim once he had established his standing.48
At first glance the Court's decision in the instant case appears to be
a practical one based on strong precedent. 44 To grant standing to anyone
who alleges a public or general interest in a problem might seriously
diminish the "case or controversy" requirement; without an individualized
injury the necessary quality of adverseness might be missing.45 The Court
states that requiring a party seeking judicial review of agency action to
allege an individualized injury "put[s] the decision as to whether review
will be sought in the hands of those who have a direct stake in the out-
come." 46 The Court further states that this requirement provides an
objective basis to insure that the group bringing the action is genuinely
interested in protecting the environment. 47
However, is this requirement really necessary to insure adverseness in
environmental lawsuits? Few groups are more interested than the Sierra
Club in protecting the environment. Moreover, the Sierra Club and other
such environmental interest groups have the financial resources to insure
adequate representation of the conservationists' viewpoint.
37. 405 U.S. at 736.
38. Id.
39. 316 U.S. 4 (1942).
40. Id. at 14.
41. Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 105 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970).
42. 405 U.S. at 737.
43. Id. at 736-37.
44. Mr. Justice Blackmun recognizes this in his dissenting opinion. See 405
U.S. at 755.
45. Lawsuits without this quality of adverseness are inconsistent with the
judicial function under US. CONsT. art. IH. 405 U.S. at 732 n.3.




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [1973], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss2/6
RECENT CASES
There are, however, a few ad hoc environmental interest groups that
may not have adequate financial resources and that do not represent a
sizeable block of public opinion. These groups might act as obstructionists,
rather than as bona fide environmental litigants. The standing requirements
set forth in the instant case appear, in part, to be an attempt to prevent
such obstructionist tactics by small groups of vocal outsiders. 48
Both Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Blackmun, in their separate
dissenting opinions, argued that environmental interest groups should have
standing without alleging an individualized injury to one of their members
or joining a party with the necessary injury. Mr. Justice Douglas's dissent
is, in part, a plea to allow users of the environment standing to sue. He is
especially concerned about users who live far away.49 This concern ap-
pears to be the basis for his suggestion that inanimate objects in the area to
be affected should have standing to sue.50 These inanimate objects would,
of course, be represented in the lawsuit by a bona fide environmental in-
terest group. Justice Douglas's concern is difficult to understand, however,
because the majority opinion does allow users of the area standing to sue.51
Mr. Justice Blackmiin's theory is more practical. He would grant
standing only to those groups who have a "provable, sincere, dedicated, and
established status."52 This limitation would help to insure adverseness
and would be enforced by the courts in the exercise of judicial discretion.5 3
He also suggested that the Sierra Club try to amend its complaint to meet
the standing requirements set forth in the instant case.
Although the decision in the instant case lays down no new test for
standing, it does make it dear that a general interest in the environment
will not satisfy the injury-in-fact test and thus qualify one as an "aggrieved"
party within the meaning of the APA. The effect of this decision has
already been felt in Missouri. In Coalition for the Environment v. Linclay
Development Corp.54 (the Earth City project), the plaintiffs were denied
standing based on Morton where the only allegations were that they
preferred open space to an industrially developed area and that an indus-
trial area was personally displeasing to them.55
In most cases the standing requirements set forth in the instant case
48. This attempt has not been entirely successful. In Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C.
1972), the plaintiff organization was formed to challenge an ICC grant of a rate
increase on freight shipped by railroad. SCRAP obtained standing under Morton
by alleging that its members use the forests, streams, and mountains of Wash-
ington, and that this use will be disturbed because the rate increase will adversely
affect the environment by discouraging the use of recydable materials. This case
is an example of a far-fetched way to meet the requirements of Morton where the
real issue has, at most, a remote connection to a general environmental interest.
49. 405 U.S. at 752.
50. Id. at 741.
51. Id. at 735. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 348
F. Supp. 916, 922 (N.D. Miss. 1972), decided after Morton, where two users of
the area in question were held to have standing based on Morton.
52. 405 U.S. at 757-58.
53. Id. at 758.
54. 347 F. Supp. 634 (E.D. Mo. 1972).
55. Id. at 637-38.
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will pose no barrier to environmental organizations, because they will be
able to allege an individualized injury to one of their members or join a
party alleging an individualized injury.5 6 However, what happens if neither
one of these requirements can be met? After the decision in this case who,
if anyone, will have standing to challenge (1) environmental depredation
that the locals want and against which no local protest can be generated
(e.g., the Alaska Pipeline), and (2) environmental depredation by the first
to arrive in a given area (e.g., oil spills from off-shore drilling platforms)?
Following the majority opinion, no one would have standing to challenge
the environmental depredation in these two situations. Thus, judicial in-
tervention may be impossible in these situations. This is the fear that
Justice Blackmun expressed in his dissent.5 7
This problem would be solved by expanding the concept of standing,
either judicially or legislatively, to allow bona fide environmental interest
groups to litigate environmental issues without joining a local plaintiff. In
fact, a bill has been introduced in Congress that would allow environmental
interest groups to litigate environmental issues in their own names.5 8
Michigan and a few other states already have such statutes (commonly
called "citizen action" statutes).5 9
It is interesting to note that subsequent to the decision in the instant
case, the Sierra Club was granted leave to amend its petition to include
local plaintiffs in order to meet the standing requirements of the majority
opinion. 60 Before this decision the dub had steadfastly refused to amend. 1
Thus, it appears that the Sierra Club had more than the preserving of
Mineral King in mind when it took the case to the Supreme Court. Per-
haps the club's main purpose was to obtain Supreme Court approval of the
approach to standing for environmental organizations adopted by so many
lower federal courts.62 Having failed, the club and other environmentalists
are seeking the help of Congress to remedy the standing problem. In the
long run the statutory approach to standing for environmental organizations
may be the best approach. It will give the environmental organizations the
56. Cases cited notes 24 & 36 supra.
57. 405 U.S. at 755. The majority refuses to recognize that this problem
exists. Id. at 740.
58. S. 1032, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R. 591, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
See 3 ENVIRON. RPTR. CURRENT DEV. 718, 1229 (1972-73). At the present time the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1972), and the Air
Pollution Control Act, 52 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1972), provide for citizen suits, but
the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-95 (1969) does not.
59. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.412 (Supp. 1972); MicH. Comp. LAws § 691.1201
(1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.03 (Supp. 1972).
60. Sierra Club v. Morton, 3 ENVIRON. RZ'TR. CURRENT DEv. 339 (N.D. Cal.,
July 6, 1972). The amended complaint alleged that the dub and its members
regularly conduct outings in the Mineral King area and that conversion into a
resort would harm the environmental and recreational interests of the club and
these members. Also, the Mineral King District Association, an organization
of cabin owners in Mineral King, were joined as plaintiffs.
61. In fact, in its reply brief the Sierra Club specifically refused to rely on
the individualized injury of some of its members as a basis for standing. 405 U.S.
at 736 n.8.
62. Cases cited note 24 supra.
(Vol. 88
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right to sue in their own names. It will allow judicial intervention in all
cases involving environmental issues whenever necessary. Finally, it avoids
any problems that might occur through the modification of the injury-in-
fact concept.
LARRY E. SKABm
ESTATE PLANNG-TRANSFERS WITH A RETAINED
LIFE INTEREST UNDER SECTION 2036(a)-
STOCK TRANSFERRED TO AN IRREVOCABLE TRUST
United States v. Byrum'
In 1958, decedent Byrum transferred shares of stock in three closely
held corporations to an irrevocable trust. After the transfer, Byrum still
owned 59 percent, 35 percent, and 42 percent of the stock in the respective
corporations; the trust owned 12 percent, 48 percent, and 46 percent. Per-
sons unrelated to Byrum owned the remaining shares. The beneficiaries
of the trust were decedent's children, or, if they died before the trust
terminated, their surviving children. When the youngest child reached
the age of 21, the trust was to be divided into separate trusts for each
child. Each individual trust terminated when its beneficiary attained the
age of 35. The trust instrument required a corporate trustee. Although the
trustee had broad discretionary powers in the administration of the trust,
the settlor retained the following powers: (1) To vote all dosely held
stock; (2) to remove the corporate trustee and all successor trustees and
appoint another corporate trustee; (3) to approve investments and rein-
vestments; and (4) to disapprove the sale or transfer of any assets.
At the date of decedent's death in 1964, the trust owned the shares
originally transferred and other property of small value.2 The Comissioner
of Internal Revenue determined that the rights retained by decedent placed
the transfer within the scope of section 2036 (a) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954,3 which provides for the inclusion in a decedent's gross estate
of property that he transferred inter vivos if he retained for his lifetime
1. 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
2. The assets of the trust were 589,000 in stock and three Series E bonds
worth $300 at maturity.
3. Unless othervise indicated, all statutory references are to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, as amended. Section 2036 (a) provides:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property(except real property situated outside of the United States) to the extent
of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a
transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate consideration
in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he has
retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without refer-
ence to his death or for any period which does not in fact end before
his death- (1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income
from, the property, or (2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with
any person, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the
property or the income therefrom.
1973]
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certain specified powers with regard to the property. The executrix paid
the tax and filed a refund action in district court. The government, which
could have prevailed by showing that either subsection (1) or (2) of section
2036 (a) applied, contended that both subsections were applicable, relying
more heavily on subsection (2). The district court found for the executrix,4
and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.5 Six Justices of the Su-
preme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Powell, affirmed the court of
appeals. Mr. Justice White, joined by Justices Blackmun and Brennan,
dissented vigorously.
I. SECTION 2036 (a) (1) ARGUMlENT AND HOLDING
Section 2036 (a) (1) applies to transfers in which the decedent retained
the possession or enjoyment of the property transferred, or the right to the
income therefrom. The government contended that the decedent retained
"enjoyment" of the transferred shares because his right to vote them and
his power to veto their sale, together with his rights in the shares he still
owned, gave him control of the corporations.6 The government said such
control guaranteed decedent continued employment, remuneration and the
right to liquidate or merge the corporations. 7
The Court read section 2036 (a) (1) as requiring that the decedent re-
tain an attribute of the property transferred, such as the use of the prop-
erty, the right to the income it produces, or a power of appointment with
respect to either income or principal.8 The Court said that the benefits
decedent retained were not attributable to the transferred shares, but
rather to his control of the corporations.9 Thus, because decedent had trans-
ferred less than 50 percent of the outstanding shares of each corporation,
he had not transferred control, and section 2036 (a) (1) was inapplicable. 10
The Court further stated that even if decedent had transferred con-
trolling interests in the corporations, he still would not have retained en-
joyment of the property under section 2036 (a) (1).11 The Court reached
this conclusion by defining "enjoyment" to mean substantial, present eco-
nomic benefit.12 The power to liquidate or merge the corporation is
not a present benefit; rather, it is speculative and contingent, because it
may or may not be exercised.'8 The probability of continued employ-
ment and remuneration is not a substantial economic benefit for two
reasons. First, under Ohio law, the director of a corporation may be liable
for retention of incompetent officers and for payment of excessive salaries. 14
4. Byrum v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 892 (S.D. Ohio 1970), aff'd, 440
F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1971), affd, 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
5. United States v. Byrun, 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 408 U.S.
125 (1972).
6. 408 U.S. at 132.
7. Id. at 145.
8. Id. at 149.
9. Id. at 148.
10. Id. at 148-49.
11. Id. at 149.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 150.
14. Berkwitz v. Humphrey, 163 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Ohio 1958).
[Vol. 38
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Second, the Internal Revenue Service would disallow any business expense
deduction for unreasonable compensation. In refusing to recognize the as-
surance of future employment and remuneration, standing alone, as en-
joyment of the property or an income interest therein, the Court's de-
cision is in accord with previous cases that have considered the question.1 5
The Court could have determined that the totality of the decedent's
retained benefits and interests constituted enjoyment in the "normal and
customary" sense.16 By retaining control of the corporations, decedent re-
tained, in addition to the benefits noted above, that portion of the control
premium allocable to the shares that he did not transfer. Further, the
Court failed to consider the psychological or mental benefits associated
with corporate control, such as personal satisfaction, community prestige,
and business challenge. These latter benefits may be as good a measure of
the decedent's enjoyment as economic benefits. No case has ever held
that enjoyment is limited to purely economic benefits. In light of the
purpose of section 2036 (a) and its companion sections, i.e., to prevent
essentially testamentary transfers in which the grantor retains substantial
interests in the property, the argument for applying section 2036 (a) (1) has
merit.
II. SECtioN 2036 (a) (2) ARGUMNT AND HOLDING
A. The Government's Position and the Court's Response
Section 2036 (a) (2) applies to transfers in which the decedent retained
the right "to designate.., the persons who shall possess or enjoy the prop-
erty or the income therefrom."1 7 Because the dividends from the transferred
stock were virtually the sole source of income for the trust,18 the govern-
ment contended that decedent's control of corporate dividend policy al-
lowed him to determine when the beneficiaries would enjoy the in-
come.1 9 The government argued further that decedent could withhold
dividends completely, thereby shifting enjoyment to the remaindermen.2 0
In United States v. O'Malley,21 the Supreme Court held that the ability
to shift or defer the beneficial enjoyment was the right to designate the
persons who shall enjoy the property under section 2036 (a) (2). In that
case, three trustees (including settlor) could, in their sole discretion, pay
the trust income to the beneficiaries or accumulate it as principal. Thus,
the trustees could control present enjoyment of the income. In fact, they
could deny any enjoyment until the trust terminated. Although the gov-
ernment argued that O'Malley was indistinguishable, the Court refused
to reach the O'Malley result for the following reasons.
15. See Estate of William F. Hofford, 4 T.C. 790 (1945); Estate of Pamela
D. Holland, 1 T.C. 564 (1943). Unless the grantor retains some security interest
in the title to the property or other substantial enjoyment, a grant of corporate
shares contingent on future employment does not incur estate tax liability.
16. The language is that of Mr. Justice Powell defining the term "right."
408 U.S. at 156.
17. INT. RrLv. CODE of 1954, § 2036 (a) (2).
18. An insignificant amount of income was derived from the three Series
E bonds.
19. 408 U.S. at 132.
20. Id.
21. 383 U.S. 627 (1966).
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B. The Court's Rationale
1. Reasonable Reliance on Precedent
Mr. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, stated that it is a
well-established principle that a settlor's retention of broad management
powers over trust assets does not necessarily subject an inter vivos trust to
the federal estate tax.22 He believed that decedent's retained powers were
within the scope of that principle and that therefore decedent had reason-
ably relied on the principle. 23 The courts, Mr. Justice Powell concluded,
should not now penalize decedent's estate by a reexamination of the prin-
ciple; instead, review of the principle is for Congress. 24
This principle was probably inapplicable to decedent's transfer. The
lower federal court decisions that established the principle make an im-
portant distinction between two types of powers over trust assets.25 Certain
powers, the exercise of which only indirectly affects income and principal,
may be designated as administrative powers. Typically, they include the
following rights: To determine whether receipts and disbursements are
allocable to principal or income;2 6 to invest in hazardous, speculative, or
unproductive assets; 2 7 and to sell or transfer any or all of the trust property
on any terms.28 Retention of administrative powers usually will not result
in estate tax liability, even though by exercising them a settlor-trustee
could significantly affect the beneficial enjoyment of trust income.2 9 On the
other hand, a settlor-trustee's retention of direct powers over income and
principal will result in estate tax liability, unless an external, judicially
ascertainable standard qualifies the settlor-trustee's power.30 Examples are
the following powers: To invade corpus; 31 to distribute income or prin-
22. The majority relied heavily on Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278
U.S. 339 (1929), as the leading case establishing the principle. Mr. Justice White,
in dissent, pointed out that the Court had not cited Northern Trust since Estate
of Church v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 632 (1949), and that Mr. Justice Reed,
dissenting in Church, announced that he considered Northern Trust overruled.
A second case the majority relied on was Estate of Willard V. King, 37 T.C. 973
(1962). Decedent in Byrum could hardly have relied on King because it was
decided four years after Byrum drafted his trust instrument.
23. 408 U.S. at 134.
24. Id. at 135.
25. See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 601 (lst Cir.
1970); United States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1962); Jennings v. Smith,
161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947); Estate of Ralph Budd, 49 T.C. 468 (1968); Estate
of Marvin L. Pardee, 49 T.C. 140 (1967).
26. See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir.
1970); Estate of Ralph Budd, 49 T.C. 468 (1968).
27. Estate of Willard V. King, 37 T.C. 973 (1962). See also State St. Trust Co.
v. United States, 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959); Estate of Ralph Budd, 49 T.C.
468 (1968).
28. Estate of Ralph Budd, 49 T.C. 468 (1968). See also State St. Trust Co.
v. United States, 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959).
29. See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 601, 603 (1st
Cir. 1970); Estate of Willard V. King, 37 T.C. 973 (1962).
30. E.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 601, 603 (lst Cir.
1970).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1962); Estate
of Marvin L. Pardee, 49 T.C. 140 (1967).
[Vol. -38
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cipal; 32 to accumulate income; 33 and to terminate the trust.34 Thus, in
Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States,3 5 the settlor-trustee's right to termi-
nate payment of income to the beneficiary, his son, when the settlor-trustee
determined it was in his son's "best interests" resulted in federal estate tax
liability because a sufficiently ascertainable standard was lacking. On the
other hand, in Jennings v. Smith,36 where the settlor-trustee could dis-
tribute income when necessary to maintain the beneficiary's "station in
life," the court found there was a sufficiently ascertainable standard.
The trustee's fiduciary obligation alone is an insufficient qualification of
his direct powers over income and principal.37
The majority considered decedent's retained powers to be administra-
tive powers. Decedent could, therefore, reasonably rely on the principle
that retention of such powers would not subject the transfer to section
2036 (a) (2). It would have been more accurate to have classified decedent's
retained powers as direct powers. Although Byrum's exercise of his right
to vote the shares was an administrative function, his use of control to de-
termine the amount of income flowing into the trust was a direct power
over income. Moreover, no external standard qualified this power. At the
time decedent drafted his trust, the cases held that under such circumstances,
estate tax liability should result.
At the very least, the law with respect to retained powers was so un-
certain that it is inaccurate to say that decedent reasonably relied on prec-
edent. Further, the cases that developed the principle upon which the
majority relied involved settlors who were also trustees. Arguably, a trustee's
fiduciary obligation is more readily enforceable than that of a majority
shareholder. Therefore, the settlor-trustees' powers over trust income and
principal were more narrowly circumscribed than were those of Byrum.
Finally, along with retaining what were conceivably direct powers, de-
cedent retained all the usual administrative powers.38 All of these factors
tend to negate the Court's argument based upon Byrum's reasonable re-
liance on precedent.
2. The Meaning of "Right"
The majority read section 2036 (a) (2) as requiring that the decedent
retain an "ascertainable and legally enforceable power" 39 to designate the
32. Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947); Estate of Dudley C. Wil-
son, 13 T.C. 869 (1949), aff'd, 187 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1951).
33. See, e.g., United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966); Commissioner
v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480 (1946).
34. Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953); Commissioner v. Estate
of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480 (1946).
35. 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970).
36. 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947).
37. See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. United tSates, 423 F.2d 601, 603
(1st Cir. 1970).
38. The trustee had the right to allocate receipts and disbursements between
principal and income, to dispose of the assets and make reinvestments on what-
ever terms desired, and to invest in assets with no limitations whatever as to
their character. Because decedent had the right to approve all actions of the
trustee, he had very broad powers of administration over trust assets.
39. 408 U.S. at 136.
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beneficiaries who shall enjoy the income. In O'Malley, decedent's power
was that of a trustee and was legally enforceable. In Byrum, decedent's
power over trust income resulted from his ability as majority shareholder to
elect directors who would carry out his wishes with respect to dividend
and compensation policy. Byrum's power was not legally enforceable; at
best, it was a de facto power only. The Court was apparently prepared to
rely solely on this distinction for its decision under section 2036 (a) (2).4 0
Such a distinction is inconsistent with the Court's recently announced in-
tention to determine tax liability on the basis of the substance, not the
form, of a transaction.41 The result of the Byrum decision was to enable
the decedent to control the beneficial enjoyment of the property without
incurring estate tax liability; whereas, the decedent in O'Malley could not
retain such control without incurring estate tax liability. The practical
effect of the two transactions was the same. In fact, the government's case
was stronger in Byrum because decedent's withholding of beneficial enjoy-
ment could inure to his benefit directly in the form of salary. Decedent
in O'Malley did not otherwise benefit from his control of beneficial enjoy-
ment. Further, the Court's literal reading of section 2036 (a) (2) contradicts
its reading of section 2036 (a) (1) with respect to the situation where two
persons declare separate trusts with the other as beneficiary. Although these
so-called reciprocal trusts are outside the literal meaning of section
2036 (a) (1), the Court has had little difficulty holding that section ap-
plicable.42- Moreover, the federal courts have previously rejected an argu-
ment for a literal definition of "right" in section 2036 (a) (2). 43 As Mr.
Justice White points out in dissent, the legislative history of section
2036 (a) (2) lends no support to such a distinction. 44 Finally, the distinc-
tion implies a substantive difference between "right" in section 2036 (a) (2)
and "power" in section 2038, a companion section, that the courts have not
recognized.45
The Court could have found that decedent did have an ascertainable
and legally enforceable power to control the income flowing into the trust.
As majority shareholder, he could have elected himself to the board of
directors (the record does not show whether or not he was a director). Then,
in conjunction with the other directors, decedent would have had the
legal right to determine dividend policy. Section 2036 (a) (2) would have
40. See id. at 136-137.
41. See United States v. Grace, 395 U.S. 316 (1969).
42. Id.
43. See DuCharme's Estate v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1947)
modified on other grounds, 169 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1948).
44. 408 U.S. at 160 (dissenting opinion). The legislation was introduced
and passed by Congress on the last day of the session in response to a Supreme
Court decision the previous day.
45. The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HAav. L. REv. 272, 277 & n.26 (1972).
Section 2038 (a) speaks of a grantor's power to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate
the trust agreement. Retention of such a power subjects the trust to taxation. The
article points out that the test under both sections has traditionally been the same,
i.e., whether a grantor's power was limited by determinable standards enforceable
in equity. 26
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been applicable even though decedent exercised the right as a director,
rather than as a trustee.46
3. The Extent of Decedents Power
The majority determined that decedent was, in fact, unable to con-
trol the beneficial enjoyment of the property.47 Thus, even if a de facto
power were within the statutory language of section 2036 (a) (2), no federal
estate tax liability would have resulted to decedent's estate. Decedent's fi-
duciary obligation as majority shareholder to minority interests and the
fiduciary obligation of the board of directors to promote the interests of
the corporations as a whole prevented decedent from controlling trust in-
come and the beneficial enjoyment of the property.48 The dissent, however,
stated that such constraints impose no substantial restriction on the majority
shareholder's power to promote his own interests, 49 noting the deference
courts give to the directors' business judgment.5 0
The Supreme Court considered the power of a majority shareholder in
a closely held corporation in Commissioner v. Sunnen.51 In that case, tax-
payer, licensor, who owned a controlling interest in the corporate licensee,
had assigned the license contracts to his wife. The Court held that the
royalties on the license contracts were taxable to the majority shareholder
under section 22 (a) of the Internal Revenue code of 1939r2 because tax-
payer had retained, after the assignment to his wife, power over the in-
come. Essential to this holding was a finding that taxpayer could exercise
virtually complete control of corporate policy involving the license con-
tracts. The Court found that the taxpayer could go so far as to compel the
corporation to cease producing the licensed devices altogether, even though
the revenue produced by them constituted a substantial part of gross re-
ceipts. In view of Sunnen, it is arguable that decedent was actually able to
control beneficial enjoyment of the trust property.
For income tax purposes, Byrum probably would be considered the
owner of the trust under section 675 (4) (A) and (B)8 3 because of the rights
46. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1 (b) (3) (1958).
47. 408 U.S. at 143.
48. Id. at 141-42.
49. Mr. Justice White noted that few plaintiffs in derivative suits are success-
ful, citing W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALs ON CoRPoRATIONS 1587 (4th ed. 1969).
408 U.S. at 158.
50. 408 U.S. at 158-59.
51. 333 U.S. 591 (1958). Although the case dealt with power over assigned
income, rather than the right to such income, the finding that taxpayer had
control of corporate policy was a necessary element of the case. Therefore, it is
relevant precedent for the issue of control in Byrum.
52. The statutory predecessor of INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 61.
53. Section 675 provides:
The grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a trust in
respect of which-(4) A power of administration is exercisable in a non-
fiduciary capacity by any person without the approval or consent of any
person in a fiduciary capacity. For purposes of this paragraph, the term
"power of administration" means any one or more of the following
powers: (A) a power to vote or direct the voting of stock or other securities
of a corporation in which the holdings of the grantor and the trust
are significant from the viewpoint of voting control; (B) a power to
19731
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he retained in the transferred shares. The purpose of section 675 is to tax,
as income to the grantor, trust income over which the grantor retains
substantial power. Implicit in section 675 (4) (A) is the assumption that a
grantor who retains voting rights in the transferred shares that, together
with his own holdings, give him a significant amount of voting control,
has a substantial amount of power over the trust income. Clearly, the
existence of corporate fiduciary duties does not significantly diminish the
grantor's power over dividend policy for income tax purposes.
In holding that Byrum's fiduciary obligation as majority shareholder
and the fiduciary duties of the directors significantly qualified Byrum's
power to control the flow of dividend income, the Court may have signalled
an increased significance for the settlor-trustee's fiduciary obligation as a
qualification of retained interests under section 2036 (a) (2). The settlor-
trustee has the fiduciary obligation to act consistently with the best in-
terests of the beneficiaries. 54 As noted earlier,55 the courts consider this
obligation to be an insufficient qualification of a direct power over income
because the standard it imposes is too vague and uncertain to be enforceable.
The fiduciary obligations involved in Byrum impose similarly vague and
uncertain standards. Corporate directors must act in the best interests of the
corporation as a whole, and a majority shareholder cannot prejudice
minority interests. Yet, the Byrum Court found these standards to be ascer-
tainable and enforceable. In the future, consistent reasoning could result
in finding, not necessarily that a settlor-trustee's fiduciary duty alone is a
sufficiently ascertainable qualifying standard to avoid application of sec-
tion 2036 (a) (2), but that a less certain and restrictive external standard is
required. If so, settlor-trustees will be able to retain an increased amount
of control over transferred property without incurring federal estate tax
liability.
III. CONCLUSION
The Byrum Court could well have found that the transfer decedent
made was within the scope of section 2036 (a). Its failure to do so may repre-
sent concern for the unique estate planning problems of the controlling
shareholder of a closely held corporation. Mr. Justice Powell mentions
some of these considerations in footnotes to his opinion.5 6 If the govern-
ment's control rationale, asserted under both paragraphs of section 2036 (a),
had been accepted, the irrevocable trust as a means of keeping the value of
the shares out of the gross estate would be unavailable to all grantors who
still had voting control of the corporation after the transfer. This would be
true regardless of how the ownership of the shares was split between the
grantor and the trust.Y7 Thus, the controlling shareholder would be en-
control the investment of the trust funds either by directing investments
or reinvestments, or by vetoing proposed investments and reinvestments,
to the extent that the trust funds consist of stocks or securities of corpora-
tions in which the holdings of the grantor and the trust are significant
from the viewpoint of voting control....
54. Old Colony Trust Go. v. United States, 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970).
55. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
56. See 408 U.S. at 132 n.4, 137 n.10, 138 n.13, 149 n.34.
57. The irrevocable trust would still be available to the individual who had
fully as much wealth in the form' of stock but did not have a controlling interest,
[Vol. 38
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couraged to liquidate his business at some point in his life; and that por-
tion of the market thereby vacated might well be taken over by a large,
publicly held corporation. Alternatively, he would be encouraged to merge
his corporation with a larger, publicly held business. Operation of a small
business would therefore be discouraged at a time when many view the
centralization of power in American industry with alarm.
BRooKS WOOD
INCOME TAXATION-BUSINESS BAD DEBT
DEDUCTION FOR SHAREHOLDER-EMPLOYEE-
DOMINANT MOTIVATION REQUIRED
United States v. Generes'
Taxpayer Generes owned 44 percent of the stock of a corporation
engaged in construction work. His original investment in this stock was
$38,900. A son and a son-in-law of taxpayer owed 12 percent of the shares.
As president of the enterprise, taxpayer received an annual salary of
$12,000. He devoted no more than six to eight hours a week to this
position, because he also served as president of a savings and loan associ-
ation, a full-time job paying an annual salary of $19,000. Taxpayer earned
a total income of approximately $40,000 per year. In 1958, he signed a
blanket indemnity agreement with a surety company which furnished
bid and performance bonds for the corporation's construction projects.
In 1962, taxpayer paid the underwriter more than $162,000 when the
corporation defaulted on a project. That same year, the corporation
entered receivership, and taxpayer was unable to obtain reimbursement.2
Taxpayer deducted part of the resulting loss as a business bad debt on
his 1962 federal income tax return and carried back the excess as a net
operating loss. The Commissioner disallowed this carryback on the ground
that taxpayer's indemnification loss constituted a nonbusiness bad debt.
Taxpayer sued for a refund in district court.3
Section 166 of the Internal Revenue Code deals with bad debts. This
section permits taxpayers to deduct business bad debts to the extent of
ordinary income.4 If this deduction does not exhaust these losses, tax-
i.e., the shareholder in a publicly held corporation. This possible inequity is in-
creased by the fact that the liquidity problem arising when closely held shares
are subjected to estate tax is much greater than in the case of publicly held shares.
1. 405 U.S. 93 (1972).
2. Id. at 97-99.
3. Generes v. United States, 67-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 85,534, 85,535-36 (E.D. La.
1967), aff'd, 427 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1970), re-dd, 405 U.S. 93 (1972).
4. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 166 provides in part:
(a) GENERAL uruE.-
(1) WHOLLY WORTHLESS DEBT.-There shall be allowed as a deduc-
tion any debt which becomes worthless within the taxable year.
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payers may carry back the unused portion under section 172.5 Nonbusiness
bad debts, however, receive less favorable tax treatment.0 Thus, the issue
in Generes was whether taxpayer's loss constituted a business or a non-
business bad debt under section 166 of the Internal Revenue Code.7
The district court, by special interrogatory, asked the jury to deter-
mine whether taxpayer's loss was "proximately related to his trade or
business of being an employee" of the corporation.8 The government argued
that to satisfy the proximate relationship requirement, taxpayer's corporate
employment must have been his dominant motivation for signing the
indemnity agreement. The district judge, however, instructed the jury
that significant motivation is the proper standard. The jury found that
the requisite proximate relation to trade or business existed, and the
court entered judgment for taxpayer.9
The government unsuccessfully appealed to the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, which approved the significant motivation standard.' 0
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among
the circuits.-1 In reversing the Fifth Circuit, the Court held that dominant
motivation is the proper criterion for determining whether a bad debt
bears a proximate relation to the trade or business of a shareholder-
employee. The Court further held that taxpayer's indemnification loss
(d) NoNnusunss Drs.-(1) GxmumzA. Ru..-In the case of a taxpayer other than a corpora-
tion-(A) subsections (a) and (c) shall not apply to any nonbusiness
debt; and(B) where any nonbusiness debt becomes worthless within the
taxable year, the loss resulting therefrom shall be considered a
loss from the sale or exchange, during the taxable year, of a
capital asset held for not more than 6 months.(2) NoNBusmxss DmT DEF-NED.-For purposes of paragraph (1), the
term "nonbusiness debt" means a debt other than-(A) a debt created or acquired (as the case may be) in connection
with a taxpayer's trade or business; or(B) a debt the loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred
in the taxpayer's trade or business.
5. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 172 states that when a taxpayer's business
deductions exceed his business gross income, he may carry the loss back three
years and then carry it forward five years.
6. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 166 (d) (1) (B) treats losses resulting from
nonbusiness debts as short-term capital losses. Thus, tax treatment of nonbusiness
bad debts is subject to the restrictions imposed by sections 1211 and 1212. Further,
section 172 (d) (4) restricts the use of nonbusiness losses for carryback purposes:
NoNBusNxss DEDUcriONs or TAxPAYERS OTHER THAN CORPORATIONS-In the
case of a taxpayer other than a corporation, the deductions allowable by
this chapter which are not attributable to a taxpayer's trade or business
shall be allowed only to the extent of the amount of the gross income
not derived from such trade or business ....
7. 405 U.S. at 94-95.
8. 67-2 U.S. Tax Gas. at 85,535; see note 24 infra; text accompanying note
26 infra.
9. 67-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 85,536, 85,540, 85,542.
10. United States v. Generes, 427 F.2d 279, 282-83 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'd,
405 U.S. 93 (1972).
11. See text accompanying notes 34-39 infra.
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constituted a nonbusiness bad debt as a matter of law and remanded
the case, directing entry of judgment for the United States. 12
Because a corporation has a legal personality separate from its share-
holders, the phrase "trade or business" possesses a special meaning for
tax purposes.' 3 A shareholder qua shareholder is not engaged in a trade
or business.14 Corporate employment, however, qualifies as an independent
trade or business under the Internal Revenue Code.1 5 In Generes, tax-
payer's dual status relative to the corporation was responsible for the
litigation. 16
In Higgins v. Commissioner,17 taxpayer sought to deduct salaries and
expenses incurred in the management of his investment portfolio, under
section 23 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. The Supreme Court,
in denying the deduction, stated that managing one's investments does
not constitute a trade or business, regardless of the time consumed.' 8
To relieve taxpayers in the Higgins-type situation, Congress amended
section 23 (a) of the 1939 Code by the Revenue Act of 1942. This act
allowed a deduction for expenses incurred in income-producing activities
which did not amount to a trade or business.' 9 At the same time, Congress
narrowed section 23 (k) (the forerunner of present section 166) to dis-
tinguish between business and nonbusiness bad debts. 20 The major purpose
in making this distinction was to prohibit business bad debt deductions
for loans made by a taxpayer to his family or friends with no expectation
of repayment.2 ' As a related purpose, Congress sought "to put nonbusiness
investments in the form of loans on a footing with other nonbusiness
investments."22
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides no test for determining
whether a bad debt is business or nonbusiness.2 3 Treasury Regulations
12. 405 U.S. at 103, 106. Two Justices took no part in the decision. Id. at
107. Two Justices would have remanded the case to allow the trial court to decide
whether a new trial was merited. Id. at 112 (White & Brennan, JJ., concurring).
13. See Burnet v. Clark, 287 U.S. 410 (1932).
14. See, e.g., Whipple v. Commissioner, 378 U.S. 193 (1963); Putnam v.
Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82 (1956); Rev. Rul. 60-48, 1960-1 Ctnmr. BULL. 112.
15. See, e.g., Batzell v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 371 (4th Cir. 1959); Roberts
v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1958); Pierce v. United States, 254 F.2d
885 (9th Cir. 1958); Overly v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 576 (3d Cir. 1957); Folker
v. Johnson, 230 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1956).
An anamolous situation arises when a taxpayer is an investor in a limited
partnership. See George A. Butler, 36 T.C. 1097 (1961), where taxpayer was
granted a business bad debt deduction.
16. 405 U.S. at 100.
17. 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
18. Id. at 215.
19. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23 (a), as amended, ch. 619, § 121, 56 Stat. 819(1943) (now INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 212).
20. Revenue Act of 1942, § 124, 56 Stat. 820.
21. H.R. RE. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 45, 76-77 (1942); S. REP. No.
1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, 90 (1942).
22. Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82, 92 (1956).
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promulgated under present section 166,24 however, adopt the language
of the committee reports on former section 23 (k).25 These Regulations
define business bad debt as a bad debt that bears a proximate relation
to the trade or business of the taxpayer.2 6
In Trent v. Commissioner,2 t taxpayer successfully argued that his
loan to a corporation constituted a business bad debt. Taxpayer owned
one-third of the stock of his corporate employer. The controlling share-
holder threatened to terminate taxpayer's employment, unless taxpayer
made certain loans to the company. After taxpayer complied with these
demands, the loans became worthless. The Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that a corporate employee is entitled to a business bad debt
deduction for worthless obligations that he incurs because of his employee
status (e.g., a loan made to protect his employment with the corporation).28
The court did not specifically allude to the Regulations' test. Subsequent
decisions, however, have cited the Trent opinion as a leading example
of a proximate relationship-type analysis.29
The Supreme Court approved the Regulations' test in Whipple V.
24. Treas. Reg. § 1.166-5 (b) (2) (1959) (emphasis added) provides:(b) Nonbusiness debt defined. For purposes of section 166 and this sec-
tion, a nonbusiness debt is any debt other than-
(2) A debt the loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the
taxpayer's trade or business. The question whether a debt is a nonbusiness
debt is a question of fact in each particular case. . . . For purposes of
subparagraph (2) of this paragraph, the character of the debt is to be
determined by the relation which the loss resulting from the debt's be-
coming worthless bears to the trade or business of the taxpayer. If that
relation is a proximate one in the conduct of the trade or business in
which the taxpayer is engaged at the time the debt becomes worthless,
the debt comes within the exception provided by that subparagraph....
25. Both the Senate and House committee reports contain the following
language:
The character of the debt for this purpose is not controlled by the
circumstances attending its creation or its subsequent acquisition by the
taxpayer or by the use to which the borrowed funds are put by the
recipient, but is to be determined rather by the relation which the loss
resulting from the debt's becoming worthless bears to the trade or
business of the taxpayer. If that relation is a proximate one in the conduct
of the trade or business in which the taxpayer is engaged at the time the
debt becomes worthless, the debt is not a nonbusiness debt for the pur-
poses of this amendment.
H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 63, 77 (1942); S. REP. No. 1631, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 65, 90 (1942) (emphasis added).
26. See note 24 supra.
27. 291 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1961).
28. Id.; see Rev. Rul. 71-561, 1971-2 Cum. BuLL. 128.
29. In Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193 (1963), the United States
Supreme Court stated:
Moreover, there is no proof (which might be difficult to furnish where
the taxpayer is the sole or dominant stockholder) that the loan was
necessary to keep his job or was otherwise proximately related to main-
taining his trade or business as an employee. Compare Trent v. Commis-
sioner ....
Id. at 204. (emphasis added).
[Vol. 38
32
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [1973], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss2/6
RECENT CASES
Commissioner.30 Taxpayer, the controlling stockholder, provided mana-
gerial services for the corporation. He claimed that a business bad debt
resulted when his loan to the company became uncollectible. The Whipple
opinion stated that to qualify for a business bad debt deduction, taxpayer
must initially demonstrate that he is engaged in "an independent trade
or business of his own." 31 The Court then held that providing managerial
services to a corporation in order to enhance one's investment does not
constitute a trade or business for tax purposes.3 2 Although the Court in
Whipple did not reach the Generes-type question, the opinion carefully
distinguished between business and nonbusiness bad debts for a share-
holder-employee:
[C]are must be taken to distinguish bad debt losses arising from
his own busines and those actually arising from activities peculiar
to an investor concerned with, and participating in, the conduct
of the corporate business.83
In applying the Regulations' test to shareholder-employees, the courts
of appeals differed as to the proper measure of proximate relationship.
In Weddle v. Commissioner,3 4 taxpayer was the salaried president and
controlling stockholder of the corporation. She guaranteed certain loans
to the company when a business venture depleted its working capital.
After liquidation of the corporation, taxpayer partially paid one of these
loans and claimed a deduction for a business bad debt. Although the Sec-
ond Circuit applied the significant motivation standard,3 5 taxpayer failed
to meet this test; her employment with the corporation was not a significant
motivation for the loan guarantees.3 6
The Seventh Circuit, however, rejected the significant motivation
test in Niblock v. Commissioner.3 ' Taxpayer owned a one-half interest in
a corporation and received a salary as an officer. After sustaining losses
on loan guarantees, he sought a business bad debt deduction. The court
held that to qualify for this deduction, taxpayer's corporate employment
must have been his primary or dominant motivation for guaranteeing
the loans. Because taxpayer's dominant motivation was to protect his
stock value, the deduction was denied. The court interpreted the Whipple
language 3 as requiring a strict standard of proximate relationship for
30. Id.; see note 29 supra; United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93, 102 (1972).
31. 373 U.S. at 202; see id. at 201-03.
32. Id. at 202.
33. Id.
34. 325 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1963).
35. Id. at 851. The court relied on the tort concept of proximate cause as
an aid in determining the meaning of "proximate" in the Regulations. The Fifth
Circuit in Generes was impressed by this reasoning. 427 F.2d at 282.
36. 325 F.2d at 852. A concurring judge criticized the test, but not the
result. He pointed out that two fundamental motivations (protecting salary and
investment) are invariably involved in this type of situation. The concurring
opinion stated that asking whether the protection of salary motivation was sig-
nificant will usually result in a verdict for taxpayer. It concluded that the majority
had not applied its own logic. Id. at 852-53 (concurring opinion).
37. 417 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1969).
38. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
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shareholder-employees. The opinion reasoned that only the dominant
motivation standard could provide certainty to the interpretation of
section 166.39
Most courts adopted dominant motivation as the criterion for proxi-
mate relationship.40 Apparently, in the interim between Weddle and
Generes, only one case unreservedly applied the significant motivation
standard.4 A few decisions rested on the cautionary language in Whippie 42
without discussion of dominant or significant motivation.48 Finally, some
courts avoided selecting between the competing standards by determining
that taxpayer could not even meet the significant motivation test.44
The cases manifest a cautious approach to the business bad debt
problem.45 The courts have limited application of the Trent doctrine to
situations where the shareholder-employee is required to make the loan.40
Shareholder-employees have argued that loans made to keep the corpora-
tion functioning are proximately related to their corporate employment.
This contention emphasizes that if the corporation fails, the taxpayer
will lose his job. This circular reasoning, however, has not impressed
the courts. 47 A controlling shareholder cannot argue that he will be fired
if he does not make the loan. Further, such taxpayers usually make loans
to the corporation in order to protect their proprietary interest. Thus,
some courts have candidly admitted that a controlling shareholder will
usually fail to obtain a business bad debt deduction.48
Determining whether a shareholder-employee has incurred a business
or nonbusiness bad debt is largely a matter of balancing the facts on a
case-by-case basis. The courts have regarded the following factors as
significant in establishing a proximate relationship between the bad debt
39. 417 F.2d at 1187. In Generes, however, the Fifth Circuit interpreted
Whipple as impliedly allowing a more lenient standard. 427 F.2d at 282. See also
Stratmore v. United States, 420 F.2d 461, 467 (3d Cir.) (dissenting opinion),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 951 (1970).
40. E.g., Eugene H. Rietzke, 40 T.C. 443 (1963); Ida Rosati, 39 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 1815 (1970); Estate of A.M. Saperstein, 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mer. 1005
(1970); Phillip W. Fitzpatrick, 86 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1 (1967); see, e.g., Frank
S. Howe, 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 60 (1964).
41. Raymond E. Morrow, 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 264 (1965). In Oddee Smith,
55 T.C. 260 (1970), vacated, 457 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1972), the court stated that
it agreed with the Seventh Circuit test, but felt constrained to apply the Fifth
Circuit standard. The case has been vacated and remanded in light of the
Generes ruling.
42. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
43. E.g., Millsap v. Commissioner, 387 F.2d 420, 422 (8th Cir. 1968); see,
e.g., James J. Brahms, 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1561 (1964).
44. E.g., Stratmore v. United States, 420 F.2d 461 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 951 (1970); Kelly v. Patterson, 331 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1964); Robert E.
Gillespie, 54 T.C. 1025 (1970).
45. See United States v. Generes 405 U.S. 93, 103 (1972).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Worrell, 398 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1968); Estate
of Martha M. Byers, 57 T.C. 568 (1972); Sol Gelfond, 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
1580 (1964).
47. See, e.g., Stratmore v. United States, 420 F.2d 461, 464 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 951 (1970).
48. See, e.g., Millsap v. Commissioner, 387 F.2d 420, 422 (8th Cir. 1968);
see note 29 supra.
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and the shareholder's corporate employment: 49 (1) A requirement that
the shareholder-employee make the loan as a condition of continued
employment;5 0 (2) the probability that the taxpayer will be unable to
find other employment, because of age or personality problems;51 (3)
the accrual of little or no investment income to the taxpayer; 52 (4) own-
ership by the taxpayer of a small proportionate equity interest; 53 (5) a
disproportionate relationship between the size of the shareholder-employee's
loan and the value of his investment.5 4 The presence of one or more of
these factors in a case will not always result in a successful business bad
debt argument. These factors, however, do tend to demonstrate the ex-
istence of a proximate relationship.
The Generes opinion emphasized that the Internal Revenue Code
distinguishes between business and nonbusiness items, not only in section
166, but also in other sections.55 The Court reasoned that adoption of
the significant motivation standard would obliterate or blunt this dis-
tinction.55 Dominant motivation was appraised as a more workable test:
"It provides a guideline of certainty for the trier of fact. The trier then
may compare the risk against the potential reward and give proper
emphasis to the objective rather than to the subjective." 57 After articulat-
ing the policy of promoting consistency in tax law, the opinion pointed
49. A discussion of the promoter of corporations or business of lending
money theories is beyond the scope of this note. For discussion of the former, see
Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193, 202-03 (1962); Giblin v. Commissioner,
227 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1955). United States v. Henderson, 375 F.2d 36 (5th
Cir. 1967), discusses the requirements of the loan business doctrine. For a general
survey of these theories, see 5 J. MERTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOmE TAXATION
§ 30.25 (1969).
50. Trent v. Commissioner, 291 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1961); see text accompany-
ing notes 27-29, 46 supra.
51. Isidor Jaffe, 36 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1167 (1967). Isidor and Samuel
Jaffe each held a 50 percent interest in a corporation. Isidor was 70 years old
and virutally unemployable if he lost his job. Samuel's personality made work-
ing for an enterprise not under his control difficult. The court did not discuss
dominant or significant motivation, but held that taxpayers made the loans to
protect their employment. In Estate of Kent Avery, 38 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 385
(1969), a talented fabric stylist, who because of personality problems could not
work well with others, formed a wholly owned corporation. The court held
that he was entitled to a business bad debt deduction. The opinion reasoned
that the advance was primarily related to his trade or business as a stylist, because
it enabled him to carry on his work. See also Philip W. Fitzpatrick, 36 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 1 (1967).
52. See B.A. Faucher, 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1039 (1970); Isidor Jaffe, 36
P-H Tax Cut. Mem. 1167 (1967).
53. See Philip W. Fitzpatrick, 36 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1 (1967).
54. See Ida Rosati, 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1815 (1970).
55. 405 U.S. at 103. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 165 (c) (1) provides for deduc-
tions for losses incurred in a trade or business, and § 165 (c) (2) provides for
"losses incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though not connected
with a trade or business." Section 162 gives allowances for trade or business
expenses. Section 262 states: "Except as otherwise expressly provided in this
chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses."
56. 405 U.S. at 103-04. But see Note, Shareholder-Creditor Bad Debts Under
Section 166 of the Internal Revenue Code, 75 HA.v. L. Rxv. 589, 601 (1962).
57. 405 U.S. at 104.
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out that dominant motivation is the test under several other related Code
sections. 58 The Court, however, found no inconsistency in the application
of significant motivation in some areas of tax avoidance activity. 0 Finally,
the analogy to the tort concept of proximate cause did not impress the
Court.60
Critics of the Generes opinion point out that the dominant motivation
test does not appear in the Code or Regulations, and thus is a judge-made
standard, imposing a heavy burden of proof on the taxpayer01 The Court,
however, feared that adoption of the significant motivation test would
create a loophole enabling taxpayers to mitigate their investment losses;
taxpayers on corporate payrolls at nominal salaries could claim business
bad debt deductions for losses from investments made in the form of
loans.62
To conclude, Generes does not offer a litmus test for deciding whether
a debt is business or nonbusiness, but does set out a workable guideline
for future cases. Dominant motivation is a sounder test than significant
motivation, because it provides a more objective analysis of the relation-
ship between the bad debt and taxpayer's corporate employment.
KIMBERLY SOMERVILLE HUGHES
58. Id. at 105; see Imbesi v. Commissioner, 361 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1966)
(primary motivation required for a deduction under section 165 (c) (1)); Austin v.
Commissioner, 298 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1962) (primary motivation required for a
deduction under section 165 (c) (2)).
59. 405 U.S. at 105; see United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297 (1969);
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 98 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied,
306 U.S. 648 (1939).
60. 405 U.S. at 105. The Court stated: "It has little place in tax law where
plural aspects are not usual, where an item either is or is not a deduction, or
either is or is not a business bad debt, and where certainty is desirable." Id.
61. 405 U.S. at 113 (dissenting opinion); Note, Shareholder-Creditor Bad
Debts Under Section 166 of the Internal Revenue Code, 75 HAiv. L. REv. 589,
601 (1962).
62. See 405 U.S. at 111 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall in con-
curring pointed out that Congress had this sort of intra-family loan in mind
when it distinguished between business and nonbusiness bad debts: "The fact
that he took a nominal salary for nominal services does not, in my opinion,
require a different result." Id.
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IMPLIED WARRANTY IN THE SALE OF A NEW HOUSE
Smith v. Old Warson Development Co.1
The defendant subdivided a tract of land into residential lots and
hired an agent to construct a display home, which the plaintiffs purchased.
The contract of sale contained no warranties concerning the quality of the
house. Defendant conveyed the property by general warranty deed. Within a
few months, a concrete slab supporting two rooms settled, causing the doors
to stick, the caulked space between the bathtub and wall to become larger,
cracks to develop in the walls, and a space to appear between a baseboard
and wall.
Plaintiffs brought an action for damages. Their complaint set forth
two alternative theories of recovery: (1) Breach of an implied warranty of
fitness2 for use as a residence; and (2) negligence in the construction of the
house. At the close of defendant's evidence, plaintiffs submitted the case
only on the theory of implied warranty of fitness. After the jury returned a
verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, the trial judge directed a verdict for the
defendant. The St. Louis Court of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme
Court of Missouri adopted the lower appellate court's opinion.
Until recent years, courts have been reluctant to allow purchasers of
new homes to recover damages for defects in the homes. Generally, they
have required an express covenant of habitability and fitness in the deed
before granting such relief.3 Recently, however, some courts have permitted
recovery without such a covenant. 4 In so doing, these courts have employed
one of three theories: Strict liability; 5 statutory warranty; 6 or implied
warranty.
The vast majority of cases permitting recovery in this area utilize the
implied warranty theory.7 As early as 1884, in the case of Kellogg Bridge Co.
1. 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. En Banc 1972).
2. As used in this casenote, the terms "implied warranty" and "implied
warranty of fitness" are used as the phrase "implied warranty of merchantability"
is used under the UNIFORm CommRcLAJL CODE § 2-314.
3. See, e.g., Druid Homes, Inc. v. Cooper, 131 So. 2d 884 (Ala. 1961); Allen
v. Reichert, 73 Ariz. 91, 237 P.2d 818 (1951); Berger v. Burkoff, 200 Md. 561, 92
A.2d 376 (Ct. App. 1952).
4. 71 W. VA. L. Rnv. 87 (1968).
5. See Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr.
633 (1969); Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr.
749 (1969); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965) (the
most frequently cited case in this area); Dyer, Extension of Products Liability to a
Land Developer, 35 Mo. L. REv. 239 (1970).
6. Only Louisiana has such a statutory warranty. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art.
2475 (West 1952). The 1967 New York Law Revision Commission recommended
similar legislation, but no action has been taken as of this time. Most states
have local ordinances containing building and zoning regulations. Violations of
these ordinances may affect the liability of the builder-vendor. In Carpenter v.
Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964), the court noted violations of building
code provisions, but this was not the controlling point for finding an implied war-
ranity.
7. See, e.g., Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970);
Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. App.) aff'd 264 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1972); Bethlahmy
v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Weeks v. Slavik Builders, Inc., 24
19731
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v. Hamilton,8 the Supreme Court of the United States recognized that, in
an appropriate situation, there is an implied warranty in the sale of realty.
The Court said that if the buyer justifiably relied on the judgment of the
builder-vendors, the law implies a warranty that the article is reasonably
fit for the use for which it was designed.9 Such an implied warranty was the
basis of the Smith deision, and this note concerns itself with that theory.10
Two doctrines have been traditional bars to recovery under implied
warranties in the sale of residential real estate. These doctrines are caveat
emptor and merger.
The doctrine of caveat emptor places upon the purchaser all risk as to
the quality or condition of the property being sold." Thus, caveat emptor
requires that the purchaser examine, judge, and test for himself the prop-
erty that he buys.12 The doctrine is inapplicable where the vendor has mis-
represented the quality or condition of the property.' 3 Further, the parties
can place the risk of defects on the vendor by entering into an express
covenant to that effect.14
Many authorities have found that current policy considerations favor
abandoning caveat emptor. The doctrine was designed to apply when
parties to a sale were on an equal footing. The builder-vendor and the
purchaser of a new home are not on an equal footing, however. The pur-
Mich. App. 621, 180 N.W.2d 503, aff'd, 384 Mich. 257, 181 N.W.2d 271 (1970);
Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev. Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967); Humber v.
Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968); Rothberg v. Olenik, 128 Vt. 295, 262 A.2d
461 (1970); House v. Thornton, 76 Wash. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969).
8. 110 U.S. 108 (1884).
9. .ld. at 116.
10. Arguably, the implied warranty created by Smith is in the nature of strict
liability in tort. This proposition is supported by the court's reference to Keener
v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969). Keener expressly adopted
the theory of strict liability as expressed in RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or ToRTS §
402A (1965). Smith quotes from Keener:
The difference between "strict liability" or "implied warranty" would not
in this state be one of substance ... since our courts are clearly recog-
nizing the tort nature of the liability imposed.
479 S.W.2d at 798. See also Krauskopf, Products Liability, 32 Mo. L. Rlv. 459,
469 (1967).
If Smith is viewed as essentially a strict liability case, perhaps the contract law
considerations dealt with by the court were inappropriate. That is, merger, privity,
and disclaimers are irrelevant to recovery in strict liability. Instead, other tort de-
fenses may be available to the builder-vendor. For example, a defendant could
raise the defense of "contributory fault" (see Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co.,
supra at 365), or he could allege "assumption of the risk." See Keeton, Assump-
tion of Products Risks, 19 Sw. L.J. 61 (1965).
11. State ex rel. Jones Store Co. v. Shain, 352 Mo. 630, 634, 179 S.W.2d 19,
20 (En Banc 1944). This case involves personal property, but the rule stated has
general applicability.
12. Hargous v. Stone, 5 N.Y. 73, 82 (1851); Humphrey v. Baker, 71 Okla.
272, 176 P. 896 (1918). These cases involve personal property, but the definition
of caveat emptor is the same for personalty and realty.
13. See State ex rel. Jones Store Co. v. Shain, 352 Mo. 630, 634, 179 S.W.2d
19, 20 (En Banc 1944).
14. See generally Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults
Upon the Rule, 14 VAmP. L. REv. 541, 543-44 (1961).
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chaser lacks the competence to discover latent defects; 15 therefore, he must
rely on the skill and judgment of the builder-vendor. 16 Also, the mass pro-
ducer of homes is now a merchant as well as an artisan. As such, he no
longer merits the special protection afforded by caveat emptor.17 In fact,
he is in a better position than the purchaser to spread the risk of defects in
homes.1s Further, he is in a better position to select a proper site, materials,
and foundation. This makes the builder-vendor, even if he is exercising
reasonable care, less innocent than the completely innocent and unsuspect-
ing purchaser.' 9
Of course, those favoring caveat emptor have countervailing argu-
ments. They argue that it is difficult to distinguish a latent defect from a
defect arising through natural wear and that the vendee often provides
improper maintenance for the house. Further, they argue that the vendee's
expectations of quality are often unreasonable. Finally, they point out that,
at present, there is no reasonably priced insurance to cover the builder-
vendor in the absence of caveat emptor.20
The second bar to recovery on an implied warranty in the sale of
realty is the doctrine of merger. Under this doctrine, any implied or express
warranties in the contract of sale merge into the deed, and are thereby
lost upon execution of the deed, unless expressly included therein.21 Because
of the harshness of this doctrine, courts have created many exceptions to
the general rule.2 2 Additionally, some judicial thought has recently de-
emphasized the importance of merger by finding it merely a corollary of
15. Id. at 545.
16. Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U.S. 108, 116 (1884) (involved a
bridge, not a house); Vernali v. Centrella, 28 Conn. Supp. 476, 266 A.2d 200 (Super.
Ct. 1970); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 67, 415 P.2d 698, 710 (1966).
17. Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant
Did It, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 835, 863 (1967).
18. Schipper v. Levitt 9: Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 91, 207 A.2d 314, 326 (1965).
19. House v. Thornton, 76 Wash. 2d 428, 435, 457 P.2d 199, 204 (1969).
20. Bearman, supra note 14, at 573.
21. 7 S. WmIsLroN, CoNTracrs § 926, at 797 (3d ed. 1963).
22. Roberts, supra note 17, at 860. See generally Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 383
(1969). Under the exception of "collateral promises," if the parties intended that
a covenant survive the deed, it did, even if not included in the deed. This excep-
tion required awkward determinations of what the parties' actual intent was. More-
over, in some jurisdictions the vendor could avoid the doctrine by stating in the
contract that merger should operate on all warranties not within the deed. In
many other jurisdictions, the courts decided this statement could only be ap-
plicable and sensible in regard to patent defects, as opposed to latent defects.
Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957), exempli-
fies another exception. Vanderschrier, one of the earliest American cases finding
an implied warranty in the contract for sale of a new house, also demonstrates the
importance of merger in the older cases. The court found an implied warranty
where the contract of sale was entered into prior to completion of the house, but
expressly distinguished this situation from one where the house is completed prior
to the sale. Where the contract of sale is entered into prior to completion of the
house, the purchaser needs an implied warranty because he has no opportunity to
inspect the finished product before becoming legally bound and must, therefore,
rely on the builder. If the contract of sale is entered into after completion, merger
would bar any implied warranties therein, because the purchaser can inspect the
completed premises with no necessary reliance on the builder-vendor.
1973]
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caveat emptor.23 Thus, if the court rejects caveat emptor, it automatically
rejects merger as well. Moreover, some have said that merger should not
operate in the case of sales of new homes, as it would in other instances of
real property sales, because mass-produced homes are comparable to any
other mass-produced product. Therefore, a new house should have the same
status under the law as a mass-produced automobile.2 4
In Smith, the court dealt directly with the implied warranty theory
and the doctrines of caveat emptor and merger. Before Smith, the Missouri
courts had rejected the possibility of an implied warranty in the sale of
real estate. In Combow v. Kansas City Ground Investment Co., 25 the court
stated: "[A]bsent an express agreement to the contrary, a seller of real
estate cannot be held liable for defective condition of the premises."20
Smith, however, repudiated this position, and established that in Missouri
an implied common law warranty of merchantable quality and fitness ex-
ists in the sale of new homes. The court decided that caveat emptor should
not bar the purchaser's recovery, because the doctrine is no longer in ac-
cord with modem home-buying practices.2 7 The modem purchaser has no
opportunity to inspect the house during construction. Further, his com-
paratively weak bargaining position prevents him from demanding war-
ranties in the deed. The court also determined that the doctrine of merger
does not bar recovery for defects in a new home, because the implied
warranty does not arise from the contract of sale at all. Rather, the court
stated, "[I]mplied warranty is a tort concept not a contract right. Plaintiffs'
rights arise as a matter of law from their purchase of the house, not from
their sale contract or the deed."2 8 Thus, merger is not even an appropriate
consideration. 29
Although the court clearly disposed of the caveat emptor and merger
problems, it left unresolved several problems related to the implied warranty
in the sale of a new house. One such problem is how serious the defect in
the house must be to permit recovery. The Smith court said that the implied
warranty requires a product of reasonable quality or fitness; it does not
23. See, e.g., Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968). The cases that
give some weight to the doctrine of merger in the implied warranty situation hold
that the doctrine of caveat emptor applies to sales of real property, reducing the
"merger" theory to the status of a "unicorn hunting bow" (a broken and in-
operative cross-bow that suffices for its purpose because no one has seen a uni-
corn since the time of Noah).
24. Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 227, 74 Cal. Rptr.
749, 752 (1969); Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Mo. En
Banc 1972); Rothberg v. Olenik, 262 A.2d 461, 467 (Vt. 1970). In Smith, the court
stated: "Although considered to be a 'real estate' transaction because the owner-
ship to land is transferred, the purchase of a residence in most cases is the pur-
chase of a manufactured product-the house." Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co.,
sup ra.
25. 358 Mo. 934, 218 S.W.2d 539 (1949).
26. Id. at 938, 218 S.W.2d at 541.
27. 479 S.W.2d at 801.
28. Id. at 800.
29. See note 10 supra. Smith relies on Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445
S.W.2d 362 (1969), to avoid the merger doctrine.
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require a perfect product.3 0 Some commentators, however, have deemed
the "reasonableness" test too broad.31 They argue that reasonableness test
opens up the possibility that the building industry will be burdened with
recoveries for minor defects, because the average juror will find virtually
any defect unreasonable. The test that they propose, however, is arguably
just the Smith reasonableness standard couched in more specific terms.3 2
At any rate, what "reasonable" means in this context is, at present, un-
known.33
The next problem Smith raises is the degree of privity of contract re-
quired for the plaintiff to recover. Both the St. Louis Court of Appeals and
the Missouri Supreme Court referred to the defendant as the "builder-ven-
dor," thus avoiding any question of privity. The court of appeals carefully
referred to the actual builder as the defendant's agent. Although the court
avoided the privity issue, it was careful to point out a recent Missouri Su-
preme Court decision, Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp.,34 that abolished
the requirement of privity in an implied warranty on personalty.85
In cases where the builder and vendor cannot be characterized as the
same entity, the courts normally permit recovery against the builder, but not
the vendor, although no privity exists between the builder and the con-
sumer purchaser.33 It appears very unlikely that the Missouri courts will im-
30. 479 S.W.2d at 798-99. The court also said that the duration of liability
would be premised on a standard of reasonableness. Id. at 801. See also Schipper
v. Levitt &: Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 92, 207 A.2d 314, 826 (1965).
31. See, e.g., Bearman, supra note 14, at 575.
32. See id. Bearman suggests the following test: "Will this construction pass
without objection in the trade?" In view of UNFOam COAMERCIAL CODE § 2-314,
query whether this test is distinguishable from Smith's reasonableness test. Section
2-314, which promulgates what is basically a reasonableness test (Woodruff v.
Clark County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 286 N.E.2d 188, 194 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972)),
adopts language identical to that of the Bearman test to serve as one of its sug-
gested tests for determining merchantability of goods.
33. See generally Hammon, Homeowners' Litigious Revenge, INs. L.J. 681
(1970). This enlightening article discloses that virtually every dwelling is improperly
constructed to some degree. The author states:
The last house I inspected in this respect had 77 defects, only 6 of which
the owners had noticed .... The ones I found were the serious variety
that posed a constant danger to the entire family and which probably
would make the jury angry that any builder could be so callous.
Id. at 684.
Under a test that permits compensation for every "unreasonable" defect, will not
the purchaser be encouraged to search out and sue for defects that may never
cause serious inconvenience? The end result could be an unbearable burden on
the building industry.
34. 362 S.W.2d 282 (Spr. Mo. App. 1962), affd, 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. En
Banc 1963).
35. 479 S.W.2d at 798.
36. See Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966). But see
UNIFoR CozmtRcuA CODE § 2-314. The Code imposes liability on the merchant
as well as the manufacturer. No stated rationale has been found for immunizing
the merchant of houses. Perhaps the variance in treatment can be explained by
the fact that the commercial vendor who is not also the builder is in little better
position than the consumer-purchaser in discovering defects by his own inspection.
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pose a requirement of privity in this situation.37 The consumer purchaser
is the person who should derive the benefit of an implied warranty. 8 It is
submitted that the builder should be unable to avoid liability by first
selling the house to a commercial vendor. Such a technical requirement of
privity could destroy the purpose of the implied warranty.
Another problem is the possible exclusion of the implied warranty.
The Smith court left open the possibility that an express warranty might
displace an implied warranty. Presumably, the rules of implied warranties
established in the personalty cases will extend to the implied warranty in
the sale of a new house. These rules may make the implied warranty estab-
lished in Smith ineffective. For example, many pre-Uniform Commercial
Code cases flatly stated that an express warranty excludes an implied war-
ranty in the sale of personalty.39 Such statements are unduly broad, how-
ever.40 The general rule has been more narrowly expressed:
A more accurate statement of the correct rule is that an express
warranty excludes an implied warranty of fitness (1) if the express
warranty is inconsistent with the warranty which would have been
implied had none been expressed; or (2) if the express warranty
relates to the same or a similar subject matter as one which would
have been implied.41
Another problem is that Missouri common law permits express dis-
claimers of all warranties.4 2 If an express exclusion of implied warranties is
permissible, builders-vendors can easily defeat the effect of the Smith de-
cision. The Smith opinion gives some indication, however, that a disclaimer
or exclusion must be precise to be effective.4 3 The contract in Smith pro-
vided: "Property to be accepted in its present condition unless otherwise
stated in contract." 44 The court held that this clause did not exclude the
implied warranty because the provision meant only that the builder was to
do no additional work. In other words, the provision did not mean that
37. The Smith court's reference to Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp. (see
text accompanying note 34 supra) indicates that the supreme court will not re-
quire privity in this situation.
38. Bearman, supra note 14, at 571-72.
39. Springer v. Indianapolis Brewing Co., 126 Ga. 321, 55 S.E. 53, 55 (1906);
Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 249, 147 N.E.2d 612, 616(1958).
40. 77 C.J.S. Sales § 316 (1952).
41. Mitchell v. Rudasill, 332 S.W.2d 91, 95 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960); Cf. UN!-
ront CoMAlRuCLAL. CODE § 2-317. Arguably, the second prong of the Mitchell v.
Rudasill test is modified by the Uniform Commercial Code. This section purports
to find express and implied warranties cumulative unless such construction would
be unreasonable.
42. DeGrendele Motors, Inc. v. Reeder, 382 S.W.2d 431, 433 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1964); Hargrove v. Lewis, 313 S.W.2d 594, 595 (Spr. Mo. App. 1958).
43. See also Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970). The con-
tract clause in that case provided:
Buyer certifies that he has inspected the property and he is not relying
upon any warranties, representations or statements of the Agent or Seller
as to the age or physical conditions of improvements.
Id. at 1101, 449 S.W.2d at 926. The court held this clause did not purport to ex-
clude all warranties, but only warranties against discoverable defects.
44. 479 S.W.2d at 800.
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the buyer accepted unknown, structural defects. 45 Perhaps reference to the
Uniform Commercial Code would be instructive in drafting an effective
disclaimer.46
Smith clearly states that there is, in Missouri, a common law, implied
warranty of merchantable quality and fitness in the sale of a new home.
The opinion disposes of the problems of caveat emptor and merger. It
leaves open, however, the questions of the seriousness of the defect, the
degree of privity required for recovery, and the possible exclusion or dis-
claimer of the warranty. Even with these open questions, Smith is an im-
portant decision for the builders and buyers of new homes.
PAUL T. LUCKENBILL
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY-WILL DRAFTING-
PROVISIONS NAMING THE DRAFTSMAN AS EXECUTOR
OR DIRECTING HIS RETENTION AS ATTORNEY
FOR THE ESTATE
State v. Gulbankian1
Defendants, brother and sister, had practiced law as partners since
1955. From January 1, 1955, through January 23, 1971, they had filed 147
wills for probate in the County Court for Racine County, Wisconsin. Of
these, they had drafted 135. Out of that number, there was a striking
incidence of certain clauses. These clauses and the number of wills con-
taining each such clause were:
1. Directions that either of the defendants be employed to probate
the will: 71.
2. Directions that defendant Gulbank K. Gulbankian be employed
as attorney for the purpose of probating the estate: 26.
3. Directions that defendant Vartak Gulbankian be employed as at-
torney for the purpose of probating the estate: 4.
4. Directions to appoint Akabe Gulbankian, sister of the defendants,
as either executrix or co-executrix: 41.
5. Directions to appoint Vartak Gulbankian as the executrix: 3.
Because of these provisions, the Wisconsin State Bar charged the Gul-
bankians with soliciting the probate of estates.
The defendants denied they had solicited the probate of estates.
45. Id. The court stated:
The reasonable interpretation of that provision is that vendor assumes no
obligation to do any additional work on the house unless specified. Such a
provision would preclude purchasers from insisting that the vendor
promised to paint the house a different color, or add a room, or retile a
bathroom or correct an obvious defect. We do not believe a reasonable
person would interpret that provision as an agreement by the purchaser
to accept the house with an unknown latent structural defect.
Id.
46. See UNIFORm Cogml-RcIAL CODE § 2-316 (2), (3) (a).
1. 54 Wis. 2d 605, 196 N.W.2d 733 (1972).
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First, the defendants pointed out that they were of Armenian extraction
and that their office was in a large Armenian community. The defendants
contended that their clients placed an unusually great amount of trust
in them, based on their language and ethnic affinity, and that each testator
specifically requested that they be named as either the executor or the
attorney for the estate. Second, the defendants pointed to the existence of
a custom in Racine County for attorneys drafting wills to name themselves
as attorney for the estate. Indeed, the evidence tended to show that in
5 to 50 percent of the wills drafted in Racine County, the drafting attorney
had included a clause directing that he be retained to probate the estate.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that there was no solicitation,
but implied that in the future such a high percentage of similar clauses
might lead to a different result.2 In its opinion, the court considered two
ethical problems. These problems were: (1) Whether an attorney should
act as custodian of a will that he has drafted; and (2) whether drafting
a will with a provision directing the executor to retain the draftsman as
attorney for the estate or naming the draftsman as executor constitutes
unethical practice.
The court voiced its disapproval of attorneys keeping wills that they
have drafted. The court stated that the best practice is for the testator to
keep the original will, and that the attorney should keep the will only
upon the specific request of the testator8 An excerpt from Partridge's book,
Country Lawyer, illustrates the reason behind this rule:
For a time [my father] puzzled over the best way to build up a
probate practice .... Following the hearse, so it was called, did
not appeal to my father at all. He had a much better idea: if he
could draw their wills-and he could keep the originals in his
safe-he would eventually, if he lived long enough, have a pro-
bate business. He reasoned that if people had to come to him to
get the will they were very likely to give him the work of settling
the estate.4
An informal opinion of the American Bar Association expressed a view
similar to that of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, and concluded, "[T]here
is nothing unethical about a lawyer or a trust company acting as custodian
of the original of a client's will if this is done with the client's express
permission."5
With respect to the second problem, it should first be noted that a
lawyer by drafting a will acquires no vested interest in representing the
testator's estate; the testator may select any attorney he wishes.0 Therefore,
the draftsman may ethically provide for the retention of his services only
at the specific request or suggestion of the testator; he may not simply in-
2. Id.
3. Id. at 611-12, 196 N.W.2d at 736.
4. B. PARTRmGE, COUNTRY LWYER 38 (1939).
5. ABA CoMM. ON PROFSSIONAL ETHIcs, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 981 (1967).
6. ABA Com. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics, OPINIONS, No. 244A (1957); see
ABA Comm. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFO.rAL OPINIONS, No. 602 (1963).
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clude such a provision as a matter of course in each will he drafts, even
if he reads the will to the testator and obtains the testator's consent.7
Furthermore, even if the testator requests inclusion of a provision
for the retention of the draftsman's services, the draftsman still may be
guilty of unethical conduct in the securing of that request. The authorities
all agree that the solicitation of legal business is unethical.8 A corollary to
this proposition is that it is both improper and unethical for an attorney
either to suggest that he be named executor or attorney for the estate or
to solicit from the testator a request that he serve in that capacity. For
example, the Missouri Bar Advisory Committee has stated: "[I]t is un-
professional for a lawyer drafting a will to suggest that he be named in
the will as attorney for the executor."9 With respect to soliciting such a
request, the Code of Professional Responsibility states: "A lawyer should
not consciously influence a client to name him as executor, trustee, or
lawyer in an instrument."'10 Thus, taken as a whole, the authorities indi-
cate that an attorney may draft a will designating himself as executor or
directing the executor to employ him as attorney for the estate, if he in-
cludes such provision at the unsolicited request of the testator."
The drafting of a will with provisions directing the executor to retain
the draftsman as attorney for the estate or naming the draftsman as
executor is not unethical per se. Nevertheless, when a high percentage
of the wills drafted contain such provisions, the pattern thus created may
well lead to an inference of the draftsman's solicitation. Because of the
secrecy surrounding the transaction, proof of solicitation may rest upon
such circumstantial evidence. In Pasternak v. Mashak,12 the St. Louis Court
of Appeals said that because of the great difficulty of obtaining proof of
undue influence "the rule is that the fact may be proven by circumstantial
evidence." 13 Moreover, evidence of a custom of inserting such provisions in
wills is insufficient to rebut this inference of solicitation, because the
existence of a custom will not sanctify a practice that violates the Code
of Professional Responsibility. 14
7. ABA Comm. ON PROFESSIONAL ETmcs, INFOR.AL OPINIONS, No. 602 (1963).
The Committee stated:
The customary and regular inclusion of provisions in wills directing the
retention of the services of the attorney drawing the will, without the
specific request or suggestion of the client is dearly in violation of Canon
II and improper.
8. See, e.g., ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmILITY DR 2-103 (A); ABA
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs No. 27; In re Woodward, 300 S.W.2d 385 (Mo.
En Banc 1957).
9. Advisory Opinion No. 101, 23 J. Mo. BAR 142 (March 1967); cf. McCown,
Ethical Problems in Probate Matters, 39 NEB. L. R1v. 343 (1960).
10. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-6.
11. R. WISE, LEGAL ETmCS 19 (1966).
12. 392 S.W.2d 631 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
13. Id. at 637.
14. State Bar v. Arizona Land Title &c Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d 1
(1961). The Arizona Supreme Court said:
This is tantamount to saying "We have been driving through red lights
for so many years without serious mishap that it is now lawful to do so."
The fact that these practices have continued for many years and have
1973]
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Although a high percentage of such clauses may support an inference
of solicitation, there are several reasons other than solicitation that might
account for the frequency of the clauses. As one author has noted, distinct
advantages are to be gained for the client in having the drafting attorney
handle the probate of the estate because of the attorney's familiarity with
the testator's affairs and property.15 In Missouri, there is an additional
advantage. When an attorney is appointed as the executor of an estate,
there can be a considerable savings to the estate under section 173.158,
RSMo 1969.16 Professor Blackmar dramatizes the situation in an imaginary,
but very practical, conversation between an attorney and client over who
should be the executor in the testator's will.17 The conversation brings
home the point that if an attorney is executor, the resulting combination of
functions will produce a savings for the client.
A Missouri attorney has the duty to point out to his client the savings
to the estate made possible by the appointment of an attorney as executor.
While the naming of any attorney would produce these savings, it is
clear that a large number of clients will request that the attorney-draftsman
be named as executor in the will after learning of the possible savings.
Thus, a Missouri attorney must face the problem of explaining the possible
savings while being careful to avoid suggesting that he be named executor.
The preceding discussion suggests that the following guidelines
would be of help to an attorney in the drafting of wills that include pro-
visions for his appointment as executor or his employment as attorney
for the estate:' 8
1. The attorney should be careful during his conversations with the
testator not to suggest either directly or indirectly that he be employed as
executor or as attorney for the executor. The attorney is, however, under
the duty to explain the executor's duties and, in Missouri, the possible
savings to the estate resulting from having an attorney as executor.
2. The attorney should avoid the customary and regular inclusion
of provisions calling for his employment as executor or as attorney for
the estate. He should draft such clauses only at the testator's specific re-
quest.19
been acquiesced in by the bar does not make such activities any less the
practice of law .... It is apparent that the bar has been remiss in al-
lowing the present custom to develop unabated .... Thus, neither the
public's blissful acquiescense nor the bar's confessed lethargy can clothe
the activities with validity.
Id. at 93, 866 P.2d at 13.
15. McCown, supra note 9.
16. Section 473.153 states:
If the executor or administrator is an attorney, no allowance shall be made
for legal services performed by him or at his instance unless such services
are authorized by the will or by order of the court or are consented to
by all his heirs and devisees whose rights may be adversely affected by
the allowance.
17. See Blackmar, Does the Public Get Value Received for Probate Fees?, 23
J. Mo. B. 247 (1967).
18. Several of these precautions are similar to measures taken when the at-
torney-draftsman is a beneficiary of the will.
19. ABA CoMm. ON PROFESSIONAL ETMICS, INFOPMAL OPINIONS, No. 602 (1963).
[Vol. 88
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3. When such a provision is to be inserted in a client's will and the
shadow of impropriety may appear, the attorney might want to have
the testator state his wishes to a disinterested witness, who may then testify
if necessary. 20
4. In cases where the testator does desire the lawyer as executor or
attorney for the estate, the attorney should consider having the testator
submit the will to another lawyer prior to its execution.2 1
5. The draftsman might have another attorney draft a codicil con-
taining the provision for the draftsman's employment in order to avoid
any inference of solicitation. 22
6. The attorney might use a disclaimer signed by the testator stating
that provision for employment of the attorney was included solely at the
testator's spontaneous request.
In conclusion, the best practice with regard to the safekeeping of wills
is for the testator to keep the will. The attorney should keep the will only
at the testator's specific request. Provisions naming the attorney-draftsman
as executor or directing the executor to employ him as attorney for the
estate should be included only at the unprompted, unsolicited request of
the testator. No Missouri case has yet dealt with this latter issue. However,
it is hoped that the Missouri Supreme Court would weigh heavily the
factors of the attorney-draftsman's familiarity with the testator's affairs and
the possible savings to the estate before holding that a high percentage of
wills containing provisions providing for employment of the draftsman
supports an inference of solicitation.
Ni.xs S. CORSON
20. H. DINxmu, LEGAL ETmcs 94 (1953).
21. ABA Co nx. ON PROFESSIONAL ETmics, OPINIONS, Nos. 263-66, App. A at
641 (1957).
22. H. DINm, supra note 20.
1973]
47
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF VOICEPRINTS
State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman1
On May 22, 1970, the St. Paul, Minnesota, Police Headquarters re-
ceived a telephone call requesting assistance for a woman about to have
a child. Two officers responded, but found no one at the address described
in the call. One officer went to the rear of the house, heard a shot and
returned to the front, where he found his companion mortally wounded.
The St. Paul Police Department tapes all emergency calls. It made
voiceprints of the call that had lured the policemen to the scene and of
13 residents in that neighborhood. A comparison of the unidentified voice-
print with those of the residents convinced police laboratory experts that
Constance Trimble was the unknown caller. Based on this opinion, a
judge issued a warrant for Trimble's arrest. Trimble was arrested, indicted
by a grand jury and charged with first degree murder. She then applied
for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the matching of the voice-
prints did not constitute probable cause for arrest. When the lower court
discharged the writ, Trimble appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court.
This court held that probable cause existed for the arrest and stated in
strong dictum that voiceprint evidence should be admissible at Trimble's
trial, at least to corroborate voice identifications made by ear alone.2
Generally, a witness may identify a person on the basis of having heard
his voice at different times.3 Such testimony is generally admissible whether
the words were spoken or recorded by mechanical means.4 The question
in Trimble, on the other hand, concerned the probative value of voiceprint
evidence on the identity issue.
The scientific basis of the voiceprint technique is that speech is a com-
posite of different frequencies. In practice, a subject's voice is recorded.
A two- or three-second segment of that recording is transposed to a sec-
ond magnetic tape. This tape is formed in a loop and placed on a special
tape player. While the loop continuously replays this segment, a variable
filter in a voice spectrograph separates a band of frequencies from the
sound. The energy from each band activates a stylus, which traces a line
on a rotating drum; the greater the energy in the band, the darker the line.
The variable filter then automatically adjusts to a higher band of fre-
quencies, and the speech segment replays. The stylus draws another line
on the rotating drum, parallel to and a short distance from the previous
line. This process continues until the spectrograph has recorded the energy
levels in a wide range of frequencies. The result is a pattern of closely
spaced lines:
In this example, the vertical axis is frequency, and the horizontal is time.
The darkness of the horizontal lines represents the intensity of the sound
within a particular frequency band. If a comparison of the unknown
1. 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971).
2. Id. at 458, 192 N.W.2d at 441.
3. Id. at 448, 192 N.W.2d at 435.
4. Id. at 449, 192 N.W.2d at 436.
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voiceprint with a known one of the same sound results in a sufficient
number of matching patterns, the unknown voice is identified.6
Three propositions support the voiceprint theory: (1) Every individual
has unique speech characteristics that distinguish his voice from all others; 7
(2) the voice spectrograph can record these distinct characteristics; (3) these
unique characteristics remain stable with respect to passage of time and
change of circumstance. Little controversy surrounds the first proposition.
The combination of multiple features of anatomy and speech habit makes
it highly unlikely that two individuals have exactly the same speech char-
acteristics.8 Although unverified, the second proposition is also largely
undisputed. The voiceprint is at least as sensitive as the human ear to
these unique characteristics. 9 The third proposition is the most contro-
versial. Many speech characteristics can be varied at will or affected by
changes in a person's emotional state or physical condition. Further, even
if certain unique speech characteristics remain stable, other variable traits
may contaminate a speech pattern.10 At present, the voice spectrograph
5. This example, contained in Kamine, The Voiceprint Technique, 6 SAN
DIrEGo L. REv. 213, 214 (1969), shows the two basic forms of voiceprints. The upper
is the bar form, and the lower is the contour form. The bar form is the spectrogram
normally used for voiceprints. Id.
6. For a detailed description of the voice spectrograph see 19 AM. JJR. PROOF
oF FAcrs Spectrogram Voice Identification 423 (1967); Kamine, The Voiceprint
Technique: Its Structure and Reliability, 6 SAN DIEG L. REv. 213 (1969). The
words ordinarily used for comparison are: "It," "me," "you," "the," "on,"
'I," "is," "and," a" and "to." 19 Am. JUR. PROOF oF FAcrs, supra at 431.
7. For a discussion of the theory of voice production see Bolt, Cooper,
David, Denes, Picket & Stevens, Speaker Identification by Speech Spectrograms, 47
J. AcousTIcAL Soc'y Am. 597, 604 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Bolt]; Kamine,
supra note 6.
8. See Kamine, supra note 6, at 226.
9. Id. at 224.
10. See Bolt, supra note 7, at 559.
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cannot discriminate between the mutable and immutable characteristics of
speech."
A comparison of voiceprint matching with fingerprint matching is
instructive.12 Fingerprints show directly the physical patterns of the loops
and whorls on the fingers. Voiceprint patterns, however, describe only in-
directly the vocal anatomy. Further, fingerprint identification results from
comparison of the minute details of skin ridge patterns, which are not
changed by time or emotional stress. In contrast, voiceprint identification
involves gross pattern matching; this process compares general shapes
rather than the details of the locus defining the shape. Finally, while a
person cannot easily disguise or fake fingerprint patterns, he can alter
speech patterns without much difficulty. In view of these differences,
voiceprint identification will probably never achieve the reliability of
fingerprint identification.13
The reliability of the voiceprint technique is disputed. Lawrence
Kersta,14 who conducted the first reported voiceprint experiments, 1 re-
ported an accuracy rate of 99 percent. Other researchers, however, made
numerous attempts to verify Kersta's results, but found much higher error
rates.' 6 Further, all of these experiments were closed trials in which the
examiner knew that his samples included matching voiceprints. This
simplified the task, because in actual criminal investigations, the examiner
does not know whether a match exists. A committee of the Acoustical So-
ciety of America surveyed these experiments and concluded:
The available results are inadequate to establish the reliability of
voice identification by spectrograms. We believe this conclusion is
shared by most scientists who are knowledgeable about speech;
hence, many of them are deeply concerned about the use of spec.
trographic evidence in courts. 17
The committee urged further investigation of the reliability of voice-
print identification under conditions approximating the actual forensic
situation.
In September, 1968, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
granted $300,000 to the Michigan State Police to conduct a comprehensive
study of the reliability of the voiceprint technique. The state police sub-
contracted this study to the Michigan State University School of Criminal
11. Id. Recent investigations indicate that a disguised voice can frustrate
the voiceprint technique. Report of W. Endres to the 80th Meeting of the Acousti-
cal Society of America, Nov. 6, 1970, in 49 J. AcousncAL SoC'y AM. 188 (1971).
12. See Bolt, supra note 7, at 599, 6 app. B at 606-08, for an exhaustive com-
parison of the voiceprint and fingerprint techniques.
13. Id. at 600.
14. Kersta is probably the most enthusiastic proponent of the voiceprint. He
is now president of Voiceprint Laboratories, which manufactures and sells the
voice spectrograph. Cederbaums, Voiceprint Identification: A Scientific and Legal
Dilemma, 5 CRrw. L. BULL. 323, 326 (1969).
15. Kersta, Voice Identification, 196 NATURE 1253, 1255 (1962).
16. Stevens, Williams, Carbonell & Woods, Speaker Authentication and Iden.
tification: A Comparison of Spectrographic and Auditory Presentations of Speech
Material, 44 J. AcousncAL Soc'y Am. 1596 (1968); Young & Campbell, Effects of
Context on Talker Identification, 42 J. AcousncAL Sody Am. 1250 (1967).
17. Bolt, supra note 7, at 603.
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Justice.1 8 Dr. Oscar Tosi, who directed this study,1 9 found in the forensic
situation 20 an approximate 6 percent rate of false identification (i.e., when
the examiner found a match but none existed) and a 12 percent rate of
missed identification (i.e., when the examiner found no match but one
existed).21 In spite of these high percentages of error, Dr. Tosi concluded
that the voiceprint was extremely reliable, if trained examiners applied the
proper technique.22 He reasoned that, in reality, the 6 percent rate of false
identification should be reduced to 2.4 percent, because in 60 percent of
the erroneous decisions, the examiner indicated that he was not sure of his
judgment. Dr. Tosi also pointed out that because the actual forensic situa-
tion would involve a more experienced, better motivated examiner, who
could study the voiceprints for an extended time, the expected rate of in-
correct identification should be reduced further.23 Dr. Tosi, however, failed
to mention the factors in the actual forensic situation that tend to increase
the error. For example, a one-month period separated the recordings in the
test situation. In actual investigations, on the other hand, a much longer
time lapse may intervene between the recording of the known voice and
of the unknown one.24 This analysis also fails to consider that emotional
distress may affect voice patterns.
25
Professor McCormick says that evidence is prima facie admissible if it
in some degree "advances the inquiry."2 6 Even assuming a 6 percent false
identification rate,27 voiceprint evidence clearly "advances the inquiry."
McCormick goes on to say that counter-balancing factors can destroy prima
facie admissibility where the "cost" of the evidence (in terms of time,
18. The results of the study were submitted to the Department of Justice in
an unpublished report. Tosi, Oyer, Lashbrook, Pedrey & Nichol, Michigan State
University Voice Identification Project, Feb., 1971 [hereinafter cited as Michigan
State Project].
19. Dr. Tosi, a professor at Michigan State, holds a doctorate degree in
physics and engineering, and another in audiology and speech science. Ceder-
baums, supra note 14, at 331. He recorded the voices of 250 students chosen at
random from the 25,000 males at the university. Michigan State Project, supra
note 18, at 90.
20. Dr. Tosi attempted to test the reliability of the voiceprint technique under
circumstances similar to an actual criminal investigation. The known and unknown
recordings were not contemporaneous. The cue words were spoken in unmatched
context. The examiner did not know whether his group of known voiceprints in-
cluded a match to that of the unknown speaker. Michigan State Project, supra
note 18, at 120-21.
21. Id. at 121.
22. State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 454, 192 N.W.2d 432,
439 (1971).
23. See Michigan State Project, supra note 18, at 122. The experiments al-
lowed the examiner 15 minutes to match the voiceprints. Id.
24. Linear extrapolation of Tosi's results to a four-month lapse yields an
error rate of 36.3 percent. Comment, The Voiceprint Technique: A Problem in
Scientific Evidence, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1365, 1382 (1972).
25. The police recorded Trimble's voice without her knowledge in a rela-
tively stress-free situation; she was called to the welfare office on the pretext of
discussing her AFDC payments. 291 Minn. at 444, 192 N.W.2d at 433-34.
26. C. McCopmilCK, EvDENCE § 185, at 438-39 (1972). See also PROP. Fm_. R.
EvID. 401, 402 (Rev. Draft, 1971), which agree with McCormick.
27. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
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confusion, etc.) outweighs its probative value.28 In the case of the voice-
prints, good reasons exist to require that the probative value be high in
order to counterbalance the "cost" of the evidence. Expert opinions con-
flict regarding the reliability of the voiceprint technique. 29 Further, the
reliability issue is complex and beyond the experience of the average juror.
This difficult collateral question threatens to distract the jury from the
central issues, thereby causing confusion that outweighs the probative value
of the evidence.80 In addition, the "aura of certainty which often envelops
a new scientific process, obscuring its current experimental nature,"8 1
might mislead the jury.
In deciding whether the probative value outweighs the cost of voice-
print evidence, examination of the courts' treatment of similar scientific
techniques is helpful. United States v. Frye32 set out the standard of re-
liability for admitting polygraphic evidence:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be-
tween experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to de-
fine. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduc-
tion is made must be sufficiently established to have gained gen-
eral acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs38
Subsequent polygraph cases almost universally followed the "general ac-
ceptance" test enunciated in Frye.34 Further, many courts extended this
standard to other types of scientific evidence.8 5 Thus, in 1966 one au-
thority stated: "[t]he Frye case has always been the guiding principle in
the field of scientific evidence."8 6 Nevertheless, Frye has not persuaded
all of the authorities. For example, McCormick regards "general acceptance"
28. C. McCoRiasc, supra note 26. See also PROP. FED. M EvID. 402, 403 (Rev.
Draft, 1971). A good discussion of the admissibility of scientific evidence appears
in Gilmore, Identification of Evidence by Neutron Activation Analysis, 37 Mo. L.
lREv. 295, 295-300 (1972).
29. For an account of the dimensions of the scientific dispute over the voice-
print see Cederbaums, supra note 14, condensing the 1300 pages of testimony on
reliability in State v. Cary, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (1970).
30. A New Jersey court suggested that admission of controversial scientific
evidence can result in a trial of the scientific technique instead of the issues. See
State v. Cary, 99 N.J. Super. 323, 332, 239 A.2d 680, 684 (1968), aff'd, 56 N.J. 16,
264 A.2d 209 (1970). See also Cederbaums, supra note 14, at 345.
31. Huntingdon v. Crowley, 64 Cal. 2d 647, 656, 414 P.2d 382, 390, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 254, 262 (1966). See also State v. Stout, 478 S.W.2d 368, 372 (Mo. 1972).
32. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
33. Id. at 1014 (emphasis added).
34. See 1 E. CONRAD, MODERN TRIAL EVIDENCE § 714 (1956); J. RICHARDsoN,
MODERN SciENTIFic EVIDENCE § 6.16 (1961).
35. United States v. StifeI, 433 F.2d 431, 441 (6th Cir. 1970) (neutron activa-
tion analysis); People v. Williams, 164 Cal. 2d 858, 860, 331 P.2d 251, 253 (Super.
Ct. 1958) (Nalline test); Brook v. People, 139 Colo. 388, 393, 339 P.2d 993, 996
(1959) (paraffin test); People v. Morse, 825 Mich. 270, 272, 38 N.W.2d 322, 324
(1949) (Harger breath test); State v. Stout, 478 S.W.2d 368, 869 (Mo. 1972)
(neutron activation analysis); State v. Coolidge, 109 N.H. 408, 421-22, 260 A.2d
547, 560-61 (1969) (neutron activation analysis).
36. 1 E. CONRAD, supra note 34, § 711 (Supp. 1966).
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as the criteria for taking judicial notice of the reliability of a scientific
technique.3 7 If the reliability of the technique in question is not "gen-
erally accepted," however, the court should judge admissibility by balancing
the probative value against the "cost" of the evidence. Thus, this analysis
avoids the dogmatism of the Frye standard and weighs each new scientific
technique according to the fundamental rules of evidence. Moreover, Mc-
Cormick points out that recent cases have tacitly ignored the "general
acceptance" test.38
Prior to Trimble, the voiceprint cases did not consistently apply the
"general acceptance" test. In 1967-1970 the New Jersey Supreme Court in
State v. Cary39 considered the testimony of Kersta and others on the re-
liability of the voiceprint. After hearing the case three times, the court re-
luctantly concluded that the technique lacked general scientific accept-
ance.40 In contrast, the United States Court of Military Appeals in United
States v. Wright4' failed to mention the "general acceptance" test. In ad-
mitting the evidence, the court expressly ignored expert testimony question-
ing the reliability of voiceprint matching and said that the triers of fact
could determine the margin of error in this technique.42 The next reported
case, People v. King,43 arose from a CBS documentary film in which an
unidentified youth made incriminating statements concerning his role in
the Watts riot. About two weeks after the broadcast, the defendant was
arrested on a narcotics charge. The police made a voiceprint of the defend-
ant, which they compared with one of the youth in the film. At trial, Kersta
testified that as a means of identification the voiceprint matched the in-
fallibility of the fingerprint. However, seven defense witnesses challenged
the method's reliability. The court held the voiceprint evidence inadmis-
sible, because the technique lacked general acceptance in the scientific
community.44
The preceding three cases constituted the only recorded opinions on
admissibility of voiceprint evidence when the court considered Trimble.
The Minnesota court agreed with Wright and rejected the Frye standard:
Where experts disagree, it is for the factfinder, whether that be
jury or court, to determine which is more credible and therefore
more acceptable. The opinion of an expert is admissible, if at all,
for the purpose of aiding the jury or the factfinder in a field in
which he has no particular knowledge or training. The weight and
credibility to be given to the opinion of an expert lies with the
factfinder. 45
37. C. McCorucK, supra note 26, § 204, at 491.
38. Id. at 490.
39. 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (1970).
40. Id. The court had twice previously heard and remanded the case for
further consideration. 53 N.J. 256, 250 A.2d 15 (1969); 49 N.J. 343, 230 A.2d 384
(1967). An opinion of the lower court on remand is reported at 99 N.J. Super.
323, 289 A.2d 680 (1968). See note 14 supra. Recently the New Jersey Supreme
Court ordered a defendant to submit to a voiceprint test. State v. Andretta, 61 N.J.
544, 296 A.2d 644 (1972).
41. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 183, 37 C.M.R. 447 (1967).
42. Id. at - 37 C.M.R. at 453-54.
43. 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal Rptr. 478, (Ct. App. 1968).
44. Id. at 460, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
45. 291 Minn. at 456, 192 N.W.2d at 440.
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The court hedged this rejection, however, by referring to the "general
acceptance" test 46 and discussing the degree to which the scientific com-
munity accepted Dr. Tosi's experiments. The court did not reject the reason-
ing of the prior cases holding voiceprint evidence inadmissible. Instead, it
emphasized that Dr. Tosi's experiments answered the objections of these
cases by providing accurate information about the reliability of voiceprint
matching.4 7
At present, Trimble is the leading case on the admissibility of voice-
print evidence. Since that decision, two other courts have dealt with this
problem. In United States v. Raymond48 the same court that decided the
Frye case held voiceprint evidence admissible. Although the court did not
expressly mention the "general acceptance" test, the Frye case apparently
influenced the decision; the court stated that Dr. Tosi's study had sub-
stantially changed the opinion of the scientific community as to the
reliability of the voiceprint technique.49 A Florida case, Worley v. State,50
also held voiceprint evidence admissible. The opinion mentioned the Gary
and King cases, which rejected such evidence on the basis of the "general
acceptance" test. The court suggested, however, that in light of Dr. Tosi's
experiments these cases would yield different results today.
Experience demonstrates the usefulness of the voiceprint technique.61
Further, on the basis of Dr. Tosi's experiments, this process is sufficiently
reliable to warrant the admission of voiceprint evidence for limited pur-
poses, such as establishing probable cause for an arrest warrant, corroborat-
ing other evidence that connects the defendant with the crime, and prov-
ig a subsidiary fact. Nevertheless, the voiceprint technique needs further
testing. The effects of time passage, voice disguise and emotional stress on
this process are still largely unknown. Thus, the present state of scientific
knowledge suggests that voiceprint evidence should be inadmissible in
criminal trials where the voice identification question goes directly to
the issue of guilt.
CHARLES E. BUCHANAN
46. Id. at 452, 192 N.W.2d at 438.
47. Id. at 451-58, 192 N.W.2d at 437-41.
48. 337 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1972).
49. Id. at 644-45.
50. 263 So. 2d 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1972). See also Alea v. State, 265 So. 2d 96
(Fla. Dist. Ct. 1972) which also admitted voiceprint evidence.
51. The voice identification unit of the Michigan Department of State Police
has conducted 673 voice identification investigations. Thirty of the identified per-
sons later confessed. Nothng indicated that any of these identifications were in-
correct. Of these cases, 172 resulted in positive eliminations. Possible identifications
or eliminations occurred in 31 cases. In 382 the examiner could not reach a con-
clusion, because of insufficient or poor voice samples. See Michigan State Project,
supra note 17, at 125. One well known voiceprint examiner, however, has made
at least one incorrect identification. Kersta (see note 14 supra) mistakenly identi-
fled a New York City police officer as the unknown telephone voice in a booking
operation. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1971, at 57, col. 2. Comparison of these con-
tentions with those made concerning the polygraph is interesting. An Army test
concluded that with "highly trained and experienced personnel," the polygraph will
yield correct judgments in about 80 percent of the cases, no judgment in about 17
percent and incorrect judgments in about 3 percent. C. McCoRMICK, supra note
25, § 174, at 372.
[Vol. 88
54
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [1973], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss2/6
RECENT CASES
TORTS-INTERSPOUSAL TIhUNITY IN PERSONAL
TORTS-MISSOURIJ'S POSITION CLARIFIED?
Ebel v. Ferguson'
On May 1, 1966, plaintiff sustained injuries in an accident while
riding as a passenger in an automobile driven by her husband. After ob-
taining a divorce, plaintiff filed suit against her former husband and the
driver of the other car to recover for the personal injuries that she suffered
in the accident. The trial court granted her former husband's motion for
summary judgment, based on the doctrine of interspousal immunity.2 On
appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a former wife
may not recover damages from her former husband for a personal tort
committed during their marriage.3
The doctrine of interspousal immunity evolved at early common law.
The judicial fiction developed that marriage merged the spouses into a
single person for legal purposes.4 As a consequence, the courts required
joinder of the husband in actions brought by or against his wife. Thus, a
"procedural bar" precluded a suit by one spouse against the other. Other-
wise, the husband would be a party to both sides of the suit.5 As another
consequence, the courts stated that no cause of action arose when one
spouse wrongfully injured the other during coverture. Thus, a "substantive
bar" also prevented suits between husband and wife.0
A majority of American jurisdictions retain the interspousal immunity
doctrine, 7 despite frequent attacks on this common law rule.8 Courts have
1. 478 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. En Banc 1972).
2. Id. at 334; see Brief for Appellant at 2, Ebel v. Ferguson, 478 S.W.2d 334
(Mo. En Banc 1972).
3. 478 S.W.2d at 336. Personal torts involve injuries or damage to the per-
son, reputation, feelings, or body. Property torts embrace injury or damage to real
or personal property. See Smith v. Smith, 300 S.W.2d 275, 280 (Spr. Mo. App.
1957). This note deals with the interspousal immunity in personal torts, where the
law is in flux. The courts have universally held that the married women's property
statutes have abrogated the interspousal immunity in the property tort area. See
W. PROSSER, Tim LA-w or TORTS § 122, at 861 (4th ed. 1971). For a discussion of
the interspousal immunity in property torts in Missouri, see Smith v. Smith, supra.
4. 1 W. BLAcSTONE, CoMINTARIES *442.
5. 1 F. HARPER & F. J. ms, THE LAW OF TORTS § 8.10 (1956); W. PROSSER,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 122 (4th ed. 1971); Kahn-Freund, Inconsistencies and In-
justices in the Law of Husband and Wife, 15 MODERN L. REV. 133 (1952); McCurdy,
Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HAnv. L. R.mv. 1030 (1930);
Akers % Drummond, Tort Actions Between Members of the Family-Husband
Wife-Parent & Child, 26 Mo. L. R-v. 152 (1961).
6. Phillips v. Barnet, I Q.B.D. 436, 440 (1876); 41 A.m. Junr. 2D Husband and
Wife § 522 (1968).
7. Delaware: Saunders v. Hill, 57 Del. 519, 202 A.2d 807 (1964); Florida:
Amendola v. Amendola, 121 So. 2d 805 (Fla. App. 1960); Georgia: Eddleman v.
Eddleman, 183 Ga. 766, 189 S.E. 833 (1937); Hawaii: HAwAn 1LEv. STAT. § 573-
5 (1968); Illinois: ILL. :Rv. STAT. ch. 68, § 1 (1969) (reinstated immunity after
abolished by courts); Iowa: Flogel v. Flogel, 257 Iowa 547, 133 N.W.2d 907 (1965);
Kansas: Fisher v. Toler, 194 Kan. 701, 401 P.2d 1012 (1965); Louisiana: LA. Rv.
STAT. ANN. § 9:291 (1965) (prohibits suits on personal torts during marriage);
but see Gremillion v. Caffey, 71 So. 2d 670 (La. App. 1954) (a cause of action
arises that is unenforceable during marriage); Maine: Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me.
19731
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utilized both the procedural bar and the substantive bar to justify the im-
munity.9 The traditional doctrine, however, has also been upheld on public
policy grounds, 0 including preservation of domestic peace,11 prevention of
a flood of litigation, and protection from collusive suits.1 2 Some courts
have regarded abrogation of the immunity as a legislative function.'5
Further, others have maintained that the divorce and criminal law provide
adequate remedies for the injured spouse.'14 In contrast, a minority of
jurisdictions have abandoned the common law rule and thus permit one
spouse to sue the other for a personal tort.15 Finally, a few jurisdictions
304 (1877); Maryland: Ennis v. Donovan, 222 Md. 536, 161 A.2d 698 (Ct. A pp.
1960); Massachusetts: Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 78 N.E.2d 637 (1948);
MAss. Gr. LAws ANN. ch. 209, § 6 (1958); Mississippi: Ensminger v. Ensminger,
222 Miss. 799, 77 So. 2d 308 (1955); Missouri: Ebel v. Ferguson, 478 S.W.2d 334
(Mo. En Banc 1972); Montana: State ex rel. Angvall v. District Court, 151 Mont.
483, 444 P.2d 370 (1968); Nebraska: Emerson v. Western Seed & Irrigation Co.,
116 Neb. 180, 216 N.W. 297 (1927); Nevada: Morrissett v. Morrissett, 80 Nev. 566,
397 P.2d 184 (1964); New Mexico: Romero v. Romero, 58 N.M. 201, 269 P.2d 748
(1954); Ohio: Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 N.E.2d 533 (1965); Pennsyl-
vania: Meisel v. Little, 407 Pa. 546, 180 A.2d 772 (1962); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48,
§ 111 (1965); Rhode Island: Castellucci v. Castellucci, 96 R.I. 34, 188 A.2d 467
(1963); Tennessee: Wooley v. Parker, 222 Tenn. 104, 432 S.W.2d 882 (1968);
Texas: Nickerson v. Nickerson, 65 Tex. 281 (1886); Utah: Rubalcava v. Gisseman,
14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963); Vermont: Comstock v. Comstock, 106 Vt. 50,
169 A. 903 (1934); Washington: Goode v. Martinis, 58 Wash. 2d 229, 361 P.2d
941 (1961) (allowing suit for intentional tort committed during pendency of
previously initiated divorce proceeding, but not otherwise); West Virginia: Adams
v. Grogg, 153 W. Va. 55, 166 S.E.2d 755 (1969); Wyoming: McKinney v. McKinney,
59 Wyo. 205, 135 P.2d 940 (1943); District of Columbia: Thompson v. Thompson,
218 U.S. 611 (1910); Puerto Rico: Serrano v. GonzAez, 68 P.R.R. 579, 68 D.P.R.
623 (1948); Virgin Islands: Paiewonsky v. Paiewonsky, 315 F. Supp. 752 (D.V.I.
1970), afr'd, 446 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1971).
8. E.g., many courts have rejected the argument that the jurisdiction's Mar-
ried Woman's Act abrogated the common law rule. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thomp.
son, 218 U.S. 611, 617 (1910).
9. For cases relying primarily on the substantive bar, see Maine v. James
Maine & Sons Co., 198 Iowa 1278, 201 N.W. 20 (1924); Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss.
61, 100 So. 591 (1924); Ebel v. Ferguson, 478 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. En Banc 1972). For
cases relying primarily on the procedural bar, see David v. David, 161 Md. 532,
157 A. 755 (Ct. App. 1932); Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 177 S.W. 382 (1915).
Most cases rely on or at least mention both bars to interspousal suits. See, e.g.,
Willott v. Willott, 333 Mo. 896, 62 S.W.2d 1084 (1933).
10. E.g., Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304 (1877).
11. E.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 618 (1910). Contra, Immer
v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 488, 267 A.2d 481, 484 (1970).
12. E.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 617 (1910). Contra, Immer v.
Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 490, 267 A.2d 481, 487 (1970). See also Smith, The Miscegenetic
Union of Liability Insurance and Tort Process in the Personal Injury Claims Sys-
tem, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 645 (1969).
13. E.g., Ebel v. Ferguson, 478 S.W.2d 334, 336 (Mo. En Banc 1972). Contra,
Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 369, 173 N.W.2d 416, 417-19 (1969); Abernathy
v. Sisters of St. Mary's, 446 S.W.2d 599, 605 (Mo. En Banc 1969) (dictum).
14. E.g., Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 307-08 (1877). Contra, Courtney v.
Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 401, 87 P.2d 660, 666 (1938).
15. Alabama: Bennett v. Bennett, 224 Ala. 335, 140 So. 378 (1932); Alaska:
Cramer v. Cramer, 379 P.2d 95 (Alas. 1963); Arizona: Windauer v. O'Connor,
107 Ariz. 267, 485 P.2d 1157 (1971) (wife may maintain action for intentional
tort against husband that she divorced); Arkansas: Leach v. Leach, 227 Ark. 599,
[Vol. 38
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have adopted an intermediate position, allowing interspousal suits in some
fact situations but not in others.16
The Missouri Supreme Court first considered the issue of interspousal
immunity in Rogers v. Rogers.17 In that case, a wife sued her present hus-
band and others for false imprisonment that occurred during coverture.
The plaintiff-wife contended that Missouri's Married Woman's Act' s abro-
gated the common law doctrine. The court rejected this argument, holding
that under Missouri law a wife could not maintain an action against her
husband for a personal tort committed during coverture.1 9 Notably, the
300 S.W.2d 15 (1957), noted in Henson, Torts-Wife's Liability to Her Husband
for Personal Injuries, 23 Mo. L. R.Ev. 103 (1958); California: Klein v. Klein, 58
Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962); Colorado: Rains v. Rains, 97
Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740 (1935); Connecticut: Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, 126 Conn. 146,
9 A.2d 812 (1939); Idaho: Lorang v. Hays, 69 Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 733 (1949);
Indiana: Brooks v. Robinson, ._Ind....._, 284 N.E.2d 794 (1972); Kentucky:
Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.WV.2d 480 (Ky. App. 1953); Michigan: Hosko v. Hosko,
385 Mich. 39, 187 N.W.2d 236 (1971); Minnesota: Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn.
366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969); New Hampshire: Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H.
86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963); New Jersey: Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481
(1970); New York: N.Y. GaN. OBUiG. LAiw § 3-313 (McKinney 1964); North Caro-
lina: N.C. Gu-N. STAT. § 52-5 (1966); North Dakota: Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62
N.D. 191, 242 N.W. 526 (1932); Oklahoma: Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395,
87 P.2d 660 (1939); Oregon: compare Apitz v. Dames, 205 Ore. 242, 287 P.2d 585
(1955) (allowed wife to sue her husband for intentional tort) with Smith v. Smith,
205 Ore. 286, 287 P.2d 572 (1955) (did not allow wife to sue her husband for
negligent tort); South Carolina: Fowler v. Fowler, 242 S.C. 252, 130 S.E.2d 568
(1963); South Dakota: Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941); Vir-
ginia: Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d 200 (1971) (holding limited
to cases involving negligent operation of automobiles); Wisconsin: Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 246.075 (1969).
16. Louisiana: Gremillion v. Caffey, 71 So. 2d 670 (La. App. 1954) (divorce
terminates wife's incapacity to sue husband for tort committed during coverture);
Missouri: Hamilton v. Fulkerson, 285 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. 1955) (wife may sue for
antenuptial tort); North Carolina: Scholtens v. Scholtens, 230 N.C. 149, 52 S.E.2d
350 (1949) (wife may sue husband for personal tort, but husband may not sue
wife); Oregon: Apitz v. Dames, 205 Ore. 242, 287 P.2d 585 (1955) (wife may sue
husband for intentional but not for negligent tort). See generally Annot., 43
A.L.R.2d 632 (1955).
17. 265 Mo. 200, 177 S.W. 382 (1915).
18. §§ 1735, 8304 [now § 451.290, RSMo 1969], RSMo 1909.
A married woman may, in her own name, with or without joining her
husband as a party, sue and be sued in any of the courts of this state hav-
ing jurisdiction, with the same force and effect as if she was a femme sole,
and any judgment in the case shall have the same force and effect as if she
were unmarried.
§ 1735, RSMo 1909.
A married woman shall be deemed a femme sole so far as to enable
her to carry on and transact business on her own account, to contract and
be contracted with, to sue and be sued, and to enforce and have enforced
against her property such judgments as may be rendered for and against
her, and may sue and be sued at law or in equity, with or without her
husband being joined as a party....
§ 8304, RSMo 1909.
19. 265 Mo. at 208, 177 S.W. at 384. The fact that the wife could still recover
from the other defendants possibly made the court's decision easier.
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court seemed to base its decision on the procedural bar;20 the substantive
bar was not mentioned.
Succeeding Missouri cases strictly adhered to the Rogers decision. 21
In Willot v. Willot,2 2 however, the Missouri Supreme Court first indicated
that a substantive bar also precluded interspousal suits. The opinion empha-
sized that at common law, neither husband nor wife had a cause of action
against the other for personal injuries.22
Mullally v. Langenberg Brothers Grain Co. 24 initiated an apparent
trend toward repudiation of the interspousal immunity doctrine. In that
case, plaintiff sustained injuries while riding in a motor vehicle operated
by her husband and owned by his employer. Plaintiff sued the employer,
contending that at the time of the accident, her husband was acting within
the scope of his employment. The court held that the wife could maintain
her action even though her husband would be liable to his employer for
any damages recovered. 25 Further, the court indicated that allowing the
suit would advance the interests of public policy.2 6 Judges advocating
complete repudiation of the immunity have cited this dicta in subsequent
cases.
27
Hamilton v. Fulkerson2s dealt with the application of the interspousal
immunity doctrine to antenuptial torts. Plaintiff-wife filed suit for per-
sonal injuries against her fianc6 two days prior to their marriage. In al-
lowing the action, the court stated that section 451.250, RSMo 1949 [now
section 451.250, RSMo 1969]29 abrogated the common law rule that
20. The court seemed to assume that defendant-husband had committed a
tort against plaintiff-wife and only questioned whether she had a remedy against
him.
21. See, e.g., Butterfield v. Butterfield, 195 Mo. App. 37, 187 S.W. 295 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1916).
22. 333 Mo. 896, 62 S.W.2d 1084 (1933).
23. Id. at 898, 62 S.W.2d at 1085.
24. 339 Mo. 582, 98 S.W.2d 645 (1936).
25. Id. at 586, 98 S.W.2d at 646 (recovery denied on other grounds); accord,
Rosenblum v. Rosenblum, 231 Mo. App. 276, 96 S.W.2d 1082 (K.C. Ct. App. 1936),
noted in Van Matte, Master and Servant-Liability of Master to Servant's Wife In-jured by the Servant in Scope of Employment, 2 Mo. L. Rav. 232 (1937).
26. 339 Mo. at 586, 98 S.W.2d at 646. The court did not specify what public
policies were involved.
27. E.g., Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808, 819 (Mo. En Banc 1959)(dissenting opinion); Hamilton v. Fulkerson, 285 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Mo. 1955).
28. 285 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. 1955), noted in Davis, Negligence-Action by Wife
Against Husband for Antenuptial Personal Tort, 22 Mo. L. Rzv. 216 (1957).
29. All real estate and any personal property, including rights in action,
belonging to any woman at her marriage, or which may come to her dur-
ing coverture, by gift, bequest or inheritance, or by purchase with her
separate money or means, or be due as the wages of her separate labor,
or has grown out of any violation of her personal rights, shall, together
with all income, increase and profits thereof, be and remain her separate
property and under her sole control ....
... [Aind any such married woman may, in her own name and withoutjoining her husband, as a party plaintiff institute and maintain any
action . . . for the recovery of any such personal property, including rights
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marriage terminates any cause of action between spouses that arose prior
to their marriage.3 0 The court refused to restrictively interpret this statute,
saying that "any common-law rule based upon the fiction of the identity
of husband and wife . . . should not be applied to any 'first impression'
fact situation arising in this state."31 Further, the court rejected several pub-
lic policy arguments for applying the immunity.3 2
In Ennis v. Truhitte,3 3 the plaintiff was injured during coverture
while a passenger in a vehicle driven by her husband, who subsequently
died. The court allowed the wife to recover from her deceased husband's
estate. The opinion seemed to abolish the common law's substantive bar to
interspousal suits in Missouri: "[I]t belies reality and fact to say that there
is no tort when the husband either intentionally or negligently injures
his wife." 3 4 Further, the court pointed out that any public policy objections
to allowing the action "vanished" with the husband's death.35
This trend toward abrogation of the interspousal immunity doctrine
ended in Brawner v. Brawner.36 Brawner held that a husband could not
sue his wife for personal injuries incurred during their marriage. The
opinion pointed out that the legislature, although active in the domestic
relations field, had not repudiated the common law rule.37 Although Ennis
and Hamilton were distinguished as involving "special circumstances,"38
Rogers was regarded as binding precedent.3 9 The court also indicated that
public policy supported the immunity.40 The court, however, might have
in action, as aforesaid, with the same force and effect as if such married
woman was a femme sole ....
§ 451.250, RSMo 1949.
30. 285 S.W.2d at 645.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 647. The court stated that tort actions between spouses disturb
domestic tranquility; cause marital discord and divorce; encourage fictitious, col-
lusive, and fraudulent claims; produce a rise in liability insurance rates; and
promote trivial actions. Further, the court remarked that, in any event, the criminal
and divorce laws provide the injured spouse with an adequate remedy. The
opinion said that no matters of public policy justified extension of the Rogers doc-
trine to antenuptial torts. This was an alternative basis for the decision. The court
also based its decision on the theory that the statute had abrogated the interspousal
immunity.
33. 306 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. En Banc 1957), noted in Dalton, Torts-Negligence-
Missouri-Action by Wife Against Administrator of Estate of Deceased Husband for
Personal Injury, 23 Mo. L. REv. 366 (1958).
34. 306 S.W.2d at 551.
35. Id. at 550. The court failed to specify what "public policy" encompassed.
36. 327 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. En Banc 1959), followed in Deatherage v. Deather-
age, 328 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. 1959) and Noland v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 413 S.W.2d
530 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967).
37. 327 S.W.2d at 812.
38. Id. at 811.
39. Id.
40. Id. The court spoke of public policy in its broad sense as the protection
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decided differently in the absence of the interpretation of the Married
Woman's Act 4l in Rogers42
A strong dissent contended that public policy no longer justified the
immunity43 and that cases subsequent to Rogers had repudiated that de-
cision.4 4 The dissenting opinion also argued that interpreting the same
statute to allow a wife to sue her husband for a property tort that occurred
during coverture but not for a personal tort that occurred during coverture
was inconsistent.4 5
Although Brawner seemed to indicate a return to the strict common
law doctrine, subsequent decisions at times relied on Hamilton and Ennis.40
Thus, examination of the Missouri cases preceding Ebel v. Ferguson4 7
reveals an unsettled judicial attitude toward the interspousal immunity.
In Ebel, the principal opinion purported to clarify the ambiguities in
the case law that, according to the court, had developed from the miscon-
ception that the interspousal immunity is based on the procedural bar.48
The court stated that this immunity is based instead on the substantive
bar.49
The concurring opinion justified disallowance of the suit on public
policy grounds. The majority's rigid application of the unity of spouses
concept 5O was rejected.51 The concurring opinion, however, failed for the
most part to enumerate the public policies that precluded the suit.5 2
The dissenting opinion attacked the substantive basis for the im-
munity, quoting statements in Ennis and Hamilton condemning the unity
doctrine. 53 The Missouri Married Woman's Act5 4 was construed as re-
pudiating the common law rule of interspousal immunity.5 5 Thus, the dis-
sent completely ignored the previous construction of the Act in Rogers.
This opinion further indicated that the divorce removed the public policy
considerations that would otherwise preclude the suit.50
41. §§ 1735, 8304, RSMo 1909 [now §§ 507.010, 451.290, RSMo 1969]; see
note 18 supra.
42. See 327 S.W.2d at 811; text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.
43. Id. at 821-22 (dissenting opinion).
44. Id. at 819-20. The dissent cited Hamilton and Ennis for this proposition.
45. 327 S.W.2d at 817 (dissenting opinion).
46. See, e.g., Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. En Banc 1960)
(court ruled, drawing an analogy to Ennis, that death negated the public policies
that supported application of the parental immunity and thus allowed the suit);
Berry v. Harmon, 329 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1959) (followed Hamilton and allowed
recovery for an antenuptial tort where suit was brought after marriage).
47. 478 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. En Banc 1972).
48. Id. at 337.
49. Id.
50. Notably, the unity of spouses concept fostered both the procedural bar
and the substantive bar. See text accompanying notes 4-6 supra.
51. 478 S.W.2d at 339 (concurring opinion).
52. The concurring opinion offered a "for instance" stating that to allow the
suit would destroy the finality of divorce decrees. Id.
53. Id. at 337 (dissenting opinion).
54. § 451.290, RSMo 1969; see note 18 supra.
55. 478 S.W.2d at 338 (dissenting opinion).
56. Id. The dissent cited the dissenting opinion in Brawner for arguments
based on public policy.
60
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [1973], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss2/6
RECENT CASES
Although Ebel purported to overrule Ennis, only three judges relied
on the substantive bar as the rationale for their decision.57 Thus, the prin-
cipal opinion in Ebel may have little precedential value. Arguably, in the
future the concurring and dissenting judges may combine to form a ma-
jority that will allow interspousal suits where substantial public policy
reasons for applying the immunity are absent.5 8 The court, however, cited
with approval Hamilton.50 That case allowed a suit that would have been
procedurally impossible at common law.60 Thus, Ebel arguably abandoned
the procedural bar to interspousal suits. As a practical effect, this shift may
decrease the likelihood that the Missouri court will abolish the immunity
in the future; the courts are more reluctant to change substantive than
procedural law.61
The Ebel case seems to indicate that at present in Missouri a spouse
may not maintain suit in most cases against the other for a personal tort
committed during marriage. The presence of the "public policy" proponents
on the court, however, precludes a definite conclusion as to cases where
the circumstances (e.g., the death of one of the spouses) might negate all
public policies that ordinarily support disallowing the suit. Ebel indicates
that divorce alone does not remove all policy considerations favoring appli-
cation of the immunity.6 2 The court did not enumerate the public policies
that justify applying the immunity. Thus, determining the circumstances,
if any, where the court will allow interspousal suits is impossible. Only
subsequent cases can clarify this situation.63
The Ebel holding departs from the trend in this country toward aban-
donment of the interspousal immunity doctrine.64 Although the principal
and concurring opinions disagreed as to the proper rationale for the de-
cision, a majority of the Missouri Supreme Court favors retaining the im-
munity, at least in certain cases.
ROBERT K. McDoNALD
57. See id. at 337.
58. See Bahr v. Bahr, 478 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. 1972) and Brennecke v. Kilpatrick,
336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. En Banc 1960), indicating that where the familial relation is
destroyed, the reasons for applying the parental immunity no longer exist and the
suit should be allowed.
59. 478 S.W.2d at 336.
60. See text accompanying notes 4-5, 28-32 supra.
61. Cf. 478 S.W.2d at 336.
62. See 478 S.W.2d at 337.
63. In referring to immunity rules in general, Professor Smith stated:
The survival of some immunity rules despite their lack of merit can be
explained only by the power of persistent advocacy in the courts. While
liability insurance has made the immunities anachronisms, ironically its
union with the tort process also has kept them alive.
Smith, The Miscegenetic Union of Liability Insurance and Tort Process in the
Personal Injury Claims System, 54 CORNELL L. Rxv. 645, 674 (1969) (emphasis
added). A comparison of the briefs submitted in Ebel points out this "persistent
advocacy." See Brief for Appellant & Brief for Respondent, 478 S.W.2d 334 (Mo.
En Banc 1972).
64. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 122, at 864 (4th ed. 1971).
19731
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Plaintiff Marjorie Gordon and her sister-in-law Phyllis Gordon pur-
chased separate automobile liability insurance policies from defendant
American Family Mutual Insurance Company. Each policy contained an
uninsured motorist endorsement with limits of $5,000 for one person in-
jured and $10,000 for two or more persons injured.2 Plaintiff was one of
three passengers in an automobile driven by Phyllis Gordon when it col-
lided with an automobile negligently driven by defendant George Maupin,
an uninsured motorist. Phyllis Gordon and the two passengers other than
plaintiff collected $8,397 from the $10,000 limit of the Phyllis Gordon
policy, leaving only $1,603 available to satisfy the plaintiff's $5,000 injury
claim. Plaintiff attempted to collect from her own policy, which had ap-
plicable limits of $5,000. American denied coverage under that policy be-
cause of the policy's "other-insurance clause," which provided:
With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an
automobile not owned by a named insured under this endorse-
ment, the insurance hereunder shall apply only as excess insur-
ance over any other similar insurance available to such occupant,
and this insurance shall then apply only in the amount by which
the applicable limit of liability of this endorsement exceeds the
sum of the applicable limits of liability of all such other insurance.8
Plaintiff brought suit against American and won a judgment of $5,000.
American appealed, and the St. Louis Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment.4 The court, in a case of first impression, based its decision on
an interpretation of the word "available" in the other-insurance clause.
The court interpreted "available" against American because it was ambigu-
ous. In support of this result, the court pointed out that plaintiff should
be entitled to recover at least the minimum level of liability because she
had purchased the additional uninsured motorist protection.
The court interpreted "available" to mean actually available at the
time plaintiff sought compensation, rather than theoretically available at
the time of the accident.8 Because only $1,603 was actually available at the
1. 469 S.W.2d 848 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971).
2. The new limits of liability are $10,000 for one injured and $20,000 for
two or more injured, pursuant to §§ 303.030, RSMo 1969, 379.203, RSMo Supp.
1971.
3. 469 S.W.2d at 849 (emphasis added). This clause is standard and is sub-
stantially similar to those found in the following sources: INSURANCE RATING BuREAu
& MUTUAL INSURANCE RATING BUREAU, TEXT or 1966 STANDARD PROVISIONS rmO
GENERAL-ArromonLE LIAIILTrY POLICIES, AUTO. LiAB. INS. CAs., app., at 292 (Supp.
1967); INSURANCE RATING BUREAU 8 MUTUAL INSURANCE RATING BUREAU, STANDARD
FAMILY COMBINATION AUTOMOBILE POLICY, [1970-72 Transfer Binder] CCH AUTo,
INs. CAs. 2315, at 2033-34 (Jan. 1, 1963 Rev.) .For a comparison of the texts of sev-
eral other-insurance clauses, see Symposium: Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, 53
MARQ. L. Rv. 319, 409-10 (1970).
Other-insurance clauses appear in many different types of insurance policies.
R. KEEToN, BASIC TExr ON INSURANCE LAw § 3.11 (a), at 168-70 (1971).
4. 469 S.W.2d at 849, 852.
5. At first glance, the court's assertion that "[ilt matters not whether we look
[Vol..$8
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time plaintiff sought recovery under the driver's policy, the court made an
award of $5,000. If the driver's and the plaintiff's policies had been with
different insurance carriers, the judgment would have been $1,603 from
the driver's insurer and $3,397 ($5,000 less the similar insurance available
of $1,603) from the plaintiff's insurer.6
Although the court interpreted only the word "available," an addi-
tional interpretation is implicit in the decision in order to justify obtain-
ing the $5,000 judgment in the manner described above, in light of the
language of the entire other-insurance clause. The latter part of the other
insurance clause provided that the plaintiff's insurance shall "apply only in
the amount by which the applicable limit of liability ... exceeds the sum
of the applicable limits of liability of all such other insurance."r The
stated limit of liability of the plaintiff's policy was $5,000, and the driver's
stated limit of liability was $10,000. Obviously, the plaintiff's $5,000 limit
did not exceed the driver's $10,000 limit. Therefore, to reach the $3,397
figure the court must have either ignored the latter part of the other-in-
surance clause or interpreted "applicable limits of liability" as having two
different meanings. If the court gave effect to the latter part of the other-
insurance clause, it must have considered the "applicable limits of liability"
of the plaintiff's policy as being the stated limit ($5,000), and the "applica-
ble limits of liability" of the driver's policy as being the amount that hap-
pened to be left in the fund after the driver's and the other passengers'
claims were satisfied ($1,603). Such an interpretation seems to disregard the
principle of insurance contract interpretation that allows the parties gener-
ally to restrict the insurer's liability to any extent to which they may agree.8
Another principle of interpretation, however, arguably supports the
court's result. In construction of any insurance contract, social policy
dictates an interpretation for the insured and against the insurer, the
upon Phyllis Gordon's $10,000 uninsured motorist coverage as being 'available'
at the time of collision or at the time plaintiff sued" (id. at 849-50) seems to bring
this statement into question. The court was merely saying, however, that Phyllis
Gordon's $10,000 uninsured motorist coverage was actually available to plaintiff
neither at the time of the accident nor at the time of the suit.
In arriving at the exact amount plaintiff was entitled to recover under her
own uninsured motorist endorsement, the court dearly had to decide at which
time "available" applied. If it applied at the time of the accident, plaintiff could
recover $5,000 under her uninsured motorist coverage, because the court concluded
that nothing was actually available to plaintiff under Phyllis Gordon's coverage
at the time of the accident. If, however, "available" applied at the time of suit,
plaintiff could recover only $3,397 under her coverage, because $1,603 was available
to her at that time under Phyllis Gordon's coverage. In a footnote to its opinion,
the court pointed out that had Phyllis Gordon's policy been with an insurer other
than plaintiff's insurer, plaintiff's insurer would have been liable for only $3,397.
See id. at 850 n.3; text accompanying note 6 infra. Thus, the court implicitly in-
terpreted "available" as applying at the time of suit.
6. 469 S.W.2d at 850 n.3.
7. Id. at 849; text accompanying note 3 supra.
8. See Webb v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 479 S.W.2d 148, 150 (Mo.
App., D.K.C. 1972), noted in Hellmuth, Insurance-Medical Setoffs and Unin-
sured Motorist Coverage, 38 Mo. L. Rv. 346 (1973); Kisling v. MFA Mut. Ins.
Co., 399 S.W.2d 245, 252-53 (Spr. Mo. App. 1966), noted in Williams, Uninsured
Motorist Insurance-Subrogation-Settlement with Tortfeasor, 32 Mo. L. R.v. 159
(1967).
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drafter of the policy, when the phrase or word in question is ambiguous.9
Missouri courts have applied this principle of construction to uninsured
motorist endorsements, finding for insureds when the phrase is ambigu-
ous,10 or for insurers when the phrase is unambiguous." If the phrase
"applicable limits of liability" is susceptible to two different interpre-
tations in the same sentence, that phrase is arguably ambiguous, and should
be interpreted for the plaintiff insured.
As a policy reason in support of its holding, the court in Gordon
stated that an insured who pays a premium should be allowed to recover
the minimum limit of liability. This reason, often asserted in other juris-
dictions invalidating other-insurance clauses,12 has not been actuarially
shown to justify invalidating the clause. The insurer no doubt assumes
that the actual amount of coverage the insured is entitled to receive for
the amount of the premium paid includes the situation when another policy
covers the insured. It is reasonable to assume that the decreased risk as-
sociated with other-insurance clauses figures in determining rate structures,
resulting in lower premiums.' 3 Thus, the plaintiff in Gordon no doubt
paid a lower premium for her uninsured motorist coverage because of the
other-insurance clause.
None of the cases in other jurisdictions have examined other-insurance
clauses in light of the reason for originally inserting such clauses in in-
surance policies, which was to protect the insurer against the possibility of
over-insurance. 14 An insured may be tempted to destroy or neglect over-
insured objects. Hence, other-insurance clauses are most often found in
various forms of property insurance; they seldom appear in life insurance
policies,15 because the value of a life cannot be over-insured. Because Mis-
souri courts have limited recovery to the amount of actual damages
proved' 6 and have frowned upon any "stacking"' 7 of policies, the moral
risks incident to over-insurance are low in cases of uninsured motorist
9. Payne v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 379 S.W.2d 209, 211 (K.C. Mo. App.1964), noted in Montgomery, Insurance-Automobile Collision Coverage-Construc-
lion, 30 Mo. L. REv. 157 (1965); see 7 D. BLAsHFm , Auromo=u.u LAW AND PRAC-
TicE § 292.2 (3d ed. 1966).
10. See Sterns v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 401 S.W.2d 510 (K.G. Mo. App. 1966).11. See Gossett v. Larson, 457 S.W.2d 709 (Mo. 1970); Kisling v. MFA Mut.
Ins. Co., 399 S.W.2d 245 (Spr. Mo. App. 1966), noted in Williams, supra note 8;Swaringin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 399 S.W.2d 131 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966).
12. See, e.g., Simpson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Go., 318 F. Supp. 1152,
1156 (S.D. Ind. 1970).
13. Although this factor was not considered in Gordon, at least one Missouri
court has been influenced by the impact of higher premiums resulting from de-
cisions for insureds. See Kisling v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 399 S.W.2d 245 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1966).
14. R. KEEON, supra note 3, at 168.
15. Id. at 169-70.
16. 469 S.W.2d at 851.
17. Id. "Stacking" is the recovery on two or more of an insured's policies by
aggregating the liability of the policies' limits. See Deterding v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 78 Ill. App. 2d 29, 222 N.E.2d 523 (1966). In most jurisdictions
approving "stacking" the policies are only stacked to the extent they provide re-
covery for actual damages sustained, even though the other insurance clause
limitation is disregarded. See Sellers v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.,
185 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1966); Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 551 (1969).
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coverage. Hence, as to uninsured motorist policies, there is little justifica-
tion for the other-insurance clause aside from decreasing premiums.
Most jurisdictions that have tested the validity of other-insurance
clauses have done so by looking to the purposes of their uninsured motorist
statutes.18 The insurer issued the policy in Gordon, however, before Mis-
souri adopted its uninsured motorist statute' 9 in 1967. Therefore, the court
had to interpret the insurance contract without the aid of the statue.
The approaches that the jurisdictions other than Missouri have taken
in determining the validity of uninsured motorist clauses fall into three
basic categories. First, some jurisdictions uphold the clause by interpreting
their statute as intending the endorsement to provide the insured with the
same protection he would have had if the uninsured motorist had been in-
sured to the limit of the statutory minimum. This is the so-called sub-
stituted coverage theory.2 0 This type of jurisdiction would have reasoned
in Gordon that the minimum level of liability coverage the defendant
George Maupin could have had available for two or more persons injured
was $10,000. Hence, the $10,000 fund theoretically available from the
driver's policy would have been sufficient under this approach, and the
plaintiff would not have recovered. Second, a few jurisdictions simply en-
force the clause because they find it unambiguous. 2 ' Finally, the recent
trend seems to be to interpret uninsured motorist statutes2 2 as prohibiting
an other-insurance clause from reducing uninsured motorist coverage below
the statutorily prescribed minimum. 23 Although this approach reaches the
same result as Gordon while avoiding the possible multiple interpretation
of "applicable limits of liability" in Gordon, it may rest upon a strained
18. See cases cited note 23 infra.
19. § 379.203, RSMo 1969, as amended, § 379.203, RSMo Supp. 1971. Section
379.203 requires all automobile liability policies issued or delivered in Missouri
to provide uninsured motorist protection.
20. Harris v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 448 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Ark.
1970); Kirby v. Ohio Gas. Ins. Co., 232 Cal. App. 2d 9, 13, 42 Cal. Rptr. 509, 512
(1965); Tindall v. Farmers Auto. Management Corp., 83 I1. App. 2d 165, 168,
226 N.E.2d 397, 399 (1967); Le Blanc v. Allstate Ins. Co., 194 So. 2d 791, 796 (La.
App. 1967); Maryland Gas. Co. v. Howe, 106 N.H. 422, 424, 213 A.2d 420, 422
(1965); Lyon v. Hartford Accident 9- Indem. Co., 25 Utah 2d 311, 315, 480 P.2d
739, 742 (1971); see Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 551, 556 (1969).
21. Grunfeld v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 232 Cal. App. 2d 4, 8, 42 Cal. Rptr.
516, 519 (1965); Burcham v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 255 Iowa 69, 75, 121 N.W.2d
500, 503 (1963); Globe Indem. Co. v. Estate of Baker, 22 App. Div. 2d 658, 659,
253 N.Y.S.2d 170, 172 (1964); Russell v. Paulson, 18 Utah 2d 157, 162, 417 P.2d 658,
662 (1966); Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 66 Wash. 2d 871, 875, 405 P.2d 712, 714
(1965).
22. There are two variations of uninsured motorist statutes. One allows an
insured to reject the endorsement by written request (as did § 379.203, RSMo 1969
before the 1971 amendment). The other allows no written or other kind of rejec-
tion. In the latter type of jurisdiction the statutory purpose mandating all policies
to carry a minimum level of liability follows more easily, because a policy can not
issue without the endorsement. These jurisdictions would invalidate the entire
other-insurance clause as being in contravention of state law. Plaintiff in Gordon
would have recovered her $5,000 limit of liability in addition to the $1,603 from her
sister's policy.
23. Jurisdictions having statutes allowing rejection of the uninsured motorist
endorsement by written request: Hogan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 287 Ala. 696, 699, 255
So. 2d 35, 37 (1971); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Williams, 119 Ga. App. 414, 416,
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interpretation of the purpose of the uninsured motorist statute in ques-
tion. Indeed, no legislative histories have been cited in support of such
statutory constructions. 24
The future impact of Gordon may depend largely upon whether in-
surance companies make other-insurance clauses less ambiguous. The hold-
ing in Gordon was grounded upon the court's interpreting "available" as
meaning available at the time of suit rather than theoretically available at
the time of the accident. Therefore, if insurance companies attempted to
make other-insurance clauses unambiguous by inserting language clearly
defining "available" to mean available at the time of the accident, a court
should have little choice but to uphold the plain meaning of the clause.
In Swaringin v. Allstate Insurance Co.,25 the insured, Swaringin, was
injured in an automobile collision with a driver who was insured at the
time of the accident. The other driver's insurance carrier became insolvent,
however, before Swaringin could recover for his injuries, so he sought re-
covery from his policy's uninsured motorist endorsement on the theory that
the other driver was uninsured. Swaringin was denied recovery because
his policy specifically defined "uninsured automobile" to mean an auto-
mobile on "which there is no bodily injury liability insurance applicable
at the time of the accident."26 The St. Louis Court of Appeals held the
language was not susceptible to construction; the meaning was "plain and
straightforward" because of the phrase "at the time of the accident."2 7
This treatment of the phrase "at the time of the accident" should signal
insurance carriers to insert the phrase to modify "available" in the other-
insurance clause.
Making the other-insurance clause unambiguous, however, may not
solve the insurance companies' problem. Because section 379.208 of the Re-
vised Statutes of Missouri, enacted in 1967 and amended in 1971, was not
167 S.E.2d 174, 175 (1969); Simpson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 318 F.
Supp. 1152, 1153 (S.D. Ind. 1970); Blakeslee v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 32
Mich. App 115, 120, 188 N.W.2d 216, 218 (1971); Harthcock v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. 248 So. 2d 456, 458 (Miss. 1971); Sullivan v. Doe, 495 P.2d 193,
198 (Mont. 1972); Mountel v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 26 Ohio App.
2d 105, 108, 269 N.E.2d 857, 859 (1971); Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Blumling,
429 Pa. 389, 896, 241 A.2d 112, 115 (1968); American Liberty Ins. Co. v. Ranzau, 473
S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971). Jurisdictions not having statutes allow-
ing rejection of the uninsured motorist endorsement by -ritten or any other kind
of request: Transportation Ins. Co. v. Wade, 11 Ariz. App. 14, 16, 461 P.2d 190,
192 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, 106 Ariz. 269, 475 P.2d 253 (1970); Fidelity
S Cas. Co. v. Darrow, 161 Conn. 169, 178-80, 286 A.2d 288, 292-93 (1971); United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Sellers, 179 So. 2d 608, 611 (1965), rev'd, 185 So.
2d 689, 690 (Fla. 1966); Protective Fire &c Cas. Co. v. Woten, 186 Neb. 212, 217,
181 N.W.2d 835, 838 (1970); Moore v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. Group, 270 N.C.
532, 543, 155 S.E.2d 128, 136 (1967); Bryant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 205
Va. 897, 901-02, 140 S.E.2d 817, 820 (1965). See Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 551, 559-60
(1969).
24. See, e.g., Simpson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 1152,
1156 (S.D. Ind. 1970).
25. 399 S.W.2d 131 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966).
26. Id. at 133 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 133-34. The Swaringin case was overruled by § 379.203, RSMo 1969,
as amended, § 379.203, RSMo Supp. 1971, which defined "uninsured motor vehicle"
to include a driver whose insurance carrier becomes insolvent within two years.
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in force when plaintiff's policy was issued, it was not controlling in Gordon.
Webb v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 28 gives some indi-
cation of the purpose that the courts may attribute to section 379.203 in the
future. In Webb, the Kansas City Court of Appeals held the insurer could
not deduct its payments under the medical benefits provisions of the policy
from the uninsured motorist endorsement limit of liability, despite a policy
provision allowing such deduction. The court gave three reasons for its
holding. First, it interpreted section 379.203 as requiring "that each insured
under such coverage have available the full statutory minimum to exactly
the same extent as would have been available had the tortfeasor complied
with the minimum requirements of the financial responsibility Law."'2 9
Second, it held that any reduction of uninsured coverage below the mini-
mum level of liability required by secton 379.203 is void as being in con-
flict with the state's public policy.30 Third, the court stated that because
the medical payments clause and the uninsured motorist endorsement
were independent the statutory minimum could not be reduced by an in-
dependent clause. 31 Although these three independent grounds are consis-
tent in the Webb context, the first two could justify opposite results in a
Gordon situation. The first rationale of Webb is the substituted coverage
theory and would dictate enforcing an unambiguous other-insurance
clause.3 2 The second rationale would invalidate the entire other-insurance
clause and yield the same result attained in Gordon.38 The only Missouri
authority cited in Webb supported the substituted coverage theory. How-
ever, that case, Sterns v. MFA Mutual Insurance Co.,3 4 was decided in
1966 before Missouri adopted section 379.203 and before the recent trend
of cases invalidating the entire clause evolved. For purposes of determining
which theory Missouri should follow, it is of little aid to compare section
379.203 with the statutes of the two types of jurisdictions because they are
without significant deviation.35 Therefore, the public policy that Missouri
will finally select for a future Gordon situation is uncertain.
In conclusion, it is probable that insurance companies can avoid the
impact of Gordon by defining available to mean available at the time of the
accident. In such case, Missouri courts may be forced to select either public
policy for section 379.203. Until that time, insureds have available a fund
at least equal to the minimum level of liability of their uninsured motorist
endorsements.
ARTHUR S. HASELTINE
28. 479 S.W.2d 148 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972), noted in Hellmuth, supra note 8.
29. Id. at 152.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 154.
32. See text accompanying notes 20 & 21 supra.
33. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
34. 401 S.W.2d 510, 514 (K.C. Mo. App. 1966).
35. See e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 36. § 74 (62a) (Supp. 1971); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.
20-259.01 (Supp. 1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 38-175a (Supp. 1973); FLA.
STAT. § 627.727 (Supp. 1972); GA. CODE § 56407.1 (Supp. 1971); IND. CODE § 27-
7-5-1 (Supp. 1972); MONT. REv. CoDrs ANN. § 40-4403 (Supp. 1971); NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 60-509.01 (1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21 (Supp. 1971); Omo REv. CODE
§ 3937.18 (1953); Tr.x. INs. CODE art. 5.06-1 (Supp. 1972); VA. CODE § 38.1-381
(Supp. 1972).
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UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE--VALIDITY OF
MEDICAL SETOFF CLAUSE
Webb v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Go.1
An uninsured motorist negligently collided with an automobile that
plaintiff John E. Webb, a .minor, occupied with three other youths. The
collision caused the death of one of the youths, and seriously injured the
others. The defendant, State Farm, had issued an automobile liability in-
surance policy to the parents of the driver of the car that the uninsured
motorist struck. The policy covered all of the occupants of that car. The
medical payments coverage of the policy provided for payment of reason-
able medical expenses up to $500 for each occupant of the insured auto-
mobile. The policy limit on uninsured motorist coverage was $20,000 total
for injury to or death of more than one person. A medical setoff clause in
the uninsured motorist section of the policy provided that any amount
payable under uninsured motorist coverage would be reduced by the
amount paid under the separate medical payments coverage of that policy.2
The insureds brought suit against State Farm when a dispute arose
concerning the effect of this setoff clause on the insurer's total liability
under the policy.3 The value of all claims for injuries, wrongful death, loss
of services, and medical expenses exceeded the $20,000 policy limit under
the uninsured motorist coverage, and apparently the medical expenses ex-
ceeded $500 per person. Based on the medical setoff clause, State Farm
claimed the right to reduce its $20,000 liability under the uninsured
motorist coverage by the $500 paid or payable to each insured under
medical payments coverage, and thus limit its total liability under the
policy to $20,000. The insureds insisted that the company pay them $500
each under the medical payments coverage, and contended that such pay-
ments should not affect the insurer's full $20,000 liability under the unin-
sured motorist coverage.
The trial court refused to enforce the medical setoff clause, and held
that the defendant State Farm was not entitled to deduct medical expense
payments from the $20,000 liability otherwise payable under the unin-
sured motorist section of the policy. The Kansas City District of the Mis-
1. 479 S.W.2d 148 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972).
2. Insurance companies commonly use such medical setoff clauses to limit
their liability under uninsured motorist coverage. The medical setoff clause ap-
pearing in the Uninsured Automobile Coverage section of the insurance policy
construed in Webb provides as follows:
13. LIMITS OF LIABILITY
(b) Any amount payable under this coverage because of bodily injury sus-
tained in an accident by a person who is an insured under this coverage
shall be reduced by:
(3) all sums paid or payable on account of such bodily injury under
[Medical Payments Coverage] of a policy issued by this company.
Id. at 149-50.
3. The suit was brought by two of the injured parties and the parents of
the youth killed in the accident. State Farm had settled with one of the injured
youths and his parents for their loss of services for $2,500. Id. at 150.
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souri Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment for the plain-
tiffs, holding the medical setoff clause void.4
The court advanced three complementary arguments to justify its in-
validation of the setoff clause. First, the court held that the clause was void
on its face because its effect was to reduce uninsured motorist coverage
below the minimum statutory requirement of $10,000/$20,000.5 The sec-
ond theory on which the court voided the clause was adopted from the
Nebraska case of Stephens v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.6 This theory
(hereinafter referred to as the "dual policy" theory) views medical pay-
ments coverage and uninsured motorist coverage as separate, independently
contracted for provisions for which separate premiums are paid.7 It is
used to overcome the argument that medical setoffs do not really reduce
uninsured motorist coverage, but merely reduce medical payments cover-
age.8 The court adopted the "substituted coverage" theory as the third
ground for invalidating the clause. According to this theory, the highly
remedial character of Missouri's uninsured motorist statute requires that an
insured under uninsured motorist coverage be treated exactly as he would
have been if the uninsured motorist had been covered by liability insurance
with full $10,000/$20,000 limits. 9 In Webb, if the uninsured motorist had
carried $10,000/$20,000 liability, the insureds could have recovered both
medical expenses from their carrier and $20,000 from the tortfeasor's car-
rier. Thus, the substituted coverage theory, in an uninsured motorist situa-
tion, requires that the insureds have a full $20,000 fund available under un-
insured motorist coverage in addition to their medical payments coverage.
In analyzing cases involving medical setoff clauses, the following two
variables are significant: (1) The exact wording of the setoff clause; and
(2) the amount of damages in relation to the policy limits (i.e., the extent
to which allowing recovery under both uninsured motorist coverage and
medical payments coverage allows an insured double recovery for the same
damages). 10 Thus, while Webb invalidated a particular setoff clause in a
4. After the settlement with the one youth and his parents, only $17,500
remained in the uninsured motorist fund. Ultimately, State Farm paid out $20,000
total under uninsured motorist coverage, in addition to $1,500 total under medical
payments coverage.
5. 479 S.W.2d at 150. Section 379.203, RSMo 1969, provides for minimum
uninsured motorist coverage as follows:
1. No automobile liability insurance covering liability arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered
or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle regis-
tered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided
therein or supplemental thereto, in not less than the limits for bodily
injury or death set forth in section 303.030, RSMo ....
Section 303.030, RSMo 1969, requires minimum limits of $10,000 for injury or
death to any one person in one accident, and limits of not less than $20,000 for
injury or death to more than one person in any one accident.
6. 182 Neb. 562, 156 N.W.2d 133 (1968).
7. 479 S.W.2d at 152.
8. The dual policy theory was used to rebut this argument in Bacchus v.
Farmers Ins. Group Exch., 106 Ariz. 280, 475 P.2d 264 (1970).
9. 479 S.W.2d at 151-52.
10. A potential double recovery situation arises when the total damages are
less than the sum of the limits of medical payments coverage and uninsured motor-
1973]
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particular damages situation, the decision is unlikely to foreclose future
litigation in Missouri over medical setoff clauses in cases that differ in
one or both of these variables.
These multiple variables render a discussion of medical setoff cases
complicated and difficult to follow. In varying fact situations, the courts
have followed as many as three approaches to recovery. The chart below
will thus be helpful in illustrating possible recoveries under each approach
in different fact situations.
CHART
DAMAGES AMOUNTS OF TOTAL RECOVERY
Recovery I Recovery II Recovery III
Medical Other Total Setoff No Double Setoff
Expenses Damages Damages Void Recovery Valid
A 1,000 8,000 9,000 10,000 9,000 9,000
S
I B 500 9,500 10,000 10,500 10,000 10,000
T
U C 1,000 9,000 10,000 11,000 10,000 10,000
A
T D 1,000 9,500 10,500 11,000 10,500 10,000
I
O E 1,000 10,000 11,000 11,000 11,000 10,000
N
F 5,000 10,000 15,000 11,000 11,000 10,000
The chart presupposes a situation where a single non-contributorily negli-
gent insured is injured by a negligent uninsured motorist. The insured has
$1,000 medical payments coverage and $10,000 uninsured motorist cover-
age. The three columns of figures on the left half of the chart show the
amount of medical expenses, other damages, and total damages incurred
by the insured in various situations. Note that in Situations A, B, C and D
the total damages are less than the combined limits of medical payments
coverage and uninsured motorist coverage. These situations present possible
double recoveries, whereas Situations E and F do not. The right half of
the chart indicates possible recoveries in the various damages situations.
The first column shows the insured's total recovery where no medical setoff
is allowed.': The middle column illustrates total recovery where a setoff
is allowed to the extent it prevents double recovery for the same damages.12
ist coverage. Thus, Webb was not a double recovery situation, because the total
damages exceeded the sum of those limits.
A third variable in medical setoff cases is the type of uninsured motorist
statute in force in the jurisdiction. This variable is not discussed in this note, and
unless otherwise specified all the cases cited are governed by uninsured motorist
statutes similar to Missouri's in all relevant respects.
11. The following cases illustrate Recovery I: Bacchus v. Farmers Ins. Group
Exch., 106 Ariz. 280, 475 P.2d 264 (1970); Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Siddons, 451
S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1970); Keyes v. Beneficial Ins. Co., 39 Mich. App. 450, 197
N.W.2d 907 (1972); Webb v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 479 S.W.2d 148(Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972); Stephens v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 182 Neb. 562, 156
N.W.2d 133 (1968).
12. The following cases illustrate Recovery II: Wittig v. United Serv. Auto.
Ass'n, 300 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Melson v. Illinois Natl Ins. Co., 1 Ill.
App. 3d 1025, 274 N.E.2d 664 (1971); Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
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The final column indicates total recovery where a medical setoff is allowed
in all damages situations.13 Note that in terms of the chart the Webb
court allowed the insureds Recovery I in Situation F.
For purposes of discussion, decisions involving medical setoff clauses
may be categorized by the first variable, i.e., the wording of the particular
setoff clause. Basically, there are three different setoff clauses found in
cases of this genre, though the potential for variance is limited only by the
ingenuity of draftsmen of insurance contracts. 14 It is logically possible for
one jurisdiction to follow one approach to recovery with one type of setoff
clause, and another approach with a different setoff clause.' 5 Thus, if Webb
is narrowly construed as applicable to its facts only, a later Missouri court
may well choose to validate a differently worded setoff clause in the same
damages situation. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the various setoff
clauses as to their exact meaning.
The first type of clause is the Webb clause.' 6 It is quite straightforward
237 So. 2d 690 (La. App. 1970); Connelley v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Co.,
219 So. 2d 206 (La. App. 1969); Lyon v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 25 Utah
2d 311, 480 P.2d 739 (1971).
13. The following cases illustrate Recovery III: Robinson v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
267 So. 2d 257 (La. App. 1972); Bailes v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 252
So. 2d 123 (La. App. 1971). Two federal district court cases allowing Recovery III
are: Boehler v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 290 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Ark. 1968);
Robey v. Northwestern Sec. Ins. Co., 270 F. Supp 466 (W. D. Ark. 1967). Both of
these cases were overruled by Heiss v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 250 Ark. 474, 465
S.W.2d 699 (1971).
14. Different clauses, not discussed in the text, can be found in: L'Manian v.
American Motorist Ins. Co., 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 524, 236 A.2d 349 (1967); Bunch v.
Frezier, 239 So. 2d 680 (La. App. 1970).
15. For example, in Bacchus v. Farmers Ins. Group Exch., 12 Ariz. App. 1, 467
P.2d 76, rev'd, 106 Ariz. 280, 475 P.2d 264 (1970), the Court of Appeals of Arizona
held that a setoff clause, which by its terms purported to characterize medical
expense payments as a loan to be paid back in case payment was made under un-
insured motorist coverage, was valid because it did not reduce statutorily re-
quired uninsured motorist coverage, but merely reduced medical expense cov-
erage. The court stated:
While offsets attempting to reduce mandatory coverages [i.e., Webb
type offsets, acting by their terms on uninsured motorist coverage] will
not be permitted, there is nothing to prevent the insurer and a person
desiring to have medical expenses insurance from employing any pro-
visions with respect to the payment or nonpayment of these benefits
which they choose.
Id. at 2, 467 P.2d at 77.
However, The Arizona Supreme Court reversed the lower appeals court, holding
that its decision amounted to nothing more than a triumph of form over substance.
Bacchus v. Farmers Ins. Group Exch., 106 Ariz. 280, 475 P.2d 264 (1970). Nonethe-
less, a court anxious to uphold a setoff clause for another reason, such as to prevent
a double recovery, might embrace such a formalistic argument, particularly if the
insurer could show that the premium was adjusted downward on the medical
expense policy because of the setoff. See Keys v. Beneficial Ins. Co., 39 Mich. App.
450, 197 N.W.2d 907 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
16. See note 2 supra.
There are very few cases involving a Webb type clause. Besides Webb, the
only other case found by this writer that deals with such a clause is Morgan v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 195 So. 2d 648 (La. App. 1967). In Morgan,
the court upheld a Webb type setoff clause, allowing Recovery III in Situation
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and on its face purports to reduce the available uninsured motorist fund
by the amount paid out in medical expense benefits. It is particularly
susceptible to attack as being violative of uninsured motorist statutes, since
by its terms it reduces uninsured motorist coverage below statutory mini-
mums. This, indeed, was the first theory upon which the Webb court re-
lied to invalidate this clause. 17
The second type of clause characterizes payments made pursuant to
medical payments coverage as mere advancements, to be repaid if the in-
surer incurs liability under uninsured motorist coverage arising out of the
same accident. By its terms, this clause (hereinafter referred to as the
"advancements" clause) purports not to affect uninsured motorist coverage
at all, but, instead, to act solely upon medical payments coverage.' 8 While
the wording of the advancements clause obviates the criticism that it re-
duces uninsured motorist coverage below statutory minimums, the clause
is fully susceptible to attack under the dual policy theory. In Bacchus v.
Farmers Insurance Group Exchange,19 one of the few cases construing an
advancements clause, the Arizona Supreme Court vigorously embraced the
dual policy theory to invalidate the clause.20 The court maintained that
a policy provision which the insured considers to be additional
protection and for which he pays a premium with such extra pro-
tection in mind cannot be transposed by the insurer into a reduc-
tion of the mandatory minimum language. 21
This choice of words in the Bacchus case is interesting. While the setoff
clause purports to act only on medical payments coverage, the court views
it as but a subterfuge, which acts to reduce uninsured motorist coverage.
This exposes the dual policy theory as grounded on the same basic
premise as the theory opposing a straightforward reduction of uninsured
motorist payments by the amount of medical expense payments.
The damages variable is not outwardly a significant consideration in
interpreting a Webb or advancements clause, although the potential for
double recovery may be an unspoken factor.22 The reason is that these
F in terms of the chart. However, many courts have treated differently worded
setoff clauses as if they were functionally the same as a Webb clause. See, e.g.,
text accompanying notes 24 & 25 supra.
17. 479 S.W.2d at 150.
18. An advancements type clause was dealt with in Bacchus v. Farmers Ins.
Group Exch., 106 Ariz. 280, 281-82, 475 P.2d 264, 265-66 (1970). See note 15
supra; text accompanying notes 19-21 infra.
19. 106 Ariz. 280, 475 P.2d 264 (1970).
20. Id. at 283, 475 P.2d at 267.
The Bacchus court rejected the substituted coverage theory as an inade-
quate expression of the legislative policy underlying Arizona's Uninsured
Motorist Statute, Aviz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-259.01 (1970) (which is similar to
Missouri's statute). 106 Ariz. at 283, 475 P.2d at 267.
21. Id. Query what the Arizona court would have done if the insured was
given his choice between setoff with reduced premium, and no setoff.
22. For instance, the Webb court might have been reluctant to void the
medical setoff clause if such a decision would have resulted in a windfall double
recovery for the insureds. Suppose, for example, an insured has suffered $10,000
total damages, all for medical expenses, in a collision with an uninsured motorist.
He has $10,000 medical payments coverage in addition to $10,000 uninsured mo-
torist coverage. In such a case, invalidating the setoff clause would give the in-
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two types of clauses do not by their terms differentiate between different
damages situations. They purport to reduce uninsured motorist coverage
in every situation. Thus, when faced with one of these clauses, a court has
but two alternatives: validate the setoff clause and arrive at Recovery Inl,
or invalidate the clause and arrive at Recovery 1.23
The third type of clause (hereinafter referred to as the "standard"
clause) is the most common setoff clause and reads as follows:
The company shall not be obligated to pay under this coverage
[Uninsured Motorist] that part of the damages which the insured
may be entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an un-
insured automobile which represents expenses for medical services
paid or payable under [Medical Payments].24
There is a split of authority as to the exact meaning of the standard
clause. A number of courts, without explicitly analyzing the specific
language of the clause, interpret it as providing for medical setoff regard-
less of the damages situation. Thus interpreted, the clause is functionally
the same as a Webb clause. Such courts uniformly hold the clause void in
all damages situations (allowing Recovery I in terms of the chart), for one
or more of the reasons employed in Webb to void the Webb clause.2 5 Other
courts, which more closely examine the wording and meaning of the
standard clause, interpret it as being quite different from the Webb clause.
These courts hold that the standard clause, by its terms, is an attempt to
preclude from recovery under uninsured motorist coverage only those
damages payable under medical payments coverage. In other words, it is
an attempt to prevent double recovery for the same damages (in terms
of the chart, an attempt to achieve Recovery II in all situations).26 Thus,
sured a $20,000 recovery for $10,000 of damages. Surely, such a possibility might have
colored the Webb court's view as to exactly what was the public policy behind
Missouri's uninsured motorist statute.
23. A court which invalidates a setoff dause, as the Webb court did, should
realize that it is paving the way for windfall double recoveries in certain damages
situations (e.g., Situations A, B, C, and D on the chart). A court might be justified,
on the basis of policy considerations against double recovery, in interpreting a
Webb or advancements clause as being valid to the extent it prevents double re-
covery, but applicable only in double recovery situations. The next clause to be
discussed, which insurance companies frequently use, does lend itself to such a
construction.
24. Drummond, Uninsured Motorist Coverage-A Suggested Approach to
Consistency, 23 ARK. L. REv. 167, 181 (1969).
25. Of the four main cases cited as authority for the holding in Webb, three
deal with a standard clause. They are: Heiss v. Aetna Cas. &, Sur. Co., 250 Ark. 474,
465 S.W.2d 699 (Ark. 1971); Tuggle v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 207 So. 2d
674 (Fla. 1968); Stephens v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 182 Neb. 562, 156 N.W.2d 133
(1968). None of these cases discuss the meaning of the standard clause. They merely
assume it is meant to operate in all damages situations. In Tuggle and Heiss,
there are vigorous dissenting opinions, however, pointing out this deficiency.
26. See, e.g., Wittig v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 300 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ind.
1969); Melson v. Illinois Nat'l Ins. Co., 1 Ill. App. 3d 1025, 274 N.E.2d 664 (1971);
Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 237 So. 2d 690 (La. App. 1970); Connelley
v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Co., 219 So. 2d 206 (La. App. 1969); Hutchison v.
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 34 App. Div. 2d 1010, 312 N.Y.S. 2d 789 (1970) (New
York's uninsured motorist statute differs from Missouri's. However, the type of
statute does not affect the preliminary matter of interpreting the meaning of
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when the court interprets the standard clause in this manner, the damages
situation is very significant, for it will determine whether the clause will
operate in the particular case. If the total amount of damages is less than
the combined policy limits, the clause will operate to prevent double re-
covery. If the total amount of damages exceeds the combined policy limits,
the clause simply does not apply to the situation.
In Melson v. Illinois National Insurance Co. 2 7 the Illinois Supreme
Court interpreted a standard clause in this latter way. In Melson, the in-
sured had sustained total damages of more than $26,000 from a negligent
uninsured motorist.28 The court allowed him to recover the full limit
of $2,000 under medical payments coverage and the full $10,000 under un-
insured motorist coverage, despite the fact that his policy contained a
standard setoff clause. 29 The damages situation in Melson was analogous
to that in Webb, equating with Situation F on the chart: total damages
were in excess of the combined upper limits of recovery under medical
payments coverage and uninsured motorist coverage. Although the Melson
court reached the same result as the Webb court, requiring the insurer to
pay the full limits of uninsured motorist coverage in addition to full medi-
cal payments coverage, the Melson court did not invalidate the medical
setoff clause, but merely held it to be inapplicable in a situation where
there was no potential for double recovery for the same damages.8 0
The question then arises how a Missouri court will interpret a stand-
ard clause in a future case with Situation F damages. The court will have a
choice between the above two alternatives. The court can blindly follow
Webb and hold that a standard clause is essentially the same as the Webb
clause, and as such is void for the same reasons the Webb clause is void.
This nondiscerning approach to differently worded setoff clauses was fol-
lowed in Stephens v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.,31 a decision, heavily
relied upon in Webb, that invalidated a standard clause. In fact, the Webb
court stated that the policy provisions involved in Stephens were "very
similar to those we consider."8 12 If a future Missouri court were to follow
this approach it would foreclose the possibility of Recovery II in Missouri,
regardless of the type of setoff clause under consideration.
Alternatively the court can take the Melson approach and hold that the
clause by its terms is inapplicable to a Situation F case, which presents no
possibility of double recovery. (Note that in terms of the chart, Recoveries
I and II reach the same result in non-double recovery situations E and F).
Under this approach the court would not need to rule on the validity of the
clause.
If a Missouri court were to give a standard setoff clause a Melson type
the clause); Lyon v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 25 Utah 2d 311, 480 P.2d 739(1971).
27. 1 Ill. App. 8d 1025, 274 N.E.2d 664 (1971).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1028, 274 N.E.2d at 666.80. The Melson court held that where the total damages incurred by theinsured are greater than the combined limits of uninsured motorist and medicalpayments coverage, the setoff provision does not apply. Id.
81. 182 Neb. 562, 156 N.W.2d 188 (1968).
82. 479 S.W.2d at 152.
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construction, a further question arises: Would the court, if presented with
a standard clause in a double recovery situation (i.e., Situations A, B, C,
and D on the chart), allow the setoff to prevent double recovery (Recovery
II on the chart), or would it invalidate the clause (Recovery I)?33 The an-
swer to this question is difficult to forecast. It may depend in part on how
a future court feels the rationales employed in Webb to invalidate the Webb
clause apply to a standard clause interpreted as in Melson.
The first Webb rationale was that a setoff clause must not reduce un-
insured motorist coverage below statutorily required limits of $10,000/
$20,000. It is arguable that this theory is inapplicable when a standard
clause is interpreted, not as reducing uninsured motorist coverage, but as
limiting those damages to which it applies (i.e., damages payable under
uninsured motorist coverage do not include those expenses already paid
once under medical payments coverage). 34
The dual policy theory was admittedly used in Bacchus v. Farmers In-
surance Group Exchange35 to support double recovery under an advance-
ments clause. Nonetheless, its vitality seems somewhat strained in a double
recovery situation. Stephens v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.3 6 was exten-
sively quoted in Webb as authority for the dual policy theory.3 7 To justify
application of the dual policy theory to invalidate medical setoffs, the
Stephens court pointed out that a medical setoff could leave uninsured
motorist coverage of nugatory value, if an insured had medical payments
coverage approaching, equal to, or in excess of the limits of uninsured
motorist coverage.35 However, the Stephens court was thinking only in terms
of the consequences of totally validating the clause, thereby allowing Re-
covery III in all damages situations. The objection made by the Stephens
court loses its urgency where a standard clause is interpreted as in Melson.
For example, an insured with $10,000 medical payments coverage and
$10,000 uninsured motorist coverage can recover up to a total of $20,000
(under Recovery II), so long as he suffers $20,000 worth of damages. Thus,
the high medical payments coverage is not useless as in the situation hy-
pothesized in Stephens.
33. Invalidating a standard clause after having given it a Melson construc-
tion would result in the same approach to recovery as that followed by the Webb
court with the Webb clause, and thus would foreclose Recovery II in Missouri.
34. See Drummond, Uninsured Motorist Coverage-A Suggested Approach to
Consistency, 23 ARK. L. Rnv. 167, 181-82 (1969), for an excellent discussion of the
operation of standard type clauses.
35. 106 Ariz. 280, 283, 475 P.2d 264, 267 (1970).
36. 182 Neb. 562, 156 N.W.2d 133 (1968).
37. 479 S.W.2d at 152-53.
38. The relevant passage, as quoted in Webb (id. at 153), reads as follows:
The complex, if not devious, ramifications of the application of the lan-
guage of this clause can be quite simply illustrated. If the plaintiff in this
case had contracted for medical expense coverage in the sum of $10,000
and had suffered medical expenses in excess of this amount, the effect
of the set off clause herein involved would be to completely eliminate
the uninsured motorist coverage.
182 Neb. at 566, 156 N.W.2d at 138-39.
It is ironical that although this hypothetical would be perfectly true as applied to
the Webb clause, it is not necessarily true as to the standard clause, which the
Stephens court was interpreting.
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The substituted coverage theory was the third rationale on which the
Webb court invalidated the Webb clause. It is conceivable that a future
Missouri court would apply this theory to invalidate a standard type clause
as well. In Missouri, though not in many other jurisdictions, double re-
covery is admittedly the rule in insured motorist situations. An insured
can recover under his medical payments coverage without subrogating to
his insurer any of his rights against the tortfeasor.8 9 Therefore, it may be
argued that the substituted coverage theory should apply so that double
recovery will also be the rule in uninsured motorist situations. A common
sense of economy would dictate otherwise, however. Surely, there are those
who would prefer to give up the chance of double recovery to save a bit of
their premium dollar. Such people should not be precluded from this option
by courts that are overzealous in their attempts to protect them. Further-
more, in Gordon v. Maupin,40 the St. Louis Court of Appeals expressly
rejected the substituted coverage theory. Though the Webb court for some
reason failed to mention Gordon, the Missouri Supreme Court may well
choose to follow the reasoning of Gordon and reject the substituted coverage
theory. In fact, it seems best to abolish the theory, which serves as no more
than a shorthand way to explain results, and can lead to undesirable results
in different fact situations.41
The failure of courts to recognize and analyze the two variables (i.e.,
the wording of the setoff clause and the damages situation) in medical
setoff cases has created an unusual amount of diversity of opinion.42 The
39. See, e.g., Forsthove v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 416 S.W.2d 208(St. L. Mo. App. 1967); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Chumbley, 894 S.W.2d 418 (Spr.
Mo. App. 1965).
Many states allow an insurer to subrogate payments made pursuant to medical
payments coverage, thus effectively denying an insured double recovery for medical
expenses in insured motorist situations. Geertz v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 451 P.2d
860, 862 (Ore. 1969). Geertz collects cases in accord with its position from seven
states and the District of Columbia. It also cites four jurisdictions holding contra,
including Missouri.
40. 469 S.W.2d 848, 851 (St L. Mo. App. 1971). Gordon dealt with a policy
issued and an accident occurring before enactment of section 379.203, RSMo 1969.
41. The substituted coverage theory is a two-edged sword. Whereas in Missouri
it acts to increase benefits in medical setoff situations, most jurisdictions following
the theory have held it reduces coverage in "other insurance" situations, by pre-
venting stacking. See, e.g., Putnam v. New Amsterdam Cas., 48 111. 2d 71, 269 N.E.
2d 97 (1970). See generally Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 551 (1969).
42. At least one reported decision, at two levels of appeal, totally fails to
mention the damages situation. See Tuggle v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 185
So. 2d 487 (Fla. App. 1966), rev'd, 207 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1968). Many decisions fail
even to mention the clause involved. See, e.g., Phillips v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 437 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1971); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Carrico,
200 So. 2d 265 (Fla. App. 1967); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 126Ga. App. 45, 190 S.E.2d 113 (1972); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Harper, 125
Ga. App. 696, 188 S.E.2d 813 (1972). Louisiana, with six medical setoff cases
reported, has yet to reach a consensus among the various circuits as to how to
handle the problem. See Robinson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 267 So. 2d 257 (La. App.
1972) (standard clause, Situation F, Recovery III); Bailes v. Southern Farm Bureau
Gas. Ins. Co., 252 So. 2d 123 (La. App. 1971) (standard clause, Situation F, Re-
covery III); Bunch v. Frezier, 239 So. 2d 680 (La. App. 1970) (no medical setoff
allowed under policy provision reducing liability under uninsured motorist provi-
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Webb decision is by no means immune from a charge of deficiency in this
respect. In fact, the decision is weak with respect to its treatment of each of
the two variables. First, the decision blindly refuses to recognize the signifi-
cance of different wording in different clauses. It considers all three clauses
discussed herein to be similar in wording and potential effect.43 This
patently is not so. Although the three clauses may ultimately be treated
similarly, this should result from sound policy considerations, not inad-
vertance. Second, the language of the decision is much too broad and fails
to recognize the consequences of varying damages situations. For example,
the Webb court quoted a portion of Bacchus v. Farmers Insurance Group
Exchange,44 which allowed double recovery under an advancements clause,
without discussing the differences in the fact situations in the two cases.
This could lead later courts to allow double recovery without properly
considering the alternatives.
The ultimate question is which of the three approaches to recovery
outlined on the chart will be available in Missouri. It is unlikely that
Recovery III will be allowed in Missouri, regardless of the particular medi-
cal setoff clause in question. To allow Recovery III would require a com-
plete break with the philosophy in Webb. Whether insureds will be al-
lowed Recovery I or Recovery II is open to serious debate. It is hoped that
the case deciding that issue will have the benefit of such serious debate.4 5
THEODoRE H. HELL uTH
sion by amount paid on behalf of uninsured driver); Taylor v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 237 So. 2d 690 (La. App. 1970) (standard clause, Situation F, Re-
covery II); Connelley v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Co. 219 So. 2d 206 (La. App.
1969) (standard clause, Situation A, Recovery II); Morgan v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 195 So. 2d 648 (La. App. 1967) (Webb clause, Situation F, Re-
covery III).
43. 479 S.W.2d at 152-53.
44. 106 Ariz. 280, 475 P.2d 264 (1970).
45. An alternative to judicial solution of the medical setoff problem would
be to deal with the problem by statute. For example, the California uninsured
motorist statute, CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (c) (West 1972), provides as follows:
The policy... may provide that if the insured has valid and collectible
automobile medical payment insurance available to him, the damages
which he shall be entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an
uninsured motor vehicle shall be reduced for purposes of uninsured
motorist coverage by the amounts paid or due to be paid under such auto-
mobile medical payment insurance.
Legislative solution of the medical setoff problem properly allows the legislature to
make the policy decision of how medical setoffs and uninsured motorist coverage
should operate. Furthermore, legislative action could simplify the law and provide
a greater degree of certainty for insurance companies and their policyholders.
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WILLS-STANDING TO CONTEST-
THE STATE AS AN INTERESTED PERSON
In re Estate of Moll'
The executor under the alleged will of the decedent Florence D. Moll
filed a petition to admit this document to probate. The State of Arizona
opposed the petition alleging undue influence, lack of testamentary ca.
pacity and absence of execution. The proponent moved to dismiss the con-
test contending that the state lacked standing2 under the Arizona will con-
test statute.3 The trial court overruled this motion. The jury found that
the decedent did not sign the will and lacked testamentary capacity at the
alleged time of execution. The trial court decreed that the document offered
for probate was not a valid will. On appeal, the executor and the residuary
legatee challenged the trial court's ruling that the state had standing to
contest.4 The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed.5
Generally, will contest statutes allow any "interested person" to con-
test the probate of a will.0 An "interested person" must have a direct finan-
cial interest which admission of the document to probate would impair or
destroy7 The contestant need not establish the requisite pecuniary interest
as a certainty; a prima fade showing is sufficient.$ In Moll, the state estab-
lished a prima fade interest by alleging that the decedent died without
heirs within the state or elsewhere. 9 Thus, if the will was invalid, and
there was no other valid will, the property would escheat.10 The court
deemed the possibility that an heir might later appear and assert his claim
as insufficient justification for overriding the state's contingent interest."1
In analyzing the interests that may give a state standing to contest,
consideration of other types of "interested persons" is helpful. Although
disinherited by a prior unprobated will, an heir has standing to contest
the admission of a subsequent document to probate. The heir is an "inter-
ested person" because the prior will may also be invalid, thus forcing the
estate to pass by intestacy. If the heir admits the validity of the earlier will,
1. 17 Ariz. App. 84, 495 P.2d 854 (1972).
2. Id.
3. Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-341 (1956): "Any person interested may .P
pear and contest the will himself or by his guardian or attorney appointed by him,
or by the court for that purpose."
4. 17 Ariz. App. at 84-85, 495 P.2d at 854-55.
5. Id. at 85, 86, 495 P.2d at 855, 856.
6. Any "interested person" may petition in the circuit court to contest the
validity of a will. E.g., § 478.083, RSMo 1969. Even in jurisdictions where the statu-
tory language allows "anyone" to contest a will, the courts apply the "interested
person" formula. See 3 W. PAGE, Wmis § 26.52 (Bowe-Parker rev. ed. 1961).
7. 17 Ariz. App. at 85, 495 P.2d at 855. See also In re Estate of Molera, 23
Cal. App. 3d 993, 100 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1972); Campbell v. St. Louis Union Trust
Co., 346 Mo. 200, 139 S.W.2d 935 (1940); State ex rel. Damon v. McQuillin,
246 Mo. 674, 152 S.W. 341 (1912); First Presbyterian Church v. Feist, 397 S.W.2d
728 (Spr. Mo. App. 1965); Steinberg v. Central Trust Co., 18 Ohio St. 2d 33, 247
N.E.2d 303 (1969).
8. 17 Ariz. App. at 85, 495 P.2d at 855; see In re Harootenian's Estate, 38 Cal.
2d 879, 288 P.2d 992 (1951).
9. 17 Ariz. App. at 85, 495 P.2d at 855.
10. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-881 (1956).
11. 17 Ariz. App. at 85-86, 495 P.2d at 855-56.
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however, he forfeits his standing to challenge the later instrument.12
Further, a devisee named in a prior will may contest a subsequent docu-
ment that reduces or destroys his interest.'3 The surviving spouse of the
decedent is an "interested person" if she would benefit from a successful
contest.14 The decedent's creditors' 5 and debtors,' 6 however, generally
lack standing. The authorities conflict as to whether the following persons
may contest: Creditors of the decedent's heirs;' 7 and assignees, personal
representatives, or heirs of a deceased heir.'8
As a general rule, an executor named in a prior will or an administra-
12. See, e.g., Ebling v. Hardesty, 354 S.W.2d 348 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962); 3
W. PAGE, supra note 6, § 26.52; Fratcher, Trusts and Suecession in Missouri, 27
Mo. L. REv. 594, 598-99 (1962).
13. See, e.g., In re Arbuckle's Estate, 98 Cal. App. 2d 562, 220 P.2d 950 (1950);
Thomas v. Gaines, 165 S.E. 833 (Ga. 1969); Reed v. Home Nat'1 Bank, 297 Mass.
222, 8 N.E.2d 601 (1937); State ex Tel. Cooper v. Lloyd, 461 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. 1971);
Campbell v. Strasburger, 17 Ohio App. 2d 56, 244 N.E.2d 530 (1968). See also 3
W. PAGE, supra note 6, § 26.54.
14. See, e.g., State ex tel. Muth v. Buzard, 205 S.W.2d 538 (Mo. 1947); Jen-
sen v. Hinderks, 338 Mo. 459, 92 S.W.2d 108 (1936); Washington & Lee Univ.
v. District Court, 492 P.2d 320 (Okla. 1971). See generally Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d
1060 (1961).
15. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Foster, 91 Ala. 613, 8 So. 349 (1890); Hooks v.
Brown, 125 Ga. 122, 53 S.E. 583 (1906).
16. A debtor to the decedent generally lacks standing because his interest is
too remote or contingent. See In re Bily's Estate, 96 Cal. App. 2d 333, 215 P.2d 78
(1950). See also Annot., 15 A.L.R. 2d 864 (1951). This rule should differ, however,
if a prior will established an interest in the debtor by forgiving his debt.
17. Some courts hold that an heir's general creditor lacks standing because he
has no direct interest in the validity of the will. Further, these courts reason that
an enormous amount of litigation would result if all general creditors of heirs
could contest. See, e.g., Burk v. Morain, 223 Iowa 399, 272 N.W. 441 (1937); Lee
v. Keech, 151 Md. 34, 133 A. 835 (1926); Smith v. Bradstreet, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.)
264 (1834). Other courts hold that a general creditor of an heir has standing. These
courts state that the heir's refusal to contest an allegedly invalid will operates as a
fraud upon his creditors. See, e.g., In re Kelt, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 108 P.2d 401 (1940);
Brooks v. Paine, 123 Ky. 271, 90 S.W. 600 (1906); Logan v. Thomason, 146 Tex.
37, 202 S.W.2d 212 (1947). An heir's judgment creditor may contest because hisjudgment lien attaches automatically to any land inherited. Hence, he has a direct
interest in the validity of the will. See, e.g., Marcus v. Pearce Woolen Mills, Inc.,
233 N.E.2d (Mass. 1968); Watson v. Alderson, 146 Mo. 333, 48 S.W. 478 (1898).
See generally T. ArmsoN, WiLis § 99 (2d ed. 1953); 3 W. PAGE, supra note 6,
§ 26.60; 95 C.J.S. Wrills § 329 (1957); Annot., 128 A.L.R. 936 (1940); 27 IowA L.
REv. 443 (1942); 4 STAN. L. REv. 607 (1952).
18. The majority rule is that the right to contest is assignable and descendible.
See, e.g., Braasch v. Worthington, 191 Ala. 210, 67 So. 1003 (1915); In re Estate
of Collins, 268 Cal. App. 2d 86, 73 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1968); Foster v. Jordan, 130
Ky. 445, 113 S.W. 490 (1908); Yingling v. Smith, 255 A.2d 64 (Md. 1969); In re
Waterbury's Estate, 18 Misc. 2d 732, 189 N.Y.S.2d 32 (Sur. Ct. 1959); In re Thomp-
son's Will, 178 N.C. 540, 101 S.E. 107 (1919); Chilcote v. Hoffnan, 97 Ohio St. 98,
119 N.E. 364 (1918); Holland v. Jackson, 19 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929),
rev'd on other grounds, 121 Tex. 1, 37 S.W.2d 726 (1931); Savage v. Bowen, 103
Va. 540, 49 S.E. 668 (1905); Ingersoll v. Gourley, 72 Wash. 462, 130 P. 743 (1913);
Childers v. Milam, 68 W. Va. 503, 70 S.E. 118 (1911); Komorowski v. Jackowski,
164 Wis. 254, 159 N.W. 912 (1916); ILL. Ra-v. STAT. ch. 3, § 90 (1969). Missouri and
Michigan, however, have followed the contrary rule. Butts v. Ruthven, 292 Mich.
602, 291 N.W. 23 (1940); In re Vanden Boch's Estate, 207 Mich. 89, 173 N.W. 332
(1919); Thompson v. Butler, 136 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1943); Davis v. Davis, 252
S.W.2d 521 (Mo. 1952); Campbell v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 346 Mo. 220,
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tor appointed on a theory of intestacy lacks standing to contest a subsequent
document if his only interest is his statutory fee.10 Therefore, an executor
under a prior will may not contest a subsequent instrument simply because
it names a new executor. The policy of preventing spurious and time-con-
suming claims supports this rule.20
The rule may differ, however, where under a prior will, the executor
is also the donee of a power of appointment. A donee of a general power,
including one who is also an executor, should have standing to contest a
subsequent document that reduces or eliminates the power. He occupies the
same position as any other devisee.21 McClain v. American Security & Trust
Co. 2 2 considered the interest of an executor who was also the donee of a
special power. In that case, the will bequeathed to the executor the power
to appoint certain personal property to any person or charity "worthy of
such gift." The executor contested a codicil that increased the shares of the
residuary legatees and thus reduced the corpus subject to the power. The
court held that the executor, as donee of the special power of appointment,
was an "interested person."23 The McClain court undoubtedly reached the
proper conclusion. Any donee of a special power of appointment, not only
one who is also the executor, should have standing to contest a subsequent
document in order to protect the interests of the ultimate beneficiaries of
the power. The courts should also consider the relationship between the
donor and the donee. The donor may have created the power because of
his confidence in the donee. Failing to recognize these issues, some courts
have reached contrary results. 24
139 S.W.2d 935 (1940); Braeuel v. Reuther, 270 Mo. 603, 193 S.W. 288 (1917);
Watson v. Alderson, 146 Mo. 888, 48 S.W. 478; see text accompanying note 42
infra. See also Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 695 (1971); 2 DE PAUL L. REv. 257 (1953); 27
IOWA L. Rxv. 448 (1942).
19. The following cases stated that the executor had no standing: Reed v.
Home Natl Bank, 297 Mass. 222, 8 N.E.2d 601 (1937); In re Ballard's Estate, 362
Mo. 1150, 1154, 247 S.W.2d 688, 685 (1952) (dictum); Love v. White, 348 Mo.
640, 154 S.W.2d 759 (1941); O'Connell v. Dockery, 102 S.W.2d 748 (St. L. Mo. App.
1937); Shock v. Berry, 221 Mo. App. 718, 285 S.W. 122 (K.C. Ct. App. 1926); State
ex rel. Hill v. District Court, 242 P.2d 850 (Mont. 1952); Hermann v. Crossen, 160
N.E.2d 404 (Ohio App. 1959); Dilow v. Campbell, 458 P.2d 710 (Okla. 1969).
Contra, McClain v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 392 F.2d 818 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See
generally 8 W. PAGE, supra note 6, § 26.55; Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 756 (1958); 29
U. GIN. L. Rxv. 897 (1960); 24 MINN. L. REv. 224 (1953).
The following cases stated that the administrator had no standing: Austin v.
Patrick, 179 Miss. 718, 176 So. 714 (1987); Cajoleas v. Attaya, 145 Miss. 486, 111
So. 359 (1927) ; Love v. White, 348 Mo. 640, 643-44, 154 S.W.2d 759, 760-61 (1941)
(dictum); O'Connell v. Dockery, 102 S.W.2d 748, 749-50 (St. L. Mo. App. 1937)(dictum); In re Fischer's Estate, 178 Neb. 510, 118 N.W.2d 625 (1962). Contra,
In re Cornelius, 14 Ark. 675 (1854); In re Davis's Will 182 N.Y. 468, 75 N.E. 530(1905). See generally Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 756 (1958).
20. See Dillow v. Campbell, 458 P.2d 710, 718 (Okla. 1969).
21. By definition, a donee of a general power of appointment may exercise
the power in favor of any person, including himself. Thus, he has a direct financial
interest in the validity of the will. Coster v. Lorilland, 14 Wend. 269 (N.Y. 1835);
Thompson v. Garwood, 8 Whart. 305 (Pa. 1837).
22. 392 F.2d 818 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
28. Id. at 819.
24. Freeman v. De Hart, 308 S.W.2d 217 (St. L. Mo. App. 1957); see Fratcher,
Trusts and Succession in Missouri, 23 Mo. L. Rxv. 467, 475 (1958).
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RECENT CASES
When the contestant is designated trustee by an earlier will, the courts
are more willing to allow standing. As a prevailing rule, a testamentary
trustee under a prior will is an "interested person."2 5 The trustee would
take title to the property on behalf of the beneficiaries. Therefore, he must
be allowed to represent the beneficiaries and to defend their interest.26 If
a prior will names a single person as both trustee and executor, he acquires
a sufficient interest as trustee even though not as executor.27 The rule
may differ, however, where the subsequent will or codicil names a new
trustee, but the beneficiaries and corpus remain the same. For example,
suppose a subsequent will devises Blackacre to A in trust for certain bene-
ficiaries and that the prior will had devised Blackacre to B in trust on
the same terms for the same beneficiaries. Does B as trustee have standing to
contest the subsequent will? On this point, the cases follow the "executor
rationale": the trustee's interest in his fee alone is insufficient. 28
The decisions concerning the state as an "interested person" follow
the various rationales that the courts apply to other persons attempting to
contest a document offered for probate.2 9 Suppose that a will is offered
for probate that devises Blackacre to A and that decedent's sole heir is
missing in action in Viet Nam. Does the state have standing to contest the
will? As a general rule, when the state's petition alleges that the decedent
died with no known heirs within the state or elsewhere, the state has estab-
lished standing to contest.30 The courts have held insufficient, however, a
petition alleging only that no known heirs reside within the particular
state.31 The state must establish that escheat is a legitimate possibility, but
need not establish it as a probability. The possibility that an heir may later
appear and assert his claim is irrelevant.32
25. Morgan v. Dietrich, 178 Md. 66, 12 A.2d 199 (1940); Reed v. Home Nat'l
Bank, 297 Mass. 222, 8 N.E.2d 601 (1937); Naylor v. McRuer, 248 Mo. 423, 154
S.W. 772 (1918); In re Estate of Maricich, 140 Mont. 319, 371 P.2d 354 (1962).
Compare In re Estate of Meredith, 275 Mich. 278, 266 N.W. 351 (1936) and Dillow
v. Campbell, 453 P.2d 710 (Okla. 1969) with State v. Haddock, 140 So. 2d 631, rev'd
on other grounds, 149 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1962).
26. See, e.g., Morgan v. Dietrich, 178 Md. 66, 70, 12 A.2d 199, 201-02 (1940);
Reed v. Home Nat'l Bank, 297 Mass. 222, 224, 8 N.E.2d 601, 602 (1937); Naylor v.
McRuer, 248 Mo. 423, 468, 154 S.W. 772, 785 (1913) (dictum); In re Estate of
Maricich, 140 Mont. 319, 332, 371 P.2d 354-55 (1962).
27. See, e.g., State v. Haddock, 140 So. 2d 631 (dictum), rev'd on other
grounds, 149 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1962); Reed v. Home Nat'l Bank, 297 Mass. 222, 8
N.E.2d 601 (1937); In re Estate of Maricich, 140 Mont. 319, 371 P.2d 354 (1962).
28. See In re Estate of Meredith, 275 Mich. 278, 266 N.W. 351 (1936); In re
Estate of Maricich, 140 Mont. 319, 371 P.2d 354 (1962); Dillow v. Campbell, 453
P.2d 710 (Okla. 1969).
29. See text accompanying notes 12-28 supra.
30. In re Estate of McCabe, 219 Cal. 742, 29 P.2d 195 (1934); State v. Ames, 23
La. Ann. 69 (1871); Warren v. Estate of Sidney, 183 Miss. 669, 184 So. 806 (1938);
State ex rel. Donovan v. District Court, 25 Mont. 355, 65 P. 120 (1901); In re
Fischer's Estate, 173 Neb. 510, 113 N.W.2d 625 (1962); State v. Niewenhaus, 43
S.D. 198, 178 N.W. 976 (1920); State v. Lancester, 119 Tenn. 638, 105 S.W. 858
(1907); Alexander v. State, 115 S.W.2d 1122 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); see Annot.,
18 A.L.R. 17 (1922); 50 HAmv. L. R.v. 705 (1970); 6 ViLL. L. REv. 429 (1961).
31. Compare State v. Niewenhaus, 43 S.D. 198, 178 N.W. 976 (1920) with
State ex rel. Donovan v. District Court, 25 Mont. 355, 65 P. 120 (1901).
32. In re Estate of Moll, 17 Ariz. App. 84, 85-86, 495 P.2d 854, 855-56 (1972);
State ex rel. Donovan v. District Court, 25 Mont. 355, 365, 65 P. 120, 122 (1901).
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Other interests may also give the state standing to contest. Under the
parens patriae doctrine, the state may have standing to represent the inter-
ests of unknown heirs.83 The jurisdictions that apply this rationale, how-
ever, fail to recognize that the state has an interest adverse to that of an
unknown heir, who may subsequently appear and prevent escheat.84 The
state may not have standing under this theory to contest for the missing-in-
action soldier; he is not an unknown heir. At least one court has rejected
the parens patriae argument.3 5
The state may also have an interest if a successful contest of the will in
question would yield a larger inheritance tax. In re Stephani.8 0 however,
held that this interest was insufficient to establish standing.87 The com-
mentators generally agree with the Stephani case: "[T]he state cannot con-
test a will simply because the amount of the estate or inheritance tax may
be affected greatly by the validity or invalidity of the will."88 Nevertheless,
however, this pecuniary and proprietary interest should be sufficient to
provide the state with standing to contest.3 9
The basic policy of will contest statutes is to prevent the admission of
fraudulent wills to probate. In construing these statutes, the courts should
consider the consequences where there are no "interested persons." This con-
sideration is especially important in jurisdictions like Missouri where the
will is offered in common form and the proceeding in the probate court is
basically ex parte.4o If the will is admitted to probate and the circuit court
determines that there are no "interested persons," a forgery may go uncon-
tested.4' This situation can also occur if persons with interests will not or
cannot contest the will (e.g., they may be unavailable or lack the necessary
financial means). Holdings in Missouri that an interested person's right to
standing is neither assignable nor descendible (i.e., it is personal and dies
with him) further complicate this practical problem.4 2 Thus, even though
an assignee has a beneficial interest under a prior will, he cannot contest a
subsequent document. In condusion, the courts should consider the basic
policy of preventing uncontested forgeries, while doing justice to the con-
cerned parties, in determining whether a person is "interested" under a will
contest statute.
CHARLEs R. BAIRD
38. In State v. Rector, 184 Kan. 685, 8 P.2d 328 ,4932), the court explicitly
held this interest sufficient. See also Warren v. Estate of Sidney, 188 Miss. 669, 184
So. 806 (1988); T. ATKiNsoN, supra note 17, § 99; 27 AM. JuR. 2D Escheat § 30(1966); 95 C.J.S. Willy § 329 (1957).
84. State v. Rector, 184 Kan. 685, 688, 8 P.2d 823, 324 (1932); Warren V.
Estate of Sidney, 183 Miss. 669, 675, 184 So. 806, 808 (1938).
85. State v. Superior Court, 148 Cal. 55, 82 P. 682 (1905).
36. 159 Misc. 43, 288 N.Y.S. 486 (Sur. Ct. 1936).
37. Id. at 49-50, 288 N.Y.S. at 493.
38. 3 W. PAGE, supra note 6, § 26.54.
39. See 50 HARV. L. REv. 705 (1987).
40. See §§ 473.013, .020, .053, .073, RSMo 1969.
41. Cf. Fratcher, Sovereign Immunity in Probate Proceedings, 31 Mo. L. Rxv.
127, 138 (1966).
42. See Thompson v. Butler, 136 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1943); Campbell v. St.
Louis Union Trust Co., 346 Mo. 200, 139 S.W.2d 985 (1940); Braeul v. Reuther,
270 Mo. 603, 193 S.W. 283 (1917); Watson v. Alderson, 146 Mo. 333, 48 S.W. 478(1898). See also IL.. REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 90 (1969); note 18 supra.
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